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1Abstract
Temporal binding refers to the perceptual attraction of causally related events, which are 
perceived as closer together in time than unrelated events. This effect is not only 
characterised by the perceived attraction of cause and effect, but also by a contraction of 
the interval separating the events. Since the original article on temporal binding (Haggard, 
Clarke, & Kalogeras, 2002), research has identified the conditions necessary for the effect to 
occur. While predictability and contiguity are both necessary, it is causality and not 
intentional action that is the root of the effect (Buehner, 2012). Despite this fruitful work, 
little is known about how temporal binding is realised. Event perception approaches suggest 
that binding arises as a realignment of sensory streams. Time perception approaches, in 
contrast, suggest that binding arises due to a changes in temporal perception during the 
interval. Given the precedence for the latter approach in the literature (Humphreys & 
Buehner, 2009; Wenke & Haggard, 2009), I therefore applied an internal clock model of time 
perception to temporal binding. In Experiments 1 – 4 (Chapter 3), I explored whether 
binding is effected by the general slowing of a rate of an internal clock. Participants made 
verbal estimates of either an interval (in causal and noncausal conditions), or of an 
unrelated event embedded either before or during the interval. I hypothesised that changes 
in a general clock rate would both affect intervals and embedded events, such that events 
embedded during causal intervals would be judged as shorter than those embedded during 
noncausal intervals. The results revealed that causal trial intervals were judged as shorter 
than noncausal intervals, while no effect was found for embedded events. These results 
suggested that binding is effected by clock processes specific to cause-effect intervals. 
Experiments 5 - 8 (Chapter 4) examined whether binding might arise either due to changes 
2in a specific clock rate or to differential timing latencies. Using a temporal discrimination 
procedure, participants judged whether a variable duration interval was shorter or longer 
than a reference interval. The point of subjective equality (PSE) was computed for each 
reference duration, and then modelled using regression. The results revealed a significant 
binding effect, but more importantly, significant differences in regression slopes between 
causal and noncausal conditions in three out of four experiments. These results supported 
the hypothesis of a slower clock rate in temporal binding. In Experiments 9 - 10 (Chapter 5) I 
verified the results of Chapter 4 by examining discrimination thresholds between two causal 
and two noncausal intervals. In both experiments (Chapter 5), higher just-noticeable-
difference (JND) thresholds were found in causal conditions, supporting the notion of a 
slower clock rate in cause-effect intervals. Taken together, the present body of work 
supports the notion that temporal binding is effected by a slower internal clock rate. Future 
experiments might investigate whether clock slowing in binding is driven by causality or 
predictability.    
31. Chapter 1: Time and causality
Unlike the processing of a picturesque scene or an acoustic experience, in which the 
information is available directly via respective visual and auditory systems, the information 
afforded to the processing of cause and effect is not direct. The human brain is not 
equipped with a ‘causality’ sense mode that can directly perceive the causal link between 
two events. To understand that event A caused event B is only possible by a process of 
inference, using various cues to form a causal impression. These cues, which largely hark 
back to Hume (1739/1888), strongly emphasise temporal components. For instance, to 
understand that A causes B is to first observe that the occurrence of A temporally precedes 
B (temporal priority). If there are sufficient experiences of this pairing, such that B almost 
always follows A, then we can be more certain that A causes B. This cue (contingency; Allan, 
1993; Elsner & Hommel, 2004; Mutter, DeCaro & Plumlee, 2009) can only be conveyed by 
repeated exposure to specific cause-effect pairs; if B follows A in 75 out of 100, and if B 
occurs on its own without A in 0 out of 100 trials, then we can be confident in judging A as 
the cause of B. If, however, B follows A in only 25 out of 100 occurrences, and if B occurs on 
its own without A in 75 out of 100 occurrences, then we are more likely to ascribe another 
event as a cause of B. Finally, a strong determinant of whether a causal impression is 
formed is temporal contiguity (Buehner & May, 2003; Buehner & McGregor, 2006; Shanks, 
Pearson & Dickinson, 1989). Consider pressing a button on a computer mouse or pressing a 
light switch, both of which are usually immediate outcomes of the pressing actions. What if 
pressing the mouse button did not immediately yield a response? Compare the following 
two conditions: pressing a mouse button triggers a small window to appear on screen 
immediately, versus a condition in which the window appears 20 seconds after pressing the 
4mouse button. Would both conditions trigger an equal-strength cause-effect link? Hume 
argued that causal impressions result when there is strong contiguity between two events. 
Therefore, causality is more likely to be felt when the window appears on screen 
immediately following the mouse button press, compared to the delayed (20 second) 
reaction. 
Of course, it is important to note that whilst the roles of temporal priority, 
contingency, and contiguity in causal induction are generally supported (Greville & Buehner, 
2015), there are exceptions. Prior knowledge, or beliefs about the relationship between two 
events can affect causal judgments (Buehner & May, 2003; Buehner & McGregor, 2006). If, 
to continue with the mouse button example above, we have prior knowledge of the 
expected delay between the action and the appearance of a small on-screen window, then 
the principle of temporal contiguity does not hold. For example, when clicking a mouse an 
hourglass symbol often appears, signifying that the request is being processed but, for 
whatever reason, is taking longer than usual. In this case we know that the mouse click has 
caused the outcome, even after a considerable delay. Despite the weak contiguity then, 
evinced with a delay between clicking the mouse and the desired result, the impression of 
causality remains. Thus, the impression of causality is affected not only by contingency and 
contiguity, but also by cognitive top-down mechanisms.
Causal associations are formed then, when one event follows another regularly and 
with contiguity. Of course, contiguity is not an absolute constant, but is situation 
dependent. Experiencing a delay between a mouse button press and an on-screen outcome 
on a computer may be expected, particularly if one has prior knowledge that the computer 
is slow in processing data. Conversely, a delay between activating the light switch and the 
bulb illuminating is unexpected, given that the connection is usually instant. Prior 
5knowledge about the expected time of outcome thus affects causal judgments (Buehner & 
McGregor, 2006). However, predicting the time of an outcome is not an easy task, chiefly 
because temporal information is not served by a dedicated sense modality (such as vision or 
audition). Instead, temporal information is based on a variety of factors, such as the 
modality of the stimulus (e.g., timing the duration of a sound or light stimulus; Wearden, 
Edwards, Fakhri & Percival, 1998), whether an interval is a single stimulus or delineated by 
two markers (Wearden, Norton, Martin & Montford-Bebb, 2007), the modality of the 
markers (e.g., the interval may be delineated by two auditory stimuli, two visual stimuli, or 
cross-modal combinations; Grondin, 2014), arousal (Droit-Volet, 2011) and attention (Tse, 
Intriligator, Rivest & Cavanagh, 2004). Judgments of time perception are therefore gleaned 
from a number of factors, making the temporal judgments particularly noisy.
Time then, affects our perception of causality. One might now reverse this statement 
by asking if causality affects our perception of time. From a Bayesian perspective, causality 
exerts a bias on time perception: If contiguous event pairs are more likely to be judged as 
causally related, then from a simple reversal, it follows that causally related events might be
more likely to be judged as contiguous (Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002; Parsons, Novich & 
Eagleman, 2013). Put simply, if events occurring closer together in time are more likely to be 
judged as causally related, then events with a causal relation are more likely to be judged as 
closer together in time than unrelated events. Empirical work finds evidence for such a bias, 
known generally as ‘temporal binding’. The remainder of this chapter introduces temporal 
binding and describes the necessary and modulating factors of this effect.
61.1.1. Temporal binding
In the first article to report the temporal binding effect, Haggard, Clarke and Kalogeras 
(2002) used the Libet clock method to study the subjective time of various events. Famously 
used by Libet and colleagues in their seminal work into human volition in the 1980s (Libet, 
Gleason, Wright & Pearl, 1983), this procedure involved participants observing a clock face, 
with marked intervals corresponding to a standard analogue clock. In contrast to a standard 
clock however, a spot would complete one rotation every 2560 ms. Participants judged the 
time of certain events by reporting the position of the spot when a particular event 
occurred. Haggard et al. used this method (in which a clock hand replaced the rotating spot 
of Libet et al.) to study the perceived time of actions and their outcomes. 
Figure 1.1. Results of Haggard, Clarke & Kalogeras (2002). In voluntary conditions, the key 
press was reported as occurring later, and the tone earlier, relative to the time events in the 
involuntary condition. Figure reproduced with permission.
There were two types of conditions in the experiment: baseline and operant. In 
baseline conditions, participants experienced single events. In some trials participants would 
7press a key, while in others they would experience a tone. In operant conditions, 
participants’ key presses triggered a tone after a 250 ms delay. The experiment was blocked 
so that participants judged the position of the clock hand either when they pressed a key or 
when a tone sounded. Judgement errors (the difference between reported and actual event 
times) were used as a measure of event awareness. The authors found a systematic shift in 
awareness for events in operant conditions. Specifically, key presses that triggered a tone 
were reported later, and tones earlier, than in single event baseline conditions (see Figure 
1.1). In other words, actions and outcomes were temporally attracted to each other. 
Figure 1.2. Schematic showing the trial structure of Cravo, Claessens and Baldo (2011). (A) In 
active or passive conditions, participants judged whether a flash occurred simultaneously 
with a beep. (B) The range of stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA) used in the Experiments. 
(C) Adaptation trials, designed to encourage participants’ attention to the beep. Figure 
reproduced with permission.
Importantly, the opposite effect was found for conditions when a tone followed an 
involuntary TMS-induced finger twitch such that involuntary actions and tones were 
temporally repulsed (note that in this condition the finger twitch did not cause the outcome 
8tone). Thus, it may be inferred that the interval between voluntary actions and outcomes is 
temporally contracted, relative to the involuntary action-outcome interval.
Many studies have since replicated this binding effect (see Moore & Obhi, 2012, for 
a review) using the Libet clock method. However, this method is not without its critics. 
Engbert and Wohlschlaeger (2007) criticise the method on the grounds of attention, 
claiming that the continual monitoring of the rotating spot (or hand) may distract from the 
cognitive process underpinning action control. A further criticism is the large variability of 
temporal estimates. In the original Haggard study (Haggard et al, 2002) effects of 46 and 96 
ms were found, using an identical procedure. According to Cravo, Claessens and Baldo 
(2011), this variability makes the quantitative comparisons of different conditions difficult. 
Although, it should be noted that high variability is commonplace in time perception and is 
not sufficient to abolish the binding effect, as Cravo et al. acknowledge. It simply means that 
saying the effect in one condition is larger than that in another by X milliseconds is difficult, 
due to the variability in judgments obtained across different experiments. Therefore, in 
order to investigate temporal binding without these confounds, Cravo et al. used a novel 
method. Drawing on psychophysical methods, the authors used simultaneity judgments as a 
proxy of event time, rather than the rotating spot method of the Libet clock. In their first 
experiment, participants completed two movement conditions; in active conditions, a 
voluntary finger lift triggered a tone after a 250 ms delay; in passive conditions, a tone 
sounded after a 250 ms delay following the disappearance of a visual stimulus (see Figure 
1.2). An additional flash stimulus was scheduled to appear either simultaneously with the 
tone or at various temporal asynchronies. For example, the flash might appear 25 ms before 
or 25 ms after the tone, up to a maximum temporal asynchrony of 200 ms. Binary responses 
were collected, with participants judging whether the tone and flash stimuli were 
9simultaneous or not. Fitted functions allowed the authors to determine the Point of 
Subjective Simultaneity (PSS) for each movement condition, and revealed a lower PSS in the 
active relative to the passive condition. Specifically, the flash had to be presented 
approximately 30 ms before the tone in active condition, and 10 ms before the tone in the 
passive condition, in order for tone and flash to be perceived as simultaneous. In other 
words, because the beep was perceived as occurring earlier in the active, relative to the 
passive condition, the flash required a shorter PSS in order to be perceived as occurring 
simultaneously with the beep. Thus, the study replicated the temporal binding effect of 
Haggard et al. (2002), with a shorter perceived interval between voluntary actions and 
outcomes. In this case however, the binding effect manifests as the difference between 
voluntary action and computer-generated events, rather than between voluntary and 
involuntary actions.  
Figure 1.3. Schematic showing the trial structure employed in Buehner and Humphreys 
(2009). Figure reproduced with permission.
10
A method related to that of Cravo et al. (2011) uses event anticipation instead of 
simultaneity judgments. Buehner and colleagues, for example, developed the Stimulus 
Anticipation Method (SAM) to replicate and extend the binding effect (Buehner & 
Humphreys, 2009; Buehner, 2012). In the SAM, participants have to press a key in 
anticipation of a target event (see Figure 1.3). A series of studies using the SAM has 
repeatedly demonstrated early anticipation of target events triggered by an action, relative 
to target events that followed, but were not triggered, by a preceding event. In other words, 
participants perceived the target event (in these studies a tone stimulus) to occur earlier 
when triggered by a voluntary action than when the target event was computer-generated. 
Thus, binding manifests as a perceived shift in cause and effect events, whether using the 
Libet clock, simultaneity judgments, or the SAM procedure.
1.1.2. Is binding effected by shifts in events or by a contraction of time? 
In addition to subjective shifts in events delineating intervals, many researchers 
have found temporal binding when directly investigating interval timing. This is a more 
direct and appropriate method of assessing temporal contraction in binding because event 
perception methods, such as the Libet clock, are based on inferred temporal contraction. 
For example, as Repp (2011) is careful to point out, there are two temporal binding effects: 
first, there is a shift of the action (or cause) forward towards the outcome; second, there is a 
shift of the outcome backward toward the action. Of course, the Libet clock method only 
measures one event (i.e., action or outcome) on any given trial. Typically, binding is defined 
as the judged error between the actual and experienced event time, so that the total 
judgment error is the sum of the (experienced - actual action time) + (actual - experienced 
outcome time). Thus, a larger judgment error in cause effect conditions reflects (implicitly) a 
shorter cause-effect interval. The downside with this method is that perceived interval 
11
duration is based upon judgments of events computed on different trials. Therefore, making 
inferences about interval perception using event perception (i.e., Libet clock) methods is an 
indirect proxy at best. A better method would be to assess action and outcome events on 
the same trial, but this is too difficult a task. Therefore, direct judgments of the interval are 
used, which are usually interval estimation (often called verbal estimation) or reproduction 
(Wearden, 2008). In the former, participants must provide an estimate of a stimulus’ 
duration in ms, either by typing a number into a computer or by using a continuous rating 
scale. In the latter, participants reproduce the experienced duration by holding down a key 
for a particular length of time. A number of studies have used these more direct measures 
of interval perception, which I now describe.
Using interval estimation, Humphreys and Buehner (2009) found estimates of 
intervals separating actions and outcomes to be lower than intervals separating two 
unrelated events. Other studies have also replicated the binding effect using this interval 
estimation procedure (Cravo, Haddad, Claessens & Baldo, 2013; Engbert, Wohlschlager & 
Haggard, 2008; Moore, Wegner & Haggard, 2009; Wenke & Haggard, 2009). Humphreys and 
Buehner (2009) also replicated the effect using temporal reproduction. They found shorter 
reproduced action-outcome intervals than intervals separated by two unrelated events. 
Using psychophysical methods, Nolden, Haering and Kiesel (2012) used a method of 
constant stimuli, in which participants judged comparison intervals as longer or shorter than 
a standard interval. Psychophysical functions were then fitted to the responses to 
determine the point of subjective equality (PSE). In line with other interval perception 
methods, the authors found lower PSEs for intervals separated by a key press and its 
outcome, than for intervals separated by two causally unrelated events. In other words, 
judging comparison and standard intervals to be of equal duration required a lower duration 
12
threshold in action-outcome intervals, than in intervals marked by unrelated events. Thus, 
the results of Nolden et al. further support the finding that binding manifests as a 
contraction of the cause-effect interval, in addition to perceived event shifts.
1.1.3. Basic conditions of temporal binding: Predictability, contiguity, and contingency
In the studies mentioned so far, one thing is evident: temporal binding occurs only in 
conditions that involve intentional action. Are there other factors necessary for the binding 
effect, or is intentional action sufficient? Buehner and Humphreys (2009) found that 
intentional action per se, is not sufficient to elicit temporal binding. Participants in this study 
were told to synchronise their key presses with two tones (T1 and T2) in separate blocks. In 
a causal condition, T2 was contingent upon the key press, whereas T2 in the noncausal 
condition always followed by, but was causally unrelated to, T1. In other words, participants 
learnt that in noncausal trials, pressing the key in synchrony with T1 did not trigger T2, 
which followed T1 regardless of whether a key was pressed. However, in causal trials, 
participants learnt that T2 only followed a key press. Using the SAM, the authors found early 
awareness of T2 in causal, relative to noncausal trials. The authors argue that intentional 
action in itself is insufficient for temporal binding. Instead, it is the causal connection 
between action and outcome that is necessary for binding to occur. Thus, merely intending 
to perform an action is not sufficient to elicit temporal binding; it is the causal link between 
action and outcome that is essential. 
The original Haggard et al. (2002) study considered the roles of predictability and 
temporal contiguity. In their second experiment the authors varied the action-outcome 
delay using durations of 250, 450 and 650 ms. By considering the subjective time of the 
outcome tone only, the authors found a decrease in the magnitude of the binding effect as 
interval length increased. Also, temporal binding was strongest when the action-outcome 
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delay was constant over trials; when the intervals randomly alternated, temporal binding 
diminished or disappeared altogether. Thus, temporal binding was strongest when the 
outcome was both predictable and contiguous.   
The results of Cravo et al. (2011), in the study described above, support this finding. 
Cravo et al. used simultaneity judgments as a proxy of event awareness. In their study, the 
authors also included conditions in which the action-outcome interval was fixed (300 or 600 
ms) or variable. When the interval was predictable but long (600 ms) the effect decreased, 
compared to conditions in which the interval was predictable and short (300 ms). Their 
results also revealed that binding was strongest at predictable (set), rather than random 
interval durations. Thus predictability and contiguity are both necessary for temporal 
binding.
Figure 1.4. Schematic of the apparatus in Engbert and Wohlschlaeger (2007). Figure 
reproduced with permission.
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Engbert and Wohlschlaeger (2007) also demonstrated the interaction of 
predictability and intentional action. In their study, participants viewed a miniature Libet 
clock projected onto a response box, upon which the participants’ finger was placed (see 
Figure 1.4). Measuring only the time of action, the authors found that when an action 
triggered a tone on two-thirds of trials, the action subjectively shifted towards the tone to a 
greater extent than when the action triggered the tone with a one-third contingency. This 
difference did not hold for conditions where a tone merely followed a computer-generated 
action (see Figure 1.5). 
Figure 1.5. Results of Engbert and Wohlschlaeger (2007). Judgment errors (reported time –
actual time) of action. The action was subjectively delayed in conditions where the effect 
was intended, whether the effect actually occurred or not. No delay was found in the 
unintended condition. Figure reproduced with permission.
Moore and Haggard (2008) further investigated predictability in temporal binding. 
The authors were interested in isolating the roles of predictive and retrospective processes. 
Specifically, the former refer to models of motor control, where voluntary actions involve a 
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prediction of the action’s consequence. The latter, retrospective component, relies on 
inferential processes to establish the cause of an effect. Using the Libet clock method, 
participants’ voluntary key presses produced tones after two different contingency levels: in 
a predictable condition, key presses triggered tones on 75% of trials, with the remaining 
25% trials featuring key presses only. In an unpredictable condition, key presses triggered 
tones on 50% of trials with key presses only on the remaining 50%. Therefore, the authors 
were able to contrast trials in which key presses triggered outcomes, with trials in trials in 
which only key presses occurred. To isolate the predictive and retrospective components, 
Moore and Haggard analysed the reported action time in action-only trials (the authors did 
not measure the reported time of the outcome). These analyses revealed a larger subjective 
shift in predictable versus unpredictable conditions. This means that even when no outcome 
actually occurred, participants’ reported actions were shifted forward in time, supporting 
the role of predictability in binding. Additionally, the results also a revealed a larger forward 
shift of reported action time in action-outcome trials, relative to action-only trials, in the 
unpredictable condition. Given that the outcome tone was unpredictable in action-outcome 
trials, the authors suggest that the presence of the outcome tone was responsible for the 
results, such that the tone was retrospectively shifted. This was later replicated and 
somewhat extended in Moore, Lagnado, Deal and Haggard (2009). Using a similar method,
the authors found both that predictive and retrospective shifts were sensitive to 
contingency; higher contingency resulted in stronger binding. In sum then, predictability, 
contiguity, and contingency are not only necessary for causal inference, but also for 
temporal binding. However, none are sufficient for the binding effect; Instead, the literature 
is divided between intentional action and causality as the roof of the effect.
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1.1.4. Is intentional action or causality at the root of temporal binding?
From the studies reviewed above it should be apparent that two key comparisons 
are used to evidence the temporal binding effect. One is between intentional and 
unintentional conditions (e.g., Haggard et al, 2002), while the other is between causal and 
noncausal conditions (e.g., Humphreys & Buehner, 2009; Zhao, Chen, Yan & Fu, 2013). The 
former comparison, used extensively by Haggard and colleagues, suggests that temporal 
binding is a product of intentional action; the absence of a binding effect in conditions 
where an outcome is generated by an unintended action, implicates the role of intentions, 
i.e., binding emerges as a consequence of intended actions. The latter comparison is 
broader in scope, implicating the more general role of causality in temporal binding. Does 
temporal binding then reflect intentional action or causality? For instance, consider 
observing another individual performing a temporal binding task, in which an action triggers 
an outcome after a short delay on every trial. Would there be a binding effect for participant 
and observer, or participant only? If binding reflects a process unique to self-generated 
motor commands, then no effect should be found for the observer. However, the evidence 
reviewed above finds that the basic conditions necessary for temporal binding (i.e., a 
meaningful causal connection between cause and effect) are also involved in causal 
perception. Accurately predicting the outcome of an action is improved when the interval 
between cause and effect is short (temporal contiguity), and when the outcome always 
follows the cause (contingency). Therefore, if causality is at the root of temporal binding 
(Buehner, 2012), there should an effect for the observer, in addition to the participant. I will 
explore the intentional account first. 
Researchers (e.g., Engbert et al, 2008; Haggard & Clark, 2003; Tsakiris & Haggard, 
2003) often explain binding in terms of a dedicated process of voluntary action. According to 
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this position, temporal binding is generated by processes dedicated to motor control 
(Moore & Obhi, 2012), which usually involve forward models of motor control (Wolpert & 
Miall, 1996; Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000). These models express the action-outcome 
relation by generating predictions based on efferent copies of motor commands. At the 
time of movement an efferent copy is generated and processed by a dedicated motor 
control system, which in turn predicts the action’s effect. When the prediction is matched 
by sensory feedback, the intensity of the signal is attenuated, leading to a less intense
experience (Blakemore, Frith & Wolpert, 1999). Tsakiris and Haggard’s (2003) results 
support this motor-predictive approach, with a binding effect for actions that triggered a 
somatic outcome (a TMS-induced twitch of an index finger). Also, somatic effects for 
voluntary-triggered actions were less intense than those for triggered by involuntary 
actions. 
Evidence for ‘intentional’ binding appears in a study by Engbert and Wohlschlaeger 
(2007), who investigated whether intentions are necessary for temporal binding. Using the 
Libet clock method, participants were told that a section of the clock would be illuminated 
for a brief period. This period, they were told, was subliminal and would not be consciously 
perceived. Participants were told to press a key during this illumination period and were 
given feedback about their success (a tone either signalled a hit or miss during this target 
zone, depending on the condition). In reality, there was no such illumination period; it 
merely served as a cover story to provide meaning and intention to participants’ actions. In 
the first experiment, participants either intended to produce an effect (in one conditions) or 
tried to avoid producing the effect (in another condition). Using the reported time of action 
as a measure of binding, the results (see Figure 1.5) revealed a delayed awareness of action 
when intending to produce the outcome (i.e., when a tone signalled a ‘hit’). Importantly, 
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this result held even for trials in which no outcome actually occurred, although the delay 
was greater when the intended action actually resulted in an outcome. In the condition 
where participants avoided producing the outcome tone, no delayed awareness of action 
was found (regardless of whether an outcome actually occurred). Engbert and
Wohlschlaeger concluded that intentional action is necessary for the binding effect.
Engbert et al (2008) examined binding within the context of self-, other- and
machine-generated actions. The authors directly examined the temporal perception of the 
interval, rather than employ an event perception method. Their results revealed binding in 
only the self-generated action condition, leading the authors to conclude that binding is 
specifically a product of motor action, and is due to efferent motor commands. 
The studies by Engbert et al. (2007; 2008) provide compelling evidence that binding 
is linked with forward models. However, Wohlschlaeger, Haggard, Gesierich and Prinz 
(2003) found binding for both self- and other-generated action conditions but no effect in 
machine-generated conditions. While forward models can explain the effect in self-
generated conditions, they cannot account for the results in the other-generated action 
condition. Instead, the authors suggest that in the other-generated condition, participants 
adopted an intentional stance (Dennet, 1987), in which agency is attributed to other 
individuals. According to this view, individuals have access to their own private intentions, 
which generate the conscious awareness of action. By analogy with our own conscious 
intentions, individuals are able to infer the intentions of others based on their actions. This 
is similar to theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1995), in which the beliefs of other individuals are 
represented in our own minds. The authors suggest that representations of others’ actions 
likely develop before the representations of others’ beliefs, stressing that understanding the 
actions of other individuals is key to social understanding (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). The 
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authors further explain that the lack of binding in the machine-generated condition is due to 
the inability to represent the actions, and thus infer the intentions, of a mechanical object. 
Therefore, the results of this study suggest that binding emerges as a process of intentional 
attribution, both to ourselves and to others.
However, the results of Buehner (2012) challenge this intentional account of binding. 
Buehner found temporal binding in self-, other- and machine-generated conditions. Using 
the SAM, Buehner found early anticipation of the outcome in all three causal conditions, 
relative to a noncausal (baseline) condition. The author argues that causality, not intentional 
action, is the driving force of temporal binding. Indeed, Buehner suggests that it is causality 
that is responsible for the lack of binding in machine trials in Wohlschlaeger et al. (2003), 
not the inability to attribute intentions to mechanical objects; it might have been evident to 
participants that the computer was controlling the machine, thus obfuscating the causal link 
between machine action and outcome. In other words, outcomes might have been merely 
associated with their triggers in the machine-generated condition, analogous to a typical 
noncausal observational condition whereby an outcome follows, but is not caused by, a 
preceding event. The apparatus in Buehner’s study likely ensured that the machine was 
perceived as autonomous mechanical agent, such that the machine caused (and was not 
merely associated with) the outcome. This situation might not have been sufficiently 
credible in Wohlschlaeger et al. Therefore, a binding of action and outcomes is indeed 
possible in machine generated conditions, providing there is a clearly perceived causal link. 
Thus, Buehner’s results provide compelling evidence for the role of causality in temporal 
binding, over and above intentional action. 
Whether temporal binding is rooted in causality or intentional action is still an on-
going debate in the literature. More empirical work is necessary to fully lay claim to a causal 
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basis of binding. However, note that causal and intentional accounts of temporal binding are 
not mutually exclusive. The causal perspective is broader in scope and the intentional 
account is a special case of ‘causal’ binding. The key focus is the causal connection between 
action (or cause) and outcome, and the extent to which self-actions are involved. It may 
simply be the case that binding is stronger in voluntary conditions because there is less 
ambiguity about the cause-effect relation. In contrast, there is likely more ambiguity when 
observing cause-effect events generated by others human individuals, or possibly to a 
greater extent, by machines.  
1.1.5. Learning, prior belief and knowledge
Related to the notion of causal ambiguity is that of learning. The evidence reviewed 
above finds that learning is an important factor in temporal binding, at least on an implicit 
level. In order to better predict the outcome of an action it is necessary to experience 
multiple cause-effect pairings, during which, causal information can be learnt; contingency 
and contiguity requires repeated exposure to cause-effect pairs, both of which increase the 
level of predictability. To what extent then, are prior knowledge and beliefs involved in 
temporal binding? 
Cravo, Haddad, Claessens and Baldo (2013) investigated the effects of prior bias and 
learning in temporal binding. Using interval estimation, in which participants make direct 
temporal judgments of the interval, the authors replicated the binding effect with shorter 
estimates in operant conditions (relative to observational conditions, in which an interval 
was separated by two computer-generated events). More importantly, though, Cravo et al. 
found that interval estimates became shorter throughout the block in both conditions. That 
is, intervals subjectively decreased with repeated exposure. However, this trend was not 
sufficient to explain the binding effect, i.e., the difference in magnitude between conditions 
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did not increase as a function of trial number, it remained the same from trial one onwards. 
Given that this difference was evident during the first trial, the authors rule out learning 
effects. Instead, they suggest that participants had different prior biases for operant, 
relative to observational conditions. Thus, the results suggest a different bias for causal 
intervals than noncausal. 
If temporal binding reflects a causal bias, as the results of Cravo et al. (2013) suggest, 
then to what extent are beliefs about the cause-effect relation involved? If participants in 
Cravo et al. were told that only half of all key presses produced outcomes but the actual 
contingency remained at 100%, then would the binding effect decrease in line with 
participants’ beliefs? Desantis, Roussel and Waszak (2011) investigated the role of belief in 
the context of temporal binding by manipulating the apparent source of the outcome. 
Participants were led to believe that either their actions or a partner’s actions produced an 
outcome, or the cause was ambiguous (both might have cause the outcome). In reality, the 
participant always caused the outcome; cues indicating the source were presented prior to 
action. Desantis et al. found a stronger binding effect when the participants believed they 
themselves caused the outcome, relative to the belief that their partner caused the 
outcome. The authors suggest that a priori causal beliefs can affect the predictive motoric 
processes of the forward model, such that motor prediction and actual feedback are closer 
matched when ‘I’ cause the outcome. Of course, these results also fit well with the more 
general causal account of temporal binding. Participants both were informed and could 
doubtlessly perceive a causal link between action and outcome, whether they believed their 
or their partner caused the outcome. The stronger binding in the self-belief action condition 
may simply reflect the close match between motor prediction and actual feedback, thus 
providing an additional boost above to observed causation. However, whether rooted in 
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causality or intentionality, the important point is that binding seems to be sensitive to 
higher-level contextual information. 
To conclude this chapter, binding occurs not only in the perceived shifts in events 
delineating intervals, but also manifests as a contraction of the interval itself. The evidence 
reviewed above finds that the principles underlying causal inference (such as regularity, 
contingency and contiguity) are all necessary conditions for binding to occur. However, 
these conditions – whilst necessary – are not sufficient. The issue of whether binding is 
attributable to intentional action or to causality, has divided opinion in the literature. Whilst 
Haggard (e.g., Haggard & Clark, 2003) maintains that binding is a product of intentional, 
relative to unintentional actions, other researchers (e.g., Buehner, 2012; Buehner & 
Humphreys, 2009) evidence causality as the sufficient condition. Implicated in the latter 
perspective are the roles of prior knowledge and belief, both of which influence the 
magnitude of the binding effect. Regardless, though, of whether causality or intentional 
actions are the sufficient conditions for binding, the key question is how causality biases 
temporal judgments, i.e., by what processes do causally related events bind together in 
time? Eagleman argues that binding occurs due to a realignment of perceptual streams 
(Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002; Parsons, Novich & Eagleman, 2013). Another view is that 
causality directly affects time perception, such that temporal binding occurs due to actual 
changes to perceived inter-event intervals. In this thesis I investigate the latter idea, of 
whether actual changes in time perception may be realized in temporal binding. First, 
however, I will describe event and time perception approaches in the following chapter.
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2. Chapter 2: Theories of time perception and their application to 
temporal binding
In this chapter I describe theories of temporal binding. Specifically, I describe 
theories of how binding is effected (i.e., by what process is binding brought about), rather 
than theories that describe why binding occurs (see Chapter 1 for a discussion of these). 
Theoretical explanations of binding can be split into two classes: event and time perception 
theories. Event perception approaches place emphasis on the events delineating cause-
effect intervals, such that the cause (action) is shifted forward and its outcome backward in 
time (Haggard et al., 2002). This perceptual shift in events affects interval judgments, such 
that the cause-effect interval is perceived as shorter than an interval delineated by 
unrelated events. The key point here is that cause-effect intervals are perceived as shorter 
simply due to the shift in cause and outcome events. The time perception approach differs 
to the event perspective in that shorter judged cause-effect intervals are not merely a by-
product of event shifts, but posit an actual change to our temporal perception of the 
interval. This is essentially the reverse of the event perspective, in that cause and outcome 
events are temporally shifted together because of a change in our perception of the interval 
(although, note that the theories are not mutually exclusive: it is equally possible for 
changes in time and event perception to occur simultaneously). 
I will first describe theories of time perception, before briefly describing event 
perception approaches to temporal binding. I will conclude this chapter by explaining how a 
time perception model can explain temporal binding.  
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2.1.1. Time perception accounts
Temporal binding paradigms involve the judgments of upcoming events (or 
intervals). Participants know in advance that judgments of an interval, for example, are 
required; participants are usually presented with an interval, and make judgments of its 
duration after its presentation. This is known as prospective timing; although judgments are 
made after exposure to the interval, participants know in advance that temporal judgments 
are required. In retrospective paradigms, in contrast, an individual is unaware that timing 
judgments are required until after the event. The key difference between the two is that 
retrospective judgments are implicit and derived from episodic memory, while prospective 
timing is explicit and requires attention to temporal information (Block & Gruber, 2014; 
Zakay & Block, 2004). Therefore, judgments of duration depend on whether or not a person 
is aware that temporal judgments are required; theoretical models that account for 
prospective timing cannot be applied to remembered durations (i.e., retrospective timing). 
Since temporal binding involves the judgments of upcoming events, I will focus on 
prospective timing for the remainder of this thesis. 
2.1.2. Internal clock models: Basic components
The most popular and indeed, most successful, models of timing represent perceived 
durations with a pacemaker-accumulator system (Creelman, 1962; Treisman, 1963). Also 
known as a clock-counter device, this timing system is based on the idea that humans use an 
internal clock on timing tasks. There are three sub-processes to this model (see Figure 2.1). 
First, the clock stage consists of a pacemaker-accumulator system that is responsible for the 
emission and counting of pulses. When timing a stimulus, a switch closes that allow the 
pulses to flow from the pacemaker into the accumulator. When timing is complete the 
switch opens, thereby stopping the pulses from flowing. Second, the pulses accrued during 
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the timing of a stimulus are stored in working memory, which are then compared to a long-
term memory store for a particular duration. Third is the decision process, which might 
involve judging whether the duration in working memory is shorter or longer than a 
reference stimulus, or in other cases, providing an explicit duration judgment. 
Figure 2.1. The information-processing model of Gibbon and Church (1984).
An example will suffice here. Consider a task where you are required to judge the duration 
of a tone, with an actual duration of 500 ms. When the tone begins the switch closes, 
allowing pulses to flow from the pacemaker to the accumulator. When the tone ends the 
switch opens, and no further pulses are accumulated. The number of pulses accumulated 
forms the basis of the temporal judgment; more pulses lead to longer perceived durations 
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and fewer pulses to shorter perceived durations. For this example, assume that the 5 pulses 
have accumulated, that each represent 100 ms (i.e., the judgment is veridical). This duration 
is then compared to a long-term store and evaluated - is the working memory duration 
longer, shorter or the same as the duration in reference memory? In the present example 
both durations are the same, and a judgment of 500 ms is given. However, judgments of 
time are rarely veridical, such that judgments of duration are either overestimated or 
underestimated. One factor that affects time perception, is arousal (Bar-Haim, Kerem, Lamy, 
& Zakay, 2010; Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007). For example, a 500 ms stimulus would be 
perceived as longer under emotionally charged, relative to neutral conditions. This fits well 
with a pacemaker-accumulator system, such that arousal increases pacemaker rate, which 
then results in a longer subjective interval. Thus, the internal clock model is parsimonious, in 
that the pulses emitted from the accumulator can account for a wide variety of temporal 
phenomena. 
2.1.3. Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET)
A popular instantiation of the internal clock model is scalar expectancy theory 
(Gibbon, 1977; but see Allen, 1998; and Wearden & Lejeune, 2008, for reviews). The central 
idea behind SET is that timing sensitivity remains constant across a range of durations. In 
other words, the variability in temporal judgments can be rescaled as a function of stimulus 
duration (Grondin, 2010). A method of computing this scalar component is to divide the 
standard deviation by the mean for a range of durations. This is a type of Weber fraction, 
known as the coefficient of variation (CV). There are various sources of variability within 
SET, but in general, human timing conforms to this scalar property of variance, with the CV 
remaining constant for a range of durations (for a review of this scalar component in 
humans, see Wearden & Lejeune, 2008; and for animals, see Lejeune & Wearden, 2006). 
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Another feature of SET is the finding that, despite being inaccurate, human timing is 
nevertheless precise. That is, participants perform with reasonable precision across a range 
of durations, such that subjective judgments tend to increase linearly with real-time 
durations (Grondin, 2001, 2010; Wearden, 2004; Wearden & Lejeune, 2008). This - mean 
accuracy - is a further property of SET, which is that subjective times are average 
approximations of real durations. 
Why is the scalar property important? Wearden (2003) provides an appropriate 
example. Imagine testing the time perception of two different populations - children and 
adults. Performance will undoubtedly differ between each group, as would the performance 
of adults compared to the elderly, and brain damaged patients compared to healthy 
controls. This merely demonstrates that different groups of people perform differently on 
timing tasks; it does not provide any insight into why performance is different. The 
application of SET allows researchers to provide more probable and meaningful surmises as 
to the underlying cause of performance differences. Chiefly, SET allows for the underlying 
variability to between populations to be computed, rather than simply compare mean 
scores.
2.1.4. Measuring perceived time: discrimination methods
Time perception researchers use a range of techniques to measure perceived time. 
Some take the form of discrimination experiments, which involve judging whether a 
particular duration is shorter or longer than another. Examples of discrimination methods 
involve temporal generalization (McCormack, Brown, Maylor, Darby & Green, 1999; 
Wearden, 1992), bisection (Allan & Gibbon, 1991; Wearden 1991), and adaptive 
psychophysical procedures that determine a temporal threshold (Rammsayer, 1999). Other 
‘classical’ methods use direct estimates of intervals, such as providing verbal estimates (in 
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milliseconds [ms] or seconds [s] perhaps) or reproducing an interval by holding down a key 
for a certain duration. Examples of classical approaches involve interval estimation (Penton-
Voak, Edwards, Percival & Wearden, 1996), reproduction (Wearden, 2003), and production 
(Wearden & McShane, 1998). I shall first describe discrimination methods then classical 
techniques. 
The temporal generalization procedure is rather elegant in its simplicity. It involves 
asking participants if a duration is equal to another. In a learning phase, participants learn 
the duration of a reference stimulus. In a test phase a series of comparison durations 
shorter than, equal to, and longer than the reference are presented. Participants then judge 
whether each comparison duration is equal to the reference duration, yielding a YES/NO 
response. Results are obtained by computing the proportion of YES responses for all 
comparison durations tested. Correct identification of the reference stimulus is ascertained 
by examining the proportion of YES responses when the reference and comparison stimuli 
are equal. A higher proportion of YES responses indicate that intervals in one condition are 
perceived as longer than another. Moreover, timing sensitivity can be assessed by using a
variety of reference durations; by plotting the response curves from different reference 
durations on the same scale and plot (a method known as superimposing), timing sensitivity 
can be ascertained. Aligned curves (i.e., superimposed) imply that timing sensitivity is 
constant. Thus, mean accuracy and timing sensitivity can both be assessed using temporal 
generalization.
Another procedure, similar to generalization, is the temporal bisection task. 
Participants are again exposed to test and comparison intervals but the procedure is slightly 
different. In a training phase, participants are exposed to two stimuli, of short and long 
durations. In a test phase, a series of comparison intervals between, and including, the test 
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durations are presented. For any comparison duration presented, participants judge 
whether the stimulus is closer to the short or the long duration. Results are obtained by 
estimating the PSE (point of subjective equality), defined as the point at which 50% of the 
responses are judged as closer to long; a lower PSE in one condition shows that the stimuli 
are perceived as longer (i.e., longer perceived stimuli would require a shorter duration to be 
judged as equal to a reference stimulus). Moreover, the scalar component can be assessed
either by superimposing the curves, or by calculating the CV, which involves dividing the just 
noticeable difference (JND: the actual stimulus change necessary to be detectable, 
computed as 75 - 25% response probability/2) by the PSE. In the former case, if the 
deviation to the mean is constant (for different ranges of durations), then the curves ought 
to superimpose. In the latter case, the JND and PSE are analogous to the standard deviation
and the mean, respectively. The strength of temporal bisection then, like the generalization 
procedure, is that participants are only required to judge whether a test stimulus is shorter 
or longer than a reference stimulus (this is in contrast to making explicit duration 
judgments).  
There is another method that involves the discrimination of reference and 
comparison intervals, but in this case the duration of the comparison intervals vary from 
trial to trial. This task, known as a temporal discrimination procedure, use adaptive staircase 
methods procedures to vary the intensity of a test stimulus (Cornsweet, 1962; Johnson, 
1992; Leek, 2001; Spielmann, 2013). In a typical experiment (e.g., Rammsayer, 1999),
participants are presented with the reference and comparison intervals, the order of which 
might vary from trial to trial. Participants are asked to judge which interval is the longest, or 
whether one interval is longer or shorter than the other. The duration of the comparison 
interval is controlled by a staircase procedure; if participants respond ‘correct’ then the 
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comparison interval is increased in duration on the next trial. On the other hand, if 
participants responded ‘incorrect’ then the duration of the comparison interval is decreased 
on the next trial. Studies usually target the threshold at which the participant is correct on 
75% of trials, but it is also possible to determine either the PSE or JND by fitting 
psychophysical functions. To calculate the CV using this technique, a ratio of the JND/PSE 
may be computed (Wearden & Lejeune, 2008). In sum, adaptive methods, like 
generalization and bisection techniques, provide an effective way of exploring temporal 
perception.  
2.1.5. Measuring perceived time: ‘classical’ methods
Classical methods of time perception differ to discrimination methods in that no 
reference durations are presented. Verbal estimation, for example, involves making 
subjective estimates of an interval without prior exposure to a reference stimulus (e.g., 
Wearden, Norton, Martin & Montford-Bebb, 2007). Therefore, the judgment of an interval 
in the first trial is based on long-term internal reference memory. Participants are usually 
exposed to a range of durations, and are required provide explicit duration estimates. Mean 
accuracy is assessed by inspecting the linear trend in mean judgments; judgments should 
increase with actual durations. The CV (standard deviation/mean) should be constant if 
scalar variability is supported. Interval estimation, despite no external reference stimulus, is 
a popular and effective method in time perception research.  
Other techniques are temporal reproduction and production. Reproduction involves 
holding a key for a duration corresponding to a perceived interval. Production, on the other 
hand, involves holding a key for a given duration; an experimenter might instruct the 
participant to hold a key for 300 ms, for example. In this case, the participant will have an 
internal representation of 300 ms and hold the key down for the perceived duration. The 
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basic difference is that in reproduction, participants are presented with an interval and then 
required to reproduce it, whereas no interval is presented in experiments involving the 
production technique. However, both techniques are commonplace in time perception 
research. 
2.1.6. Disentangling internal clock processes
Research using discrimination and classical techniques show that human timing may 
be precise, but not accurate (Grondin, 2010; Wearden, 2003). That is, perceived durations 
tend to increase linearly with actual stimulus durations but are rarely veridical. What 
accounts for this inaccuracy? One source is pacemaker reliability (Grondin, 2010; Wearden 
& Lejeune, 2008), such that the rate of the pacemaker varies according to different 
conditions. Another is that the switch to start and stop timing is delayed. How can 
pacemaker reliability and switch latencies be disentangled? Consider a study of Wearden et 
al. (1998) on the temporal perception of auditory and visual stimuli. In their Experiment 2, 
participants estimated a range of durations (from 77 - 1181 ms) in both modalities. 
Wearden et al then conducted individual participant regressions, by regressing interval 
estimates onto the actual stimulus durations. The coefficients of these regressions 
represent different aspects of the internal clock model: the slope coefficient represents 
pacemaker rate, while the intercept represents switch latencies. Therefore, differences 
between slope coefficients would imply that timing in auditory and visual modalities are 
effected by different pacemaker rates. Meanwhile, differences between intercept 
coefficients would imply different switch latencies between the modalities, such that there 
is a greater stop/start delay in one modality. Their results revealed no difference between 
intercepts but a significant difference between slope coefficients. In particular, the slope of 
the visual condition was shallower than the auditory condition, implying a relatively slower 
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pacemaker for visual stimuli. Interestingly, evidence shows that the pacemaker also runs at
different rate for filled versus unfilled stimuli (Wearden et al., 2007), for stimuli preceded 
versus not preceded by clicks (Penton-Voak et al., 1996), and for loud versus quiet tones 
(Matthews, Stewart, & Wearden, 2011). Overall, there is a substantial body of evidence 
demonstrating that variation in pacemaker rate can account for the inaccuracies found in 
time perception (Matthews, 2011; Matthews & Meck, 2014).
Can switch latencies account for differences in judgments of timing? There is scant 
evidence for this. The majority of temporal illusions evidence variable pacemaker rates. 
However, buoyed by these findings, Matthews (2011) investigated whether switch latencies 
ever occur. In the first experiment, participants estimated a range of intervals marked by 
different visual events. In both conditions the stimuli marking the start of intervals were 
different in size than those marking the end, such that the end-of-interval marker was either 
substantially or slightly different in size from the first marker. Trials began with either the 
smallest or largest square first; in small first trials, the second marker was either 
substantially or slightly larger (deemed large or small jump conditions, respectively). In large 
first trials, analogously, the second marker was smaller in size by either a small or large 
jump. The intention was to determine if intercept differences can be found, when 
pacemaker rate differences are impossible, i.e., because the first marker and the interval are 
identical for small and large jump conditions, any difference in estimates can only be due to 
switch latency at the end of the interval. Matthews’ results revealed differences in 
intercepts only, between conditions where the marker size difference was either large or 
small, providing evidence that intercept differences can occur. However, in his Experiment 
3, there were conditions in which the stimuli marking the start of the intervals were the 
same in both in conditions, but crucially, the end of interval markers differed in size 
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between conditions. The logic of this approach was that the pacemaker cannot change rate 
at the start of the interval because the same sequence of events are common to both 
conditions. Nevertheless, Matthews found evidence of slope differences, implying different 
pacemaker rates. It is not clear why this was the case, but nevertheless, the key point is that 
Matthews’ study provides rare evidence that intercept differences can occur.  
In sum, internal clock models explain differences in subjective time under various 
conditions as arising either from different pacemaker rates or switch latencies.  
2.1.7. What modulates subjective time? Top-down factors
In the section above I described how pacemaker rate and switch latencies can 
account for subjective distortions of time, and how regression analyses can disentangle 
these processes. The question now is, what are the factors that distort subjective time? 
A fundamental factor in time perception research is attention (Tse, Intriligator, 
Rivest & Cavanagh, 2004). This is commonly used to explain perceived durations (Grondin, 
2010), such that attending to time increases subjective duration. Within the SET framework, 
attention is purported to operate via switch latencies, such that the attentional switch is not 
synchronous with veridical timing. The switch may operate at different latencies, depending 
on attentional demands in the particular context. Is the increase in perceived duration 
merely due to the amount of information processed or to increased attention? Tse et al. 
addressed this question. They argued that because attention requires ~120 ms to allocate to 
a new stimulus, that any subjective expansion effect should not be found under these 
durations if only attention is involved. Additionally, they argued that because attention is a 
central mechanism, then its effects should not be modality specific. The authors used the 
oddball paradigm, in which an expanding black circle (the oddball) was embedded within a 
sequence of static black circles (standard stimuli). They found that the oddball was 
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perceived as longer than the standard stimuli, an effect that also occurred with a static 
oddball, and with auditory stimuli. Importantly, they found no subjective expansion at the 
lowest duration tested (75 ms), but the effect was evident at durations above 135 ms. Tse et 
al. therefore attribute the effect to increased attention for oddball stimuli. Thus, attentional 
capture distorts subjective time, an effect that has been replicated by Eagleman and 
colleagues (Eagleman, 2008; Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007). 
An ubiquitous idea in time perception is that attention is resource limited. In dual-
task paradigms, a concurrent (non-temporal) task interferes with timing, such that durations 
are perceived as shorter (Brown, 2006, 2008; Brown & Merchant, 2007) relative to single-
task conditions. Interestingly, research also shows that time perception is affected by a 
preceding non-temporal task. Wearden, O’Rourke, Matchwick, Min & Maeers (2010) found 
that switching between an addition task and a timing task resulted in decreased duration 
judgments. Furthermore, time perception is also affected when timing multiple, partially 
overlapping stimuli; temporal accuracy is shown to decrease as the number of events to be 
timed increases (Klapproth, 2011). In general then, time perception suffers as attentional 
demand increases, supporting the notion that attention is resource limited. 
When reviewing the factors that distort subjective time, one must necessarily 
include arousal. To be clear, arousal is an umbrella term for a range of specific factors. For 
example, emotional (Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007) and physiological factors (Tamm, Jakobson, 
Havik, Burk, Timpmann, & Allik et al, 2013) affect subjective time. Droit-Volet, Brunot, and 
Niedenthal, 2004, for example, show that intervals are perceived as longer when angry faces 
are presented during the intervals, compared to neutral. Likewise, emotional sounds are 
perceived as longer than neutral sounds (Noulhiane, Mella, Samson, Ragot, & Pouthas, 
2007). Additionally, Stetson, Fiesta and Eagleman (2007) conducted a novel experiment in 
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which participants experienced a free fall of 31 metres. Stetson et al. found that 
participants’ estimates of their own free fall were longer than the estimates of other 
participants’ free falls. Interpreted via SET, the common explanation for these results is that 
arousal accelerates the rate of the pacemaker.
2.1.8. What modulates subjective time? Interval structure
In addition to attention and arousal, the structure of an interval also affects time 
perception. Whether an interval is filled or unfilled (Wearden, Norton, Martin, & Montford-
Bebb, 2007), the duration of the interval markers, and the modality of the markers all affect 
temporal judgments (Grondin, Roussel, Gamache, Roy & Ouellet, 2005). Grondin et al. 
investigated how marker duration and modality affect temporal discrimination. Intervals 
were marked by either auditory or visual stimuli, and of either short or long durations. The 
results revealed that duration judgments were unaffected by marker duration, but were 
affected by modality; intervals marked with an auditory and visual stimulus (auditory-visual) 
were perceived as longer than visual-visual marked intervals. The authors also examined 
variability, and found that intervals marked by 500 ms stimuli were more variable than 
intervals marked by 10 ms stimuli. Additionally, variability was reduced when intramodal 
(visual-visual) markers were used, compared to intermodal (visual-auditory). However, time 
perception also differs depending on whether an interval is marked by two stimuli or is a 
single stimulus. Wearden et al. (2007) found that intervals consisting of a single stimulus 
(e.g., a tone) were perceived as longer than an interval delineated by two markers (e.g., two 
tones). Therefore, the perception of time is dictated not only by top-down processes, but 
also by the structure of events that define an interval. Thus, interval structure is another 
source of variability to consider, when comparing conditions in time perception studies (in 
addition to top-down processes).    
36
2.1.9. Is timing general?
An interesting question in time perception is whether timing is a general process or 
is underpinned by separate mechanisms (Eagleman, 2008). In other words, when subjective 
time changes, does time in general change or is the change specific to the stimulus? In one 
study that addressed this question, Pariyadath & Eagleman (2007) presented sequences of 
repeated stimuli, one of which was unexpected, i.e., an image of a clock embedded during a 
series of shoe images. Participants judged whether the oddball (the clock) was shorter or 
longer than the images of shoes preceding and succeeding it. The results revealed a 
perceived expansion of time for the oddball, compatible with the results of Tse et al. (2004). 
Importantly, to investigate whether this perceived dilation reflected a general clock process, 
additional experiments presented simultaneous auditory stimuli (tones) or flickering images. 
The authors reasoned that if the perceived expansion of time reflects a general increase in 
temporal acuity, then (1) the pitch of tones should appear at lower frequencies and (2) 
flickering images should be perceived at higher frequencies (relative to preceding and 
succeeding stimuli). The authors found that, while the duration of the oddball was perceived 
as longer than the repeated stimuli, there was no perceived difference in frequency, either 
for the images or the tones. The authors replicated this finding in their 2007 study (Stetson 
et al, 2007). Motivated by the anecdote that time slows down during frightening events, the 
authors tested whether time in general slows down. Consequently, if time slowing is general 
then there should be an ability to perceive events at a higher temporal resolution, such as 
perceiving a higher flicker rate when falling. Accordingly, participants wore a specially 
constructed watch that presented flickering digits. The threshold for correct digit 
identification was determined before the fall, and subsequently increased prior to the fall, 
during which participants had to identify the digits. In accordance with the Pariyadath & 
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Eagleman, the authors found that participants judged their own fall as lasting longer than 
others’, yet there was no increase in temporal resolution during the fall. Thus, the authors 
conclude that time “is not one thing, but is instead composed of separate neural 
mechanisms that usually work together but can be teased apart in the laboratory” 
(Eagleman, 2008, p.133). 
2.1.10. Internal clocks and temporal binding
Thus far, I have described the how changes in internal clock processes can account 
for changes in subjective duration, and the various factors that affect duration judgments. 
Most studies find that timing differences between various conditions are underpinned by a 
difference in pacemaker rate. Therefore, given that temporal binding refers to a contraction 
of time during cause-effect intervals, would this be effected by a slower pacemaker?  
To answer this question, Wenke and Haggard (2009) combined the temporal binding 
procedure with a temporal discrimination paradigm: In a causal condition, participants 
pressed a key to generate a tone after 600, 800 or 1000 ms; in a corresponding non-causal 
condition, their finger was passively pulled down by a motor, which was followed by a tone –
the computer scheduled both events, making it obvious that there was no causal connection 
between the passive movement and the tone. In addition, participants experienced two 
electric shocks administered via electrodes on their fingers. On a given trial, participants 
were prompted to either report whether the shocks were successive or simultaneous, or to 
estimate the duration of the action/movement – tone interval.  In addition to replicating the 
binding effect, Wenke and Haggard found that simultaneity detection on causal trials was 
poorer (i.e. higher thresholds) compared to noncausal trials. This is what would be predicted 
if temporal binding is effected via a slowing of the internal clock: a slower pacemaker 
lengthens the period between pulses, increasing the likelihood that two sequential shocks 
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fall into the same period, which in turn leads to higher discrimination thresholds. Thus, the 
authors concluded that temporal binding is effected via a slower pacemaker.
However, there are a few concerns that urge caution, rather than accepting the 
conclusions at face value. It may be that the higher threshold for discrimination judgments 
is not due to a slower clock, but instead simply reflects a tactile specific contraction of time. 
For example, Tomassini, Gori, Baud-Bovy, Sandini, and Morrone (2014) measured time 
perception surrounding the onset of voluntary movements. Tactile pads were attached to a 
static hand and a moving hand, and delivered two pairs of taps. Participants judged the 
duration of the second variable-spaced pair of taps (presented toward the end of each trial) 
in relation to the first fixed-spaced pair (presented prior to hand movement). The authors 
found a contraction in conditions where the taps were delivered to the moving hand, 
relative to the when taps were delivered to the static hand, i.e., an effector-specific 
contraction of time just prior to and immediately following hand movement. Therefore, 
Wenke and Haggard’s (2009) results might simply reflect a similar, tactile-specific process, 
rather than a contraction of time specific to temporal binding. However, one glaring issue 
with this study is the relation between actual and estimated intervals. A regression of the 
latter onto the former would yield slope differences between causal and noncausal 
conditions. This was not the case with Wenke and Haggard, who found no slope differences.  
A study that provides better evidence of clock slowing in temporal binding is 
Buehner and Humphreys (2009). They investigated temporal binding across a range of 
durations, notably finding a binding effect for durations up to 4 s. A regression of interval 
estimates onto actual interval durations found shallower slopes for causal, compared to 
noncausal trial intervals, indicative of a slower pacemaker rate in causal intervals. However, 
one issue with this study is the use of verbal estimation, which, as Matthews (2011) has 
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shown, often produces slope differences when none should occur. Therefore, it is not 
possible to conclusively say that a slower clock operates in temporal binding on the strength 
of current, purported evidence. Furthermore, it is unknown whether potential clock slowing 
in binding is specific to the cause-effect interval, or is a general timing process. Therefore, 
more empirical work is necessary to discover whether temporal binding is effected by a 
slower pacemaker.
2.1.11. Event perception accounts
Although this thesis is concerned with a time perception account of temporal 
binding, it would not be permissible to exclude event perception approaches. Therefore, I 
briefly describe how an event perception approach can account for the perceptual 
attraction of events that is temporal binding. 
The term ‘binding’ refers, in the domain of perception, to the integration of sensory 
information. For example, light travels faster than sound - 300,000,000 compared to 330 
metres per second to be exact (Spence & Squire, 2003). Yet, when observing an individual 
clicking his or her fingers, the click sound and the movement of the fingers are perceived at 
the same time. However, when experiencing thunder and lightning, we see the lightening 
before hearing the thunder. Why are these auditory and visual streams not integrated into a 
single event? According to the ‘horizon of simultaneity’ (Poppel, 1988; Sugita & Suzuki, 
2003) the brain temporally binds auditory and visual information into a unitary event, up to 
a distance of around 10 - 15 metres. Sugita and Suzuki, for example, measured the effect of 
distance on perceived simultaneity. Participants were exposed to auditory asynchronies via 
headphones, and watched LEDs at a range of distances. The participants were told to 
imagine the LEDs as the locus of the sound, and make simultaneity judgments about the 
auditory stimuli. The results showed that the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS: the point 
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at which the auditory and visual stimuli were perceived to co-occur) increased with 
distance, up to 15 metres. In other words, the window of integration increased with 
distance, allowing for the fact that sound will lag behind visual signals as distance increases, 
such that a wider window of integration is necessary at longer distances. Thus, there is no 
absolute (temporal) lag threshold for unification but rather the window moves as 
audiovisual stimuli become more distant (Spence & Squire, 2003). This extends work by 
Dixon and Spitz (1980), who found that when auditory speech and visual lip movements are 
separated by an interval of up to 250 ms, they are perceived as unitary. The window of 
integration then, proposes (1) that temporal asynchronies are perceived as simultaneous if 
the events occur within the same window; and (2) the limits of the window temporally 
expand with distance.   
A ‘window of integration’ is one account of sensory integration. Another is ‘temporal 
ventriloquism’, which refers to the perceptual shift of sensory events into a unified percept; 
input from one sensory modality is shifted in time into alignment with another sensory 
input (Chen & Vroomen, 2013). The most striking aspect of temporal ventriloquism is that 
visual stimuli are shifted into alignment with auditory stimuli. In an early study, Gebhard and 
Mowbray (1959) presented participants with a flickering light and a corresponding fluttering 
sound. They found that a change in the flutter rate of the auditory stimuli resulted in a 
corresponding change in the perceived flicker rate, but not vice versa (i.e., visual flicker rate 
did not alter the perceived rate of the fluttering sound). Similarly, in more recent studies 
using tapping tasks, participants were able to tap in synchrony with an auditory click while 
ignoring a visual stimulus (a temporally misaligned flash), but were not able to ignore an 
auditory distractor while tapping to a visual flash (Repp, 2005). In a study with single events, 
Morein-Zamir, Soto-Faraco, and Kingstone (2003) found that when an auditory stimulus 
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follows a visual stimulus after an interval, the visual event is perceived as shifted forward in 
time towards the auditory event. This auditory dominance occurs because audition is the 
dominant mode for temporal information, according to the theory of ‘modality 
appropriateness’ (Welch, DuttonHurt, & Warren, 1986). A spatial dominance occurs when 
sound is ventriloquized towards the spatial location of the stimuli (Bartelson & de Gelder, 
2003; see also Chen & Vroomen, 2013, for a review of sensory binding). However, the main 
point is that temporal ventriloquism accounts for the binding of temporal asynchronies by 
bringing events into alignment. 
While most studies on temporal ventriloquism have focused on audio and visual 
modes, there are a small number of studies that have investigated the effect using tactile 
and sensory stimuli. Keetels and Vroomen (2008) investigated whether motor-sensory 
asynchronies would lead to a long-term recalibration. In other words, rather than probing 
for immediate temporal shifts in sensory signals, such as the attraction of a visual towards 
an auditory stimulus, the authors measured if exposure to motor-sensory asynchronies 
resulted in after-effects. Their experiment consisted of two phases - an exposure phase and 
a test phase. During the exposure phase participants experienced temporal asynchronies 
with lag times of -100, 0, and 100 ms between a visual stimulus and tactile vibration. During 
the test phase participants were briefly re-exposed to the same time lag as in the exposure 
phase, then given a test pair: a tactile vibration and visual stimulus were presented with a 
range of temporal asynchronies, and participants had to judge which stimulus was 
presented first. The authors found that the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) was shifted 
in the direction of the exposure lag; when the tactile stimulus was presented first 
participants reported more visual-first pairings, while presenting the visual stimulus first 
resulted in reports of more tactile-first pairings. Put simply, the brain attempts to 
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compensate for motor-sensory lags by realigning events, such that when the tactile event 
occurred first, the subsequent visual stimulus was shifted backward in time towards the 
tactile. Interestingly, the results also found that when both stimulus pairs were actually 
presented simultaneously, the visual had to precede the tactile by 8.6 ms to be perceived as 
simultaneous. This is largely in line with studies that employ audiovisual stimuli, in that 
visual information is processed slower than auditory and (possibly) tactile stimuli (Keetels & 
Vroomen, 2012). 
So what does this evidence suggest so far? At a minimum, it implies that the 
alignment of temporal asynchronies are not limited to audiovisual domains but also involve 
the tactile modality. One question that naturally poses itself is would the brain adapt to 
temporal asynchronies when motor action is involved? Keetels and Vroomen (2008) 
employed tactile stimulation, rather than motor action (i.e., key presses). How then, would 
temporal asynchronies be perceived when motor action (not stimulation) is involved? One 
study that addresses this question is Stetson, Cui, Montague, and Eagleman (2006). 
Participants in their study completed control (baseline) blocks and experimental (injected 
delay blocks). Control and experimental blocks shared a similar set-up: on 60% of trials a 
flash appeared after a fixed delay following a key press (35 ms in baseline, 135 ms in 
injected delay). In the other 40% of trials unexpected flashes appeared randomly 150 ms 
before or after the key press. Participants reported whether the flash occurred before or 
after the key press. The key finding was that in the injected delay blocks a flash appearing 44 
ms, for example, after the key press would have been perceived as occurring before the key 
press, while in baseline trials it would be reported as occurring after the key press. This is 
because when participants adapt to a relatively long key press-flash delay, an unexpected 
flash after a short delay is perceived sooner. Indeed, the striking feature is that the flash is 
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perceived before the key press that caused it. However, on 40% of trials the flash was 
scheduled to randomly appear either before or after the key press, which might have 
reduced the causal link between the key press and flash; because causes precede outcomes, 
the presentation of flashes before the key presses might have led participants to believe 
that key press did not cause the flash to appear. To what extent then is causal belief a factor 
in determining the direction of the sensory shift? Given that causes precede their outcomes, 
would a causality-induced stimulus be more likely to be perceived after its cause, relative to 
an unrelated key press-stimulus pairing?
Desantis, Waszak, Moutsopoulou and Haggard (2016) investigated the effect of 
causal belief on the temporal order of actions and their outcome. Their study involved 
learning action-outcome associations and then judging the temporal order of events when 
the outcomes were either congruent or incongruent with the associations. In an association 
phase, participants learned the relation between key presses and the direction of random 
dot kinematograms (RDKs), such that pressing a certain key triggered upward motion and 
another key triggered downward motion. In a test phase, RDKs were presented for a range 
of lag times before or after the key press, and participants were asked to judge whether the 
coherent motion of the RDKs occurred before or after their key press. Importantly, the 
participants were explicitly told about the causal relationship, such that a coherent dot 
motion that occurred before the key press was computer generated, while coherent motion 
after pressing the key was caused by the participant (in reality the motion was random, 
regardless of whether it occurred before or after. The authors simply used a rolling average 
of participants’ key press times and scheduled dot motion to occur sometime before or 
after). Furthermore, participants also believed that the key press-motion associations still 
applied, such that pressing a certain key triggered an upward direction. This was so that any 
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effect of congruence can be attributed to the key press-motion mappings learned in the 
association phase (again, the motion of the RDKs was entirely random and did not respect 
the learned associations). The results can be summarised thus: when the coherent motion 
was congruent with the previously learned association, the motion was reported to occur 
more often after the key press. However, when participants were told about the true causal 
relationship between key presses and RDK motion, specifically that motion was not 
contingent on the previously learned association, then no congruency effect was obtained. 
It is important to note that coherent motion was reported to occur after the actual key 
press time regardless of causal belief (in line with classical causal principles of cause 
preceding outcome). Yet, when motion was in line with a causal belief then the subjective 
shift was greater, such that more coherent motions were reported after the key press, 
relative to incongruent motions. Thus, although this Desantis et al. study is not a study of 
recalibration per se, it does evidence the role of causality in the perception of events. 
Thus far, an adequate summary might be as follows. Input from different sensory 
streams is processed by the brain with different latencies. One way in which the brain unites 
the different inputs into a single event is by sensory realignment. With audiovisual stimuli 
there is an auditory dominance, such that the arrival times of visual events are shifted 
towards the time of audition. Recalibration also occurs with tactile stimuli, particularly if 
there is a causal connection between tactile and sensory events; outcomes are more likely 
to be perceived after their purported cause, relative to events not causally triggered. 
How can sensory realignment explain temporal binding? According to David 
Eagleman (Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002; Parsons, Novich & Eagleman, 2013), binding can be 
explained by a process of adaptation and recalibration. Individuals usually have a prior belief 
that outcomes follow causes without delay, such as clicking one’s fingers causes an 
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immediate ‘clicking’ sound. If, however, there is a delay between action and outcome, then 
the expectation of an immediate outcome is violated. The timing of events are then 
recalibrated to compensate for this delay. The Stetson et al., (2006) study is a notable 
example of this sensory recalibration hypothesis. When participants had adapted to a delay 
between an action and outcome, the presentation of the outcome immediately following 
the action resulted in a perceived reversal of action-outcome events; the outcome was 
perceived to occur before the action. Sensory recalibration then accounts for temporal 
binding with a process of adapting to motor-sensory delays, bringing action and outcome 
closer together in time.  
2.1.12. Sensory recalibration, time perception, and the current experiments
Proponents of sensory recalibration (Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002; Parsons et al., 
2013) suggest that temporal binding cannot be effected by a slower pacemaker. One of the 
reasons for this is that after adapting to an action-outcome delay, the presentation of an 
outcome immediately following the action results in a perceived reversal: outcomes are 
perceived before their actions. Parsons et al. note that the internal clock model cannot 
account for this subjective interval that is negative in duration. Another reason is that in 
Parsons et al., when two sensory outcomes were presented (a beep and flash), binding only 
occurred between action and one of the sensory outcomes. In other words, the beep and 
flash were able to subjectively shift independently of each other. If an internal clock model 
effected binding, then both sensory outcomes, argues Parsons et al., would have shifted by 
an equal amount. Binding then, occurs due to sensory realignment, and not to changes in 
the rate of an internal clock (according to this perspective). 
There are, however, two reasons not to discount internal clock models. First, motor-
sensory recalibration occurs only in conditions that involve motor action; it cannot account 
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for binding between mechanical devices that trigger outcomes (e.g., Buehner, 2012). Thus, 
this finding is difficult to explain without implicating internal clock models. Second, there is 
precedence in the literature for multiple clocks (Buhusi & Meck, 2009; Klapproth, 2011),
such that multiple overlapping stimuli are timed by separate clocks rather than a single 
timing system. Pariyadath and Eagleman (2007; see also Eagleman, 2008) find that increases 
in subjective duration for one stimulus, do not results in orthogonal increases in an 
additional, simultaneously presented stimulus. Therefore, the results of Parsons et al. (2013) 
can be explained by the involvement of multiple clocks, each timing a specific pair of action-
outcome stimuli. 
Internal clock models then, are not only difficult to discount (as in point two, above), 
but are indispensable in certain instances (as in point one). However, given the paucity and 
inconsistency of evidence for pacemaker slowing in temporal binding, further empirical 
work is necessary. The current experiments are therefore, an application of the internal 
clock model to temporal binding. Specifically, I ask one key question: is temporal binding 
effected by a slower pacemaker? 
2.1.13. Scope
Given that previous research has shown that temporal binding is rooted in causality 
(Buehner, 2015, 2012; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & Haggard, 
2009), occurs across various stimulus modalities and tasks (Humphreys & Buehner, 
2009,2010; Haering & Kiesel, 2014,2015), and does not merely reflect processes related to 
motor preparation and execution, I focused my efforts on a simple causal versus non-causal 
interval distinction: In the experiments reported in this thesis, causal intervals were 
delineated by a participant’s key press, which always caused a sensory outcome after a 
delay, while noncausal intervals were delineated by two sequential sensory outcomes. This 
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manner of operationalizing causal and noncausal intervals presented the most efficient 
method of manipulating causality. The key difference is that in causal intervals, only a key 
press triggers an outcome, hence the action is causally related to the outcome stimulus. In 
noncausal trials, the interval markers (the visual change and the outcome stimulus) are not 
causally related but are merely associated - the outcome always follows the visual change. 
Thus, causal intervals were always delineated by a key press and sensory outcome, while 
noncausal intervals were delineated by two sensory stimuli (for information this causal 
versus noncausal distinction, see the introduction to Chapter 3, on the following page).
I began by investigating whether the contraction of time in temporal binding is 
served by the slowing of a general pacemaker, or instead, by the slowing of clock processes 
specific to the cause (action)-effect interval (Experiments 1 - 4 in Chapter 3). The results 
were in accordance with Pariyadath and Eagleman (2007), with the finding that binding is 
served by a specific clock process (admittedly, the results also fit with a sensory realignment 
process, but I defer this discussion until Chapter 6). In order to understand the nature of this 
specific process, I conducted experiments with a regression procedure to disentangle switch 
latencies and changes in pacemaker rate (Experiments 5 - 8 in Chapter 4). In accordance 
with the majority of temporal illusions, I found that binding is effected by differences in 
pacemaker rate. Therefore, as a final and stronger measure of pacemaker slowing, I 
conducted temporal discrimination tasks, in which participants discriminate causal and 
noncausal intervals (Experiments 9 - 10 in Chapter 5). The results of these latter 
experiments found higher thresholds when discriminating causal, versus noncausal 
intervals, as expected from a slower clock. The present body of work then, finds empirical 
support for pacemaker rate changes in temporal binding. 
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3. Chapter 3: Investigating a general clock slowing account of 
temporal binding using the embedded interval estimation 
procedure
I developed a new procedure - the embedded interval estimation procedure - to 
address whether temporal binding is effected by a slower clock rate. Given that previous 
research has shown that temporal binding is rooted in causality (Buehner, 2015, 2012; 
Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Moore, Lagnado, Deal & Haggard, 2009), occurs across various 
stimulus modalities and tasks (Humphreys & Buehner, 2009,2010; Haering & Kiesel, 
2014,2015), and does not merely reflect processes related to motor preparation and 
execution, I focused my efforts on a simple causal versus non-causal interval distinction: 
Causal intervals were delineated by a participant’s key press, which always caused a sensory 
outcome after a delay, while noncausal intervals were delineated by two sequential sensory 
outcomes. This manner of operationalizing causal and noncausal intervals presented the 
most efficient method of manipulating causality. Whilst the events of both conditions 
appear to be associated, the key difference is that in causal intervals, only a key press 
triggers an outcome, i.e., the outcome occurs only when a key is pressed and does not occur 
in the absence of a key press. In noncausal trials, by contrast, the interval markers (the visual 
change and the outcome stimulus) are not causally related but are merely associated - the 
outcome always follows the visual change1. Critically, I embedded an additional event into 
1 Although the physical difference between conditions is whether or not intentional actions occur, I 
prefer to use the terms ‘causal’ and ‘noncausal’, given the evidence for a causal root to temporal binding: 
intentional actions (i.e., key presses) that are associated with outcomes, do not yield a binding effect if there is 
an a priori belief that such outcomes will occur even in the absence of such actions (Buehner & Humphreys, 
2009). In other words, association is not sufficient for binding to occur; a more meaningful causal link is 
required, such that the trigger (e.g., the key press) is causally linked to the outcome, and not merely a stimulus 
in a sequence of associated stimuli.
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certain trials at different points; sometimes this event occurred before the interval, in other 
trials it occurred during the interval, and in others not at all. 
One may at this point ask how causality could possibly influence pacemaker function, 
given that I can only be sure of causality after the outcome has occurred and not at the time 
of action (there is a rich literature in in cognitive science on this, based on David Hume’s 
(1888/1739) empiricism; for an overview see Cheng & Buehner, 2012). In other words, the 
motor system only obtains information about the successful completion of a causal action 
once the outcome occurs, at which time the switch closes, thereby stopping pulses to 
accumulate. However, Moore and Haggard (2008), using the Libet clock method described 
earlier (Libet et al, 1983), demonstrated that temporal binding occurs not only due to 
retrospective awareness of causality, but also due to the prediction of causal relations. They 
contrasted a predictable condition (a key press produced a tone on 75% of trials), with an 
unpredictable condition (a key press produced a tone on 50% of trials). This allowed them to 
study the extent of perceptual shifts when a causal action was followed by its outcome as 
well as when it failed to do so.  On trials where the action did not produce an outcome, 
Moore and Haggard found a larger subjective shift of actions towards (expected, but absent) 
tones in the 75% compared to 50% conditions. In other words, when participants expected 
an outcome, they experienced binding even when in fact no outcome occurred.  
Furthermore, Moore, Lagnado, Deal, and Haggard (2009) showed that the extent of binding 
varied as a function of the contingency, in line with a causal theory of binding. In the 
experiments reported in this chapter the action-outcome contingency was set to 100% (i.e., 
perfect predictability). It is therefore reasonable to assume that participants would show 
strong binding effects based on cause-effect predictability. This, in turn, means that 
pacemaker rate could, at least in principle, be affected by this manipulation of causality. 
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In order to provide a comprehensive test of my hypotheses and to increase the 
generalizability of the results, I conducted four experiments that factorially combined 
stimulus modality (auditory, visual) with event type (outcome, embedded event) as follows: 
In Experiments 1 and 2, the outcome event marking the end of the overall interval was visual 
(a flash), while in Experiments 3 and 4, the outcome was an auditory click. Furthermore, the 
embedded event was auditory (a constant tone of variable duration) in Experiments 1 and 3, 
and visual (a flash of a polygon of variable duration) in Experiments 2 and 4. In other words, 
in Experiments 1 and 4, the embedded event and the outcome event marking the end of the 
interval were of different modalities, while they were of the same modality in Experiments 2 
and 3 (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 
Modality of embedded events and outcomes for each experiment.
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Figure 3.1. Predictions for trials with an embedded event during the interval. Interval 
judgments: I predicted a temporal binding effect regardless of theoretical approach. 
Embedded event judgments: Only a general pacemaker slowing will result in shorter 
perceived embedded events during causal intervals. C: Causal; NC: Non-Causal.
In all experiments, participants had to estimate the duration of either the overall 
interval, or the embedded event. If causality-induced clock slowing is general, then 
embedded event estimates should be shorter for events embedded into causal intervals, 
compared to events embedded into noncausal intervals. Alternatively, if clock slowing is a 
binding-specific process, then estimates for embedded events should not differ between 
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causal and noncausal conditions. This would necessitate multiple clocks operating in parallel, 
rather than a single clock system: One clock might time the interval and another the 
embedded event simultaneously. Likewise, if temporal binding does not implicate any 
changes to clock speed, then there should also be no differences in the estimates for 
embedded events (see Figure 3.1 for a schematic of these predictions). Because there are 
modality-specific differences in the timing of auditory versus visual events (Wearden et al. 
1998), I decided to factorially combine stimulus modality with event type in a 2 x 2 design to 
ensure that whatever effects I might find are not confined to a particular modality.
A key concern in developing the embedded interval estimation procedure was to 
ensure that the embedded stimulus was independent of the main interval. More specifically, 
embedded events had to be perceived as causally unrelated to key presses. This was to 
ensure that no temporal binding between key presses and embedded events occurred; if 
this were the case, then embedded events and outcomes might be perceived as a sequence 
of action-related outcomes. This, in turn, would make any effects of clock-slowing during the 
key press-interval, difficult to ascertain. To make it clear that the embedded event was 
independent of the action, I scheduled one-third of trials to contain an embedded event 
before the key press, one-third after the key press, and one-third to contain no embedded 
event. To achieve this, I used an algorithm that predicted a participant’s key press time for 
each causal trial, and scheduled delivery of the embedded event either before or after this 
predicted time. In noncausal trials I employed stimulus delivery times recorded from 
participants in a pilot experiment using the same algorithm. The pilot experiment consisted 
of 24 participants using a procedure similar to that in the present experiments. The only 
difference was that causal blocks were experienced first, with the values for different stimuli 
duration (interval duration, time of key press, time of embedded event, and so on) replayed 
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in noncausal blocks. This pilot experiment used the same prediction algorithm as the current 
experiments. For the current experiment, this procedure ensured noncausal trials mirrored 
causal trials as closely as possible, whilst also allowing for the counterbalancing of causal 
and noncausal blocks.
Participants were asked to estimate the duration of either the interval or the 
embedded event. To make sure that they focus on all aspects of the task, participants were 
not told which event they had to estimate until the end of each trial.
3.1. Experiments 1 and 2
3.1.1. Method
3.1.1.1. Participants
Thirty-five Students (32 female, 3 male, Mage = 19.9 years, age range: 17-40) of 
Cardiff University participated in Experiment 1, and 34 (32 female, 2 male, Mage = 18.9 years, 
age range: 18-22) participants in Experiments 2. Students were provided with course credits 
or £5 payment.
3.1.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli
The experiment was implemented in Psychopy (Peirce, 2007) on PCs connected to 
19” monitor with resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixels. The embedded event was a tone (523.25 
Hz) in Experiment 1 and a yellow polygon (vertices bounded by a 270 x 210 pixel rectangle) 
in Experiment 2, of either 300 or 500 ms duration. In both experiments a 1000 ms 
presentation of a red square (400 pixels2) served as the outcome on causal trials and marked 
the end of noncausal intervals. A black square (400 pixels2) was presented at the beginning 
of each trial in all experiments. All visual stimuli were presented centrally on the screen.
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3.1.1.3. Design and procedure 
Three factors were employed in the study: Trial Type consisted of two levels (causal, 
noncausal), Embedded Event Location of three levels (before interval, during interval, no 
event) and Embedded Event Duration of two levels (300, 500 ms). Dependent variables 
(measured on separate trials) were estimates of overall interval and embedded event 
duration.
Figure 3.2 shows the trial structure of Experiment 1. Causal trials began with the 
black square on the screen. Participants pressed a key at a time of their choice. This led to 
the immediate disappearance of the black square, and triggered the red square after a 
random interval (range 700-1300 ms). Noncausal trials also began with the black square, 
which remained on the screen according to a predetermined time derived from the causal 
trials of previous pilot participants as explained below; following the disappearance of the 
black square, the red square appeared after a random interval of the same 700-1300ms 
range. Both types of trials were presented in blocks of 30 trials, 10 of which were scheduled 
to contain an embedded stimulus during the relevant interval, 10 to contain an embedded 
stimulus before the interval (i.e. before the participant pressed the key or before the black 
square disappeared on its own), and 10 trials in which no embedded stimulus was 
scheduled. At the end of each trial, participants were prompted to estimate either the 
duration of the embedded stimulus, or the duration of the key press – outcome interval (on 
causal trials) or the duration between the disappearance of the black square and the 
appearance of the red square (on noncausal trials).
To schedule delivery of the embedded stimulus, an algorithm was used to predict 
participants’ key press time, with the embedded event scheduled at a random time (range 
50 - 400 ms) before or after the predicted key press. Based on pilot data, I set the algorithm 
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to begin with a prediction of 800 ms on the first trial, and implemented a cumulative 
average based on key press times up to the first five trials. Thereafter, a rolling average 
calculated over the last five trials was employed. Values shorter than 400 ms or longer than 
3000 ms were not considered for the averages. 
Figure 3.2. Trial structure of Experiment 1. In causal trials a black square was displayed until 
participants pressed a key, which led to the immediate disappearance of the square and 
triggered an outcome stimulus after a random interval (700 - 1300 ms). In noncausal trials a 
black square was displayed for a random time (replayed from a pilot version of the 
experiment) before disappearing, followed by an outcome stimulus after a random interval 
of the same 700 - 1300 ms range. Additionally, in both trial types an event was embedded 
before or during the interval, or in some trials no embedded event was scheduled. 
Participants estimated the duration of either the interval or embedded event. In all 
experiments a black square always began the display, while the modality of outcomes and 
embedded events varied factorially between experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2 the 
outcome was a red square, and in Experiments 3 and 4 an auditory click sound. Meanwhile, 
the embedded event was a tone in Experiments 1 and 3, and a polygon in Experiments 2 and 
4.
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At the beginning of each causal trial, the computer thus determined the length of the 
to-be-experienced key press – outcome interval (from a random range of 700-1300 ms), as 
well as whether and when it was to contain an embedded event. If an embedded event was 
scheduled, its duration could be either 300 or 500 ms (see design specifics below). For the 
participant, the trial began with the display of the black square, which remained on the 
screen until he or she pressed the Z key, which led to the immediate disappearing of the 
black square and triggered the appearance of the red square after the scheduled interval. 
Depending on the schedule, the embedded event occurred between 50-400 ms before or 
after the predicted time of the key press, or not at all. Following the display of the outcome 
(red square), participants were prompted to estimate either the duration of the action-
outcome interval (on a scale from 0 – 2000 ms) or the duration of the embedded event (on a 
scale from 0 – 1000 ms). Participants estimated the duration by entering a numerical 
estimate in milliseconds. The screen then blanked for a random duration (1200 - 2000 ms) 
before the next trial.  
For noncausal trials I adopted an analogous procedure. I replayed values from causal 
trials of a pilot version of the experiment, where I recorded the time of participants’ key 
presses, the durations of the intervals, as well as the positions and durations of the 
embedded events (based on the same prediction algorithm as described above). In the 
current experiment, for each participant, I randomly selected a pilot participant’s data file 
and replayed its values in noncausal trials, using the recorded key press time to schedule the 
disappearance of the black square. For example, if a pilot participant pressed the key 900 ms 
into the trial, experienced an interval of 1100 ms, with a 300 ms embedded event presented 
800 ms after his or her key press, a corresponding noncausal trial in the current experiment 
would display the black square for 900 ms at the start of the trial, followed by the red square 
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after 1100 ms; in addition, an embedded event of 300 ms duration would be presented 800 
ms after the disappearance of the black square.  Note that the algorithm cannot perfectly 
predict a participant’s key press, and that consequently the number of trials where the 
embedded event was experienced before or after the action will fluctuate between 
participants. Table 3.2 shows that the prediction algorithm achieved approximately equal 
distribution of embedded events before and during intervals. For example, Table 1 shows 
that for interval judgments in Experiment 1, 50.16% of trials featured an embedded event 
before the interval, out of a target of 50%. Likewise, 44.35% of trials featured an embedded 
event during the interval (also out of an intended target of 50%). Thus, there were no 
systematic deviations from the intended 50-50 balance, and no deviation was larger than 
9%.  
Table 3.2 
Mean percentage of trials on which an embedded event was experienced before and during 
the overall interval, for interval and embedded event judgment trials in Experiments 1 and 2 
(standard deviation in parenthesis).
Judgment
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Causal Noncausal Causal Noncausal
BI DI BI DI BI DI BI DI
Intervals 50.16 
(11.09)
44.35 
(12.63)
41.94 
(6.28)
53.63 
(6.35)
47.66 
(9.71)
45.55 
(11.55)
44.38 
(7.04)
51.72 
(6.64)
Embedded
Event
50.40 
(10.02)
45.16 
(11.76)
46.05 
(5.62)
49.27 
(6.23)
51.41 
(10.34)
41.95 
(12.28)
46.48 
(5.53)
48.67 
(6.57)
Note: BI, DI = Embedded Event occurred before/during the interval. Percentages do not sum 
to 100 because a mean range of 3.91 - 6.80% of trials contained embedded events that 
began during or after the outcome, and are thus not included. 2 x 2 (Trial Type [causal, 
noncausal] x Embedded Event Location [before, during]) ANOVAs in which the dependent 
variable was the proportion of trials with an embedded event, found no significant effects 
(ps>.05), with one exception: Interval judgment trials in Experiment 2 had more events in 
noncausal than causal trials (means of 48.05 and 46.60 %, collapsed across BI and DI trials, 
respectively), F(1, 31) = 7.79, p < .01. I attribute this to random fluctuation.
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To optimize the experience on noncausal trials, I screened previous participants’ 
stimulus patterns (from the pilot version) and excluded those where embedded event 
timings deviated by more then 30% from the schedule (e.g. where the balance of embedded 
events occurring before and during the relevant interval deviated from the scheduled 50-
50% balance; fewer than 35% or greater than 65% resulted in exclusion. Each causal and 
noncausal block consisted of 30 trials prompting for an interval and 30 requesting an 
embedded event duration judgment, presented in random order. For each judgment type, 
there were 10 trials with the embedded event scheduled before, 10 with it scheduled during 
the interval, and 10 trials with no event. The duration of embedded events was either 300 or 
500 ms, with both durations occurring equally often across trial and judgment types. Ten 
trials in each block prompted for an embedded event judgment when in fact no embedded 
event had occurred.  These served as catch trials, and participants were instructed 
beforehand to enter an X on such trials.
Each participant worked through two causal and noncausal blocks in an alternating 
sequence, with the beginning of the sequence (causal, noncausal) counterbalanced. 
Participants were tested in groups of 10 - 15 and the experiments took about 45 minutes.
3.1.2. Results
3.1.2.1. Data analysis 
Data were screened based on catch trials. Participants who failed to correctly 
recognize more than 30% of catch trials in at least one condition (Four participants in 
Experiment 1, two in Experiment 2) were not considered for analysis. In addition, while 
Table 3.2 and ANOVAs show that generally, the distribution of before and during interval 
embedded events did not differ between causal and noncausal trials, inspection of individual 
data revealed that certain participants experienced a distribution of causal before and 
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during trials with greater than 30% deviance, i.e., some participants experienced fewer than 
35% or greater than 65% of before and during trials, rather than the intended 50 - 50 
balance. Twenty percent (Experiment 1) and 35% (Experiment 2) of participants fell into this 
category. Whilst I considered removing these participants from analyses, doing so does not 
change the pattern of results in any of the four experiments (all interval judgment Ps < .05, 
all embedded event judgment Ps > .05), so I decided to report analyses based on the entire 
valid sample (see Appendix C, however, for analysis with these participants removed). 
Data for interval judgments were classified into three categories: trials where an 
embedded event occurred before the interval, during interval, or not at all. Data for 
embedded event judgments were classified into two categories: trials where the embedded 
event occurred before the interval and trials where it occurred during the interval. Note that 
this classification is based on actual rather than scheduled embedded event location, and 
classification is based on the start of the embedded event. This meant that some events 
began before but overlapped into the interval. Likewise, certain events began during the 
interval but overlapped into the outcome stimulus (in both cases this occurred on an 
average of 14.8% and 13.7% of trials in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively). The analyses 
reported below included such overlapping trials; excluding them does not change the 
pattern of results (see Appendix A). All analyses were computed with respect to judgment 
errors2, defined as the difference between the estimated and the actual value, where 
underestimation is conveyed by negative values and overestimation by positive values. 
Additionally, analyses with Embedded Event Duration included as a factor yielded the same 
results as those reported below (all interval judgment ps < .05; embedded event judgment 
2 See Appendix B for scatter plots showing actual versus estimated durations, for 
interval and embedded event judgments. 
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[Experiments 1,2 and 4] ps > .05 and Experiment 4 p = .05). I therefore conducted the 
analyses by collapsing across Embedded Event Duration.
Figure 3.3. (A) Experiment 1. (B) Experiment 2. Mean interval judgment errors from causal 
and noncausal trials broken down by embedded event location. Error bars represent within-
subjects confidence intervals (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008).
3.1.2.2. Interval Judgments: Experiment 1 
Figure 3.3 (A) shows that intervals were generally underestimated, with causal 
intervals underestimated to a greater extent, replicating the typical binding effect. An 
exception to this pattern of general underestimation is the result from noncausal intervals 
with an embedded event before the interval, which shows overestimation. Figure 3.3 also 
shows that intervals with an event presented during the interval were underestimated more 
than intervals with no event and an event before. I conducted an analysis of variance 
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(ANOVA) with Trial Type (causal, noncausal) and Embedded Event Location (none, before, 
during) as factors. This analysis found a significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 30) = 24.97, p
< .001, partial η2 = .45, and a significant effect of Embedded Event Location, F(2, 60) = 17.58, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .37. The Trial Type x Embedded Event Location interaction was also 
significant, F(2, 60) = 6.33, p < .01, partial η2 = .17. Simple effects analysis found significant 
differences between Trial Type with no embedded events (p < .05), for events before (p
< .001) and for events during the interval (p < .01).
3.1.2.3. Interval Judgments: Experiment 2 
Figure 3.3 (B) shows that intervals again were generally underestimated, with greater 
underestimation for causal intervals. A deviation from this pattern, analogous to Experiment 
1, concerns interval judgments from noncausal trials where an embedded event occurred 
before the interval, which seemed to reflect overestimation. Above all, Figure 3.3 (B) shows 
a clear binding effect regardless of embedded event location. ANOVA supports these 
findings, with a significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 31) = 13.03, p < .01, partial η2 = .30. The 
effect of Embedded Event Location, F(2, 62) = 7.14, p < .01, partial η2 = .19, as well as the 
Trial Type x Embedded Event Location interaction, F(2, 62) = 3.75, p < .05, partial η2 = .11,
were also significant. Simple effects analysis found no difference between Trial Type with no 
embedded events (p = .10), but did for events embedded before (p < .001), and during the 
interval (p < .05).
62
Figure 3.4. (A) Experiment 1. (B) Experiment 2. Mean embedded event judgment errors for 
events occurring before and during the interval, broken down by trial type. Error bars 
represent within-subjects confidence intervals.
3.1.2.4. Embedded Event Judgments: Experiment 1 
Inspection of Figure 3.4 (A) finds a general overestimation of embedded events, with 
somewhat greater overestimation for events embedded in causal intervals, contrary to what 
is predicted from a general clock slowing hypothesis. ANOVA (with Trial Type [causal, 
noncausal] and Embedded Event Location [before, during]) found no effect of Trial Type, F(1, 
30) = 1.29, p = .27, partial η2 = .04, or Embedded Event Location, F(1, 30) = .83, p = .37, 
partial η2 = .03, nor an interaction, F(1,30) < .01, p = .97, partial η2 < .001. In addition, I 
conducted a Bayesian analysis to compare the fit of the data under the null against the 
alternative hypothesis, using the Bayes Factor package in R (Morey & Rouder, 2015). Using 
the same 2 x 2 (Trial Type [causal, noncausal] x Embedded Event Location [before, during]) 
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design, I compared a restricted model against the null (see Figure 3.5). The restricted model 
captured my original prediction, in which the means of events embedded during causal 
intervals would be subjectively shorter than those embedded during noncausal intervals. I 
did not specify any other order restrictions (i.e., I made no predictions about embedded 
events that occurred before the interval, either in causal or noncausal trials). This analysis 
yielded a Bayes factor of 22 in favour of the null versus the alternative restricted model, 
suggesting that the data are around 22 times more likely to occur under the null than the 
alternative hypothesis.  
Figure 3.5. The restricted model entered into my Bayesian analysis. I specified a single 
constraint: events embedded during causal intervals would be judged shorter than events 
embedded into noncausal intervals. I made no assumptions about any other differences.
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3.1.2.5. Embedded Event Judgments: Experiment 2 
Figure 3.4 (B) shows that embedded visual events were underestimated, in contrast 
to embedded auditory events in Experiment 2, which were overestimated. This most likely 
reflects the typical finding that auditory events are judged longer than visual events 
(Wearden et al, 1998).  More important for my purposes here, though, is whether 
embedded event judgments varied as a function of trial type. As in Experiment 1, this was 
not the case. There were no significant effects of Trial Type, F(1, 31) = .03, p = .87, partial η2
< .01, Embedded Event Location, F(1, 31) = 2.36, p = .14, partial η2 = .07, nor a Trial Type x 
Embedded Event Location interaction, F(1, 31) = .00, p = .96, partial η2 < .001. I also 
conducted a Bayesian analysis using the same procedure I applied to embedded event 
judgments in Experiment 1. This yielded a Bayes factor of 12 in favour of the null versus the 
alternative restricted model.
3.1.3. Discussion
In both experiments I replicated the temporal binding effect. Interval judgments in 
Experiments 1 and 2 show that causal intervals were perceived as shorter than noncausal 
intervals, regardless of embedded event location and modality. Interestingly, I also found an 
interaction, whereby noncausal intervals with embedded events before the interval were 
perceived as longer than intervals with events embedded in other locations. While this is 
interesting, it is tangential to my main purpose and therefore, I return to this in Chapter 3: 
Discussion section.
My main concern, however, was with temporal judgments for events embedded into 
causal and noncausal intervals.  I found no difference between causal and noncausal 
embedded event judgments, both when the event began before or during the interval, and 
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irrespective of whether the event was auditory or visual. This is also the case for embedded 
events that are clearly delineated as before or during, i.e., no overlaps (see Appendix A). 
What do these results say about clock slowing in temporal binding? If an internal 
clock operates at a slower speed during action-outcome intervals relative to noncausal 
intervals, then embedded events presented during the interval should be judged as shorter 
in causal than noncausal trials. My results do not bear this out, with no difference in 
embedded event judgments between trial type or location. Thus, Experiments 1 and 2 
provide no evidence for general clock slowing during temporal binding. Instead, it could be 
that binding-induced clock slowing, rather than being a general cognitive process, selectively 
affects action-outcome intervals only. However, Experiments 1 and 2 only considered 
intervals marked by visual events.  To glean a better understanding, and in an attempt to test 
the reliability and robustness of these findings, Experiments 3 and 4 replicate Experiments 1 
and 2, but used an auditory event to mark the end of the action-outcome interval.
3.2. Experiments 3 and 4
In Experiments 3 and 4 I replaced the visual outcome with an auditory stimulus. In 
other respects, the procedure remained the same as in Experiments 1 and 2 (see design 
specifics below). 
3.2.1. Method
3.2.1.1. Participants 
Thirty-four students of Cardiff University participated both in Experiment 3 (30 
female, 4 male, Mage = 19.5 years, age range: 18-22) and 34 another in Experiment 4 (28 
female, 6 male, Mage = 21.9 years, age range: 17-46), in exchange for course credits or £5 
payment.
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3.2.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli 
The embedded event was a tone (523.25 Hz) in Experiment 3 and a yellow polygon 
(vertices bounded by a 270 x 210 pixel rectangle) in Experiment 4. In both experiments, a 
130 ms click sound served as the outcome in causal trials and marked the end of noncausal 
intervals. A black square (400 pixels2) was presented at the beginning of each trial in both 
experiments. The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1. 
3.2.1.3. Design and procedure 
The procedure remained the same as Experiments 1 and 2. 
3.2.2. Results
3.2.2.1. Data analysis 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, data were screened based on catch trials. This resulted in 
five participants in Experiment 3, and two in Experiment 4 not considered for analysis. The 
distributions of before and during interval embedded events for causal and noncausal trials 
are shown in Table 3.3. Twenty-four percent (Experiment 3) and 26% (Experiment 4) of 
participants deviated from the intended 50-50 balance. Removing these participants from 
analyses did not change the pattern of results, and therefore I report the following results 
with these participants included. However, one participant was removed from analyses in 
Experiment 3 and another participant in Experiment 4, for not experiencing any causal trials 
with an event embedded during the interval. Finally, embedded events that began before
but overlapped into the interval were removed and the data subjected to reanalysis. 
Likewise for events that began during but overlapped into the outcome (in both cases this 
occurred on average on 14.8% and 15.5% of trials per participant in Experiments 3 and 4, 
respectively). The analyses reported below included such overlapping trials; excluding them 
does not change the pattern of results (see Appendix A). 
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Table 3.3 
Mean percentage of trials on which an embedded event was experienced before and during 
the overall interval, for interval and embedded event judgment trials in Experiments 3 and 4 
(standard deviation in parenthesis).
Judgment
Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Causal Noncausal Causal Noncausal
BI DI BI DI BI DI BI DI
Intervals 48.93 
(11.37)
46.61 
(12.55)
43.93 
(4.69)
52.50 
(4.56)
50.73 
(17.04)
45.40 
(17.37)
45.32 
(8.34)
51.21 
(8.01)
Embedded
Event
46.34 
(10.33)
49.20 
(11.55)
45.00 
(5.93)
50.63 
(7.03)
53.63 
(15.86)
43.06 
(15.35)
46.61 
(5.11)
48.87 
(5.73)
Note: BI, DI = Embedded Event occurred before/during the interval. Percentages do not sum 
to 100 because a mean range of 3.33 - 4.58% of trials contained embedded events that 
began during or after the outcome, and are thus not included. 2 x 2 (Trial Type [causal, 
noncausal] x Embedded Event Location [before, during]) ANOVAs in which the dependent 
variable was the proportion of trials with an embedded event, found no significant effects 
(ps>.05).
3.2.2.2. Interval Judgments: Experiment 3 
Figure 3.6 (A) shows a similar pattern to Experiments 1 and 2. On the whole, intervals 
were underestimated, with greater underestimation for causal trials. Two exceptions are 
noncausal trials where an embedded event occurred before the interval, and trials where no 
event occurred. The former replicates a pattern shown in Experiments 1 and 2, suggesting 
that the presence of an event presented before the interval subjectively lengthens its 
duration (I explore reasons for this in Chapter 3: General Discussion). In general, Figure 3.6 
shows a clear binding effect, regardless of embedded event location. ANOVA supports these 
findings, with a significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 27) = 44.77, p < .001, partial η2 = .62. The 
effect of Embedded Event Location, F(2, 54) = 12.56, p < .001, partial η2 = .32, and the Trial 
Type x Embedded Event Location interaction was also significant, F(2, 54) = 6.70, p < .05, 
partial η2 = .20. Simple effects analysis found significant differences between Trial Type for 
all levels of Embedded Event Location (all ps < .001). 
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Figure 3.6. (A) Experiment 3. (B) Experiment 4. Mean interval judgment errors from causal 
and noncausal trials broken down by embedded event location. Error bars represent within-
subjects confidence intervals.
3.2.2.3. Interval Judgments: Experiment 4 
Figure 3.6 (B) shows a different pattern to Experiments 1 - 3, with a general 
overestimation of noncausal trial intervals. However, a clear binding effect is evident, 
regardless of embedded event location. ANOVA supports this finding, with a main effect of 
Trial Type, F(1, 30) = 80.31, p < .001, partial η2 = .73 and Embedded Event Location, F(2, 60) = 
15.37, p < .001, partial η2 = .34. No Trial Type x Embedded Event Location interaction was 
found, F(2, 60) = 1.57, p = .22, partial η2 = .05. I conducted simple effects analysis to explore 
the main effect of Embedded Event Location. These revealed significant differences between
before and during levels, and between during and none levels (all ps < .001). No difference 
between before versus none levels was found (p = .13).   
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Figure 3.7. (A) Experiment 3. (B) Experiment 4. Mean embedded event judgment errors for 
events occurring before and during the interval, broken down by trial type. Error bars 
represent within-subjects confidence intervals.
3.2.2.4. Embedded Event Judgments: Experiment 3 
Figure 3.7 (A) shows that embedded events are overestimated, corroborating the 
finding of Experiment 1. Inspection of Figure 3.7 (A) also suggests that, numerically, at least 
the pattern found in Experiment 1 might be reversed:  events presented during causal trials 
might have been perceived as shorter than those presented during noncausal trials. 
However, ANOVA does not corroborate this impression: The effect of Trial Type failed to 
reach significance, F(1, 27) = 3.94, p = .06, partial η2 = .13, and neither the effect of 
Embedded Event Location, F(1, 27) = 1.71, p = .20, partial η2 = .06, or  the Trial Type x 
Embedded Event Location interaction, F(1, 27) = .25, p = .62, partial η2 = .01 were significant. 
A Bayesian analysis yielded a Bayes factor of 1.5 in favour of the alternative versus the null 
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model (see Embedded Event Judgments: Experiment 1 and Figure 3.5 for specifics). Thus, 
the evidence that events embedded during causal intervals are not perceived as shorter 
than those embedded during noncausal intervals, is inconclusive here.
3.2.2.5. Embedded Event Judgments: Experiment 4
Figure 3.7 (B) shows a general underestimation of embedded events, replicating the 
results of Experiment 2’s embedded events (i.e., that auditory stimuli are judged longer than 
visual stimuli). Similarly to Experiment 3, Figure 3.7 (B) also suggests relative 
underestimation of embedded events in causal trials. However, just as in Experiment 3, 
statistical analysis does not bear this out, with no effect of Trial Type, F(1, 30) = .42, p = .52, 
partial η2 = .01, Embedded Event Location, F(1, 30) = .22, p = .64, partial η2 < .01, or Trial 
Type x Embedded Event Location interaction, F(1, 30) = .06, p = .82, partial η2 < .01. A 
Bayesian analysis found a factor of 13 in favour of the null versus the alternative restricted 
model.
3.2.3. Discussion
The results of Experiments 3 and 4 replicate those of Experiments 1 and 2: I found a 
significant binding effect, regardless of embedded event location and modality. In 
Experiment 3 I also replicated the finding that noncausal intervals with an embedded event 
occurring before it were judged as longer than other Trial Type x Embedded Event Location 
combinations. As stated in the previous section, I will comment on this in Chapter 3: General 
Discussion. Regarding embedded event judgments, I again found no difference between 
temporal estimates of events embedded into causal and noncausal intervals, nor any 
differences depending on whether the event occurred before or during the interval. While 
the pattern of embedded event judgments is numerically reversed relative to Experiments 1 
and 2, with the shortening of perceived durations for events embedded into causal intervals 
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approaching statistical significance in Experiment 3, I attribute this fluctuation to random 
noise, and perhaps changes to the outcome modality. Crucially, however, Experiments 3 and 
4, like Experiments 1 and 2 do not support the hypothesis of general clock slowing, which 
would be evidenced by reliable subjective shortening of events embedded into causal 
intervals. Furthermore, neither Experiment 3 nor Experiment 4 showed any evidence of 
embedded event judgments being affected by Event Location. If traces of relative 
underestimation of events embedded into causal intervals were driven by general clock 
slowing during causal intervals, then such underestimation should only occur for events 
presented during causal intervals, and not for those presented before them. Results from 
both Experiments 3 and 4 clearly show no evidence for this, neither numerically, nor via a 
Trial Type x Embedded Event Location interaction. This result also holds when embedded 
events are clearly delineated, i.e., when embedded events before do not overlap into the 
interval (see Appendix A).  
3.3. Experiments 1 – 4: Discussion
I developed a new procedure - the embedded interval estimation procedure - to 
study the potential implication of internal clock models in temporal binding. Using this 
method, I replicated the binding effect across four experiments, with causal intervals being 
consistently judged as shorter than noncausal intervals, irrespective of whether or when an 
additional event was embedded in the overall interval, and irrespective of the modality of 
the embedded event, and that marking the end of the interval. Interestingly, I found that 
when tones were deployed as embedded events (in Experiments 1 and 3), they were 
generally overestimated, while visual stimuli serving as embedded events (Experiments 2 
and 4) were generally underestimated. This replicates a well-established finding that 
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auditory stimuli are judged as relatively longer than visual stimuli (Wearden et al, 1998) and 
reassures us of the overall validity of the embedded interval estimation method. 
Contrary to what would be predicted if temporal binding were effected via a general 
slowing of subjective time, I found no difference in perceived duration of events embedded 
within causal and noncausal intervals. This pattern of results held across four experiments 
and regardless of whether the interval was marked by a visual or auditory event. Likewise, it 
was unaffected by whether the embedded event was visual or auditory. Interestingly, 
removing overlapping embedded events does not change the pattern of results. One 
anonymous reviewer expressed the concern that my failure to find an effect of causality on 
embedded event judgments, might simply be due to the (relatively) short durations I 
employed; differences in r might be more likely to manifest at longer intervals. However, I 
rule out this argument because Humphreys & Buehner (2009) found that participants gave 
shorter estimates for causal, compared to noncausal intervals, at durations as short as 150 
ms, As the shortest interval in the present study was twice this duration (i.e., 300 ms), it is 
unlikely that my results can be explained be the mere durations of the embedded event. 
Naturally, one always has to be cautious when interpreting null results. However, a 
Bayesian analysis of temporal judgments found Bayes factors greater than 10, in favor of the 
null hypothesis in three of the four experiments reported here (Experiments 1, 2, and 4; the 
exception is Experiment 3, which yielded a factor of less than 1). Furthermore, I combined 
the data from all Experiments and conducted an ANOVA with Embedded Event Modality and 
Outcome Modality as between-subjects factors. The results of this pooled analysis find 
significant effects of Embedded Event Modality (p < .001) and an Outcome Modality x Trial 
Type interaction (p < .05), reflecting the findings discussed above, namely that (1) auditory 
stimuli are judged as longer than visual (Wearden at el, 1998), and (2) the numerical 
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difference between judgment errors for events embedded in causal versus noncausal 
intervals reversed when the modality of the outcome stimulus was auditory compared to 
when it was visual. More importantly, I found no significant effects of Trial Type (p = .34) nor 
a Trial Type x Embedded Event Location interaction (p = .67). This corroborates the main 
observation that events embedded in causal intervals are not judged as shorter than events 
embedded in noncausal intervals, regardless of stimuli (outcome and embedded event) 
modality. Finally, I compared the restricted model against the null (see Embedded Event 
Judgments: Experiment 1) to yield a Bayes factor of 99 in favour of the null versus the 
alternative restricted model, pooling the data from all four Experiments (this pattern also 
holds for data with no overlapping embedded events; see Pooled Analysis in the Appendix 
A). In general then, this pattern represents positive evidence against a difference in 
perceived duration of events embedded in causal versus noncausal intervals.
An unanticipated result concerns noncausal intervals on trials with an embedded 
event before the interval, which were consistently judged as longer than any other interval 
category. One explanation implicates the trial structure I employed: Because on a given trial 
at most one embedded event occurred, the presentation of an event before the interval 
meant that participants knew that no further event will occur during the remainder of the 
trial. Participants would then have been able to attend exclusively to the interval, whereas 
otherwise they would still have to divide their attention between tracking overall interval 
duration and monitoring the potential occurrence of an embedded event. A common 
assumption in internal clock models is that subjective time is modulated by attention, with 
greater attention paid to time passing resulting in more clock pulses accrued, which in turn 
leads to the experience of a subjectively longer interval (cf. the common adage “A watched 
pot never boils” or “Time flies when you are having fun”, Avni-Babad & Ritov, 2003). This 
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attentional modulation would of course have affected causal and noncausal trials equally, 
and indeed this is reflected by analogously less negative judgment errors on causal trials 
with an interval embedded before the trial, relative to causal trials with an interval 
embedded during the trial. However, the binding effect evidently was robust enough to
prevent causal intervals preceded by an embedded event from being overestimated. 
Another explanation is that interval judgments are biased by some property of the 
embedded event. For example, if an embedded event occurs before the marker delineating 
the start of the interval (disappearance of the black square or key press), perception of the 
marker could be biased towards the earlier embedded event.  Consequently, the interval 
would then be perceived as longer. In contrast, if the embedded event occurs after the 
marker, such biases would lead to relatively shorter perception of the interval (I thank an 
anonymous reviewer for this suggestion).
Importantly, finding that temporal binding is robust regardless of the presence, 
location or modality of embedded events demonstrates the reliability of the procedure. 
What then, can my results say about how temporal binding relates to time perception itself? 
At a minimum, my results show that temporal binding does not occur due to general slowing 
of the pacemaker. These results are in accordance with work by Eagleman and colleagues 
(Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007; Stetson et al., 2007; see also Eagleman, 2008, for a brief 
review). Pariyadath and Eagleman found that a perceived temporal expansion of an 
unexpected event did not result in the expansion of an additional, simultaneously presented 
event. They found that when the unexpected event (i.e., the oddball: a clock image 
presented during a series of shoe images), was simultaneously presented with tones, then 
no subjective temporal expansion occurred for the tones. Additionally, they found that 
flickering the visual images did not result in increased temporal acuity for the oddball 
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stimulus, which would be expected if the expansion is effected by an increase in the rate of 
an internal clock. This last effect was also demonstrated in a novel study in which 
participants made a 50 metre free-fall into a net, whilst looking at flickering digits on a wrist 
watch (Stetson et al., 2007). The authors reasoned that if an increased pacemaker is 
responsible for time ‘slowing down’ during a frightening event, then temporal resolution 
should also increase; participants should perceive the digits at a faster flicker rate whilst 
falling, than when stationary. Their results showed that this was not the case, as flicker 
thresholds during the fall did not differ to those measured before the fall. However, duration 
judgments did significantly differ, with participants overestimating their own fall in relation 
to the fall of other participants. Eagleman (2008) posits that distinct neural populations 
underlie different temporal judgments, such that duration judgments are independent of 
flicker rate judgments and simultaneity judgments, and so forth. One solution then, despite 
interval estimation being used for all duration judgments in the current experiments, is that 
different neural populations were responsible for the timing of intervals and embedded 
events (I discuss how this might be in Chapter 6: General Discussion). The key point is that 
temporal binding might be effected by a dedicated clock process, one allocated to keeping 
track of cause-effect intervals. 
How might the timing of multiple events be achieved? Computationally, this would 
necessitate multiple clocks, each capable of independent and simultaneous timing. 
Klapproth (2011) provides evidence for such a notion. Using the temporal production 
technique, in which a key press terminates a temporally extended stimulus, participants 
were required to simultaneously produce two partially overlapping durations. More 
specifically, one (longer) duration served as the target interval, and the participant always 
began timing (i.e. producing) this interval first. Sometime after the onset of the stimulus that 
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was used to demarcate the target interval, a second temporally extended stimulus was 
presented, which served to demarcate a distracter interval. The temporally extended stimuli 
that defined the two to-be-produced target and distracter durations were visual or auditory 
(factorially combined). Klapproth’s aim was to determine whether simultaneous timing (of 
separate durations) is effected via a single internal clock, or multiple clocks operating in 
parallel. The rationale was that multiple clocks would result in modality specific effects on 
clock speed: if auditory clocks run faster than visual ones (as found by Wearden et al, 1998) 
then auditory stimuli should be produced in less time than visual stimuli (the faster auditory 
clock would mean that pulses representing a given duration are accumulated in less 
objective time than pulses emitted from a visual clock). A key prediction made by Klapproth 
therefore was that auditory distractor events should result in shorter production times than 
visual distractors, regardless of whether they were embedded within auditory or visual 
target intervals. The results supported this prediction, in line with a multiple clock account of 
simultaneous timing. Given that there is precedence in the literature for multiple clock 
processes operating simultaneously, and at different clock speeds, it might well be possible 
that temporal binding reflects a change in time-keeping specific to tracking the elapsed 
interval between cause and effect. One possibility, for example, would be that r for clocks 
that time cause-effect intervals is lower relative to clocks dedicated to other timing 
processes. 
Is there evidence for specific clock slowing in temporal binding? There is one study 
by Humphreys and Buehner (2009), who found evidence for changes in r during temporal 
binding. Using a verbal judgment paradigm, they found a linear relationship between 
perceived and actual durations for a range of causal and non-causal intervals. Importantly, 
they reported different slopes for causal and noncausal conditions, suggesting a stable 
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pacemaker rate within but variable between condition(s). Specifically, a shallower slope for 
subjective durations of causal relative to non-causal intervals suggested that clock processes 
dedicated to timing causal intervals ran slower than those used for tracking other events.
How do my findings relate to Wenke and Haggard (2009), who obtained evidence of 
clock slowing using simultaneity judgments? As noted in section 2.1.10 (‘Internal clocks and 
temporal binding’), it is likely that Wenke and Haggard’s results do not reflect clock slowing 
but instead simply reflect a motor-specific contraction of discrimination thresholds at the 
effector, which is independent of binding (Tomassini et al, 2014). Also, internal clock models 
are concerned with interval perception, and it is difficult to see how they may be applied to 
simultaneity judgments. Finally, a particularly glaring issue is that if pacemaker rate r is lower 
in the voluntary condition, then the slope of Wenke and Haggard’s interval estimates should 
be shallower than that for the involuntary condition. This is not the case, which is another 
reason to believe that their temporal discrimination task does not measure pacemaker 
slowing. Given that the procedure I deployed in my studies is a more apposite measure of
pacemaker rate than Wenke and Haggard’s, I argue that the higher temporal discrimination 
thresholds they reported in causal versus noncausal trials reflect a temporal contraction 
related to motor planning (Tomassini et al, 2014).
3.3.1. Is binding effected by differences in timing latencies?
Until now I have discussed my results in light of the possibility that temporal binding 
might reflect a slowing of pacemaker speed r, with the important qualification that such 
changes would need to be specific to timekeeping of the cause-effect interval, and would 
not affect the timing of other events. However, my results are equally consistent with the 
possibility of causality-specific changes to timing latencies Lc and Lo: A delay between the 
actual onset of a causal interval and subjective timing, such that subjective timing begins 
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relatively later for causal compared to non-causal intervals would also result in shorter 
perceived durations. Similarly, if subjective timing terminates earlier in a causal condition 
relative to a noncausal one, then this would also contribute to shorter perceived durations. 
In other words, temporal binding could be due to causality-specific slowing of r, or to 
causality-specific changes in Lc and Lo. Importantly, whether binding is effected by causality-
specific changes either to r or to switch latencies, the embedded event judgments in the 
current experiments would not change.  
In sum, my results have conclusively ruled out the possibility that temporal binding is 
effected by a general slowing of an internal clock. Instead, they suggest that causality-
induced changes in time perception necessitate the operation of multiple specific clock 
processes, such that causality leads to changes in r for the clock that tracks the cause-effect 
interval. Alternatively, causality could lead to changes in switch latencies Lc and Lo, which 
determine when time-keeping for cause-effect intervals begins and ends. One way to 
disentangle switch latencies versus specific pacemaker slowing is to conduct a temporal 
discrimination experiment, such that participants discriminate two causal intervals (in one 
condition) and two noncausal intervals (in another). If temporal binding is effected by a 
slower pacemaker rate, then the resultant poorer resolution would lead to higher 
discrimination thresholds for causal, relative to noncausal intervals. 
Another way to disentangle these accounts is by systematically investigating clock 
processes in causal and noncausal intervals with regression models. Regression coefficients 
for the relationship between actual and perceived intervals indicate whether differences in 
time perception reflect changes in clock rate or differences in timing latencies (Wearden et 
al 1998; Matthews, 2011); differences in causal and noncausal intercept coefficients imply 
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different switch latencies, while different slope coefficients indicate different pacemaker 
rates. 
At present, however, I conclude that temporal binding is not effected by a general 
pacemaker slowing. Instead, I assert that the change in perceived time, associated with 
temporal binding, occurs due to changes in time-keeping processes specific to the causal 
interval. Whether these changes reflect causality-specific pacemaker rate slowing, or 
changes to switch latencies, will be investigated in the following experiments. 
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4. Chapter 4: Investigating a specific account of clock slowing using 
psychophysical techniques
The results of Experiments 1 - 4 showed that binding might be effected by a specific 
clock process. Buehner and Humphreys (2009) provide tentative evidence for this 
hypothesis, by demonstrating a slower pacemaker in causal than noncausal trials using the 
regression technique (e.g., see Wearden et al., 1998; and ‘Disentangling internal clock 
processes’ in Chapter 1; the shallower slopes obtained from this procedure imply a slower 
pacemaker). Likewise, Wenke and Haggard (2009) also claim their evidence supports a 
slower clock in binding. Both studies are compatible, in that both use interval estimation as 
a measure of duration perception. However, whereas Buehner and Humphreys find slope 
differences between causal and noncausal conditions, Wenke and Haggard do not. This 
inconsistency means we cannot be certain whether temporal binding is effected by the 
slowing of a specific clock. Furthermore, the use of interval estimation is another reason to 
exercise caution; there is evidence that using interval estimation is not a reliable technique 
with which to disentangle internal clock processes (Matthews, 2011). In Matthews’ study, 
slope differences were found when no differences should, theoretically, have occurred. This 
casts doubt on interval estimation as a technique to disentangle intercept and slope 
differences. Given Matthews’ results, it would be wise to adopt a different technique in 
order to disentangle differences between slope and intercept coefficients.
Another reason to be wary of interval estimation as a means analysing regression 
coefficients, is that the assumptions of internal clock models are often violated (Wearden & 
Lejeune, 2008). One of the assumptions of internal clock models is that perceived durations 
should increase linearly with actual durations. Interval estimates, however, often display 
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Vierordt’s law (Gu & Meck, 2011). This refers to the finding that shorter intervals are 
overestimated, while longer intervals are underestimated, which is a violation of the linear 
assumption of SET. One reason why interval estimation violates this linear assumption is 
because duration judgments are based on an internal, and not external, reference stimulus. 
The difference is that studies using an external reference stimulus present this particular 
(fixed) duration at some point(s) during the experiment. A test stimulus, of variable 
duration, is then compared to the reference. Thus, both stimuli that require comparison are 
presented on during the experiment. 
In contrast, in interval estimation based-studies, there is no external reference 
stimulus. Instead, the reference is an internal memory of a duration, which might be prone 
to distortion (memory is not infallible, after all). A better option is to use discrimination 
methods (alluded to above), which present the reference stimulus during the experiment. 
Nolden et al. (2012) used a discrimination task, specifically, the method of constant stimuli, 
to replicate the binding effect. Participants judged whether a series of comparison durations 
(in causal and noncausal conditions), were shorter or longer than a fixed reference interval. 
For causal and noncausal conditions, the authors estimated the point of subjective equality 
(PSE), which refers to the duration at which the comparison is perceived the same as the 
reference interval. Their results revealed smaller PSEs in causal versus noncausal conditions, 
for both reference intervals tested (250 and 600 ms). However, there were too few 
reference durations employed to conduct regression analyses, and thus, determine whether 
different slopes were evident between causal and noncausal conditions.  
Therefore, more evidence is required to establish whether temporal binding is 
actually effected by a slower clock, by employing psychophysical procedures and then 
conducting regression analyses. The experiments in the current chapter use a variant of that 
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used in other studies, whereby interval estimates are regressed onto actual durations and 
the slopes analysed (e.g., Wearden et al, 1998). In the present experiments (5 - 8) however, I 
regressed PSEs onto actual durations, before inspecting the slope and intercept coefficients. 
In these experiments, participants experienced two intervals both in causal and noncausal 
conditions: in causal trials, one of the intervals was between a key press and visual flash, 
while in noncausal trials, one of the intervals was delineated by two visual flashes. In both 
conditions an additional single stimulus served as the comparison interval. Participants 
judged whether the single stimulus interval was shorter or longer than the key press-flash 
interval (causal trials) or the flash-flash interval (noncausal trials). I computed the point of 
subjective equality (PSE) as a measure of perceived interval duration, for a range of 
durations. I expected shorter causal versus noncausal PSEs, due to temporal binding. 
Importantly, a regression of PSEs onto actual durations would reveal slope differences if 
pacemaker rates vary between causal and noncausal intervals.
4.1. Experiments 5 and 6
In causal and noncausal conditions participants experienced reference and 
comparison intervals. The reference interval was delineated by two events: a key press and 
visual flash (causal trials) or two visual flashes (noncausal trials). The comparison interval 
was a single visual stimulus in both conditions. The sequence of reference and comparison 
intervals differed between experiments, with either the reference interval first and 
comparison second (Experiment 5), or the reverse in Experiment 6. In both experiments 
participants compared the duration of the comparison to the reference interval. The PSEs 
were then estimated and regressed onto reference durations to analyse the coefficients. I 
predicted lower PSEs in addition to a shallower slope, for causal versus noncausal 
conditions.     
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4.1.1. Method
Figure 4.1. Trial structure of Experiment 5. Participants were presented with two intervals in 
each condition. The duration of the first interval was fixed for a block, while the second was 
variable. In causal trials, a key press triggered a visual flash after an delay (interval 1), 
followed by an extended temporal event (black circle: interval 2). In noncausal trials, two 
visual flashes delineated interval 1, followed by the black circle (interval 2). Participants 
were asked whether the second interval was shorter or longer than the first.
4.1.1.1. Participants
Sixteen students (14 female, 2 male, Mage = 20.4 years, age range: 18-25) of Cardiff 
University participated in Experiment 5 and 18 (15 female, 3 male, Mage = 19.6 years, age 
range: 18-23) in Experiment 6. Prior to analysis, the data were screened for normality. 
Participants whose PSEs deviated from the mean by more than 3 standard deviations were 
not entered into the analysis. This led to four participants being removed in Experiment 5 
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and six in Experiment 6. However, I replaced certain (but not all) participants in Experiment 
6 by retesting, to enable a between-subjects comparison of each experiment. The reason 
was to afford a suitable comparison of Experiments 5 and 6 using equal sample sizes; whilst 
the pattern of results does change with different participant numbers, I nevertheless wished 
to avoid incurring any explanation of the results that might be attributable to unequal 
samples. Thus, the final sample entered into the analyses were 12. Participants received 
course credit or £10 payment. 
4.1.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli
The experiment was implemented in Psychopy (Peirce, 2007) on cathode ray tube 
(CRT) monitors connected to Apple Mac Minis, with resolution of 1280 x 1024 and refresh 
rate of 120 Hz. Both conditions (causal, noncausal) featured two intervals. A reference 
interval was marked by two visual events: a key press and white square in causal trials, and 
two white squares in noncausal trials (all white squares were 200 pixels2 and displayed for 
50 ms). The second was a single visual event (a black circle; radius 70 pixels), which served 
as the comparison interval. The duration of reference intervals was fixed for a block, while 
the duration of the comparison interval varied from trial to trial. A white fixation cross (60 
pixels2) was displayed throughout each trial. All stimuli were presented centrally on the 
screen. 
4.1.1.3. Design and procedure
I employed two factors: Trial Type (causal and noncausal) and Reference Duration 
(10 durations: 100, 200, 300, . . . 1000 ms). The dependent variable was participants’ 
discrimination judgments. Participants completed 10 blocks of causal and noncausal trials 
(one block per Reference Duration x Trial Type combination), with each block comprising 
around 30 trials. This resulted in around 600 trials total, with an additional 12 practice trials
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for causal and noncausal blocks (actual trial numbers varied due to the staircase procedure 
employed – each block ended when minimum reversal and trial number criteria were 
satisfied; see below for specifics).
Figure 4.1 shows the trial structure of Experiment 5. Causal trials began with the 
display of a fixation cross on screen. Participants were told to press a key at a time of their 
choosing, which triggered a visual flash after a fixed duration (100, 200, 300, . . . 1000 ms). 
After an ISI of 1000 ms, the black circle was displayed for a duration that varied from trial to 
trial (trials began with durations of 50% and 150% of the reference duration, for two 
interleaved staircases, respectively. See below for specifics). Participants then indicated 
whether the black circle was shorter or longer in duration than the key press - flash interval 
by pressing the S or L keys, respectively. After responding, the screen blanked for a random 
duration (1500 - 2300 ms) before the display of the fixation cross signalled the next trial.
Noncausal trials followed a similar procedure. The trial began with the display of a 
fixation cross, presented for a random duration (750 - 1250 ms). A visual flash marked the 
start of the first interval, followed by another flash after a fixed interval (100, 200, 300, . . . 
1000 ms). After an ISI of 1000 ms, the second interval (black circle) was displayed for a 
duration (variable from trial to trial). Participants were then asked whether the second 
(variable) interval was shorter or longer than the first (fixed) interval. The screen then 
blanked for a random duration (1500 - 2300 ms) before the fixation cross signalled the 
beginning of the next trial. 
The experiment began with either a causal or noncausal block, thereafter alternating 
between them. The duration of the fixed interval was selected at random from one of the 
ten Reference Duration intervals, and remained fixed for each block. The variable interval 
was controlled by a staircase procedure, using a Kesten stochastic approximation algorithm 
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(Kesten, 1958; Treutwein, 1995). This allows for fast and reliable convergence onto any 
probability threshold. I used 2 randomly interleaved staircases, each with target 
convergence thresholds of 0.5, with each block ending after a minimum of 4 reversals and 
15 trials per staircase. The first trials of each staircase began with durations of 0.5 and 1.5 
times the fixed duration, i.e., for a fixed interval of 400 ms, the variable interval would begin 
at durations of 200 and 600 ms for each respective staircase. Additionally, the first trial of 
each staircase was classed as a control trial, with the first and second trials of each staircase 
set to the same duration, regardless of response. This was to ensure that incorrect or 
mistaken responses early in each block did not adversely affect the direction of each 
staircase, e.g., a mistaken response would alter the direction of the staircase and reduce the 
likelihood of convergence within the scheduled number of trials.
Participants first completed practice blocks (causal and noncausal), which contained 
a fixed reference duration of 650 ms. These were shorter than main experimental blocks 
and were programmed to end after a minimum of 2 reversals and 6 trials per staircase. 
Participants then alternated between causal and noncausal blocks of the main experiment. 
Throughout the experiment, participants were given a short 2-minute break between 
blocks. The study was conducted across 2 sessions, with one session per day. The sessions 
were scheduled on two successive days. Participants began with a causal block in session 
one and noncausal in session two.
Experiment 6 followed the same general procedure except that I reversed the order 
of fixed and variable intervals. The comparison interval was presented first, and the 
reference interval second. The fixation cross disappeared during the ISI period, so that 
participants would know when to press the key to trigger the flash. Participants were still 
asked whether the comparison interval was shorter or longer than the reference interval.  
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Figure 4.2. Results of Experiments 5 (upper row: A & B) and 6 (lower row: C & D). (Left 
panels A & C): Causal PSEs are smaller in both experiments, replicating the temporal binding
effect. The long and bold dashed line represents the best linear fit; this shows that durations 
are generally underestimated in both conditions, particularly Experiment 5. Error bars show 
standard error. (Right panels B & D): Scatterplots show JNDs increase linearly with PSEs.
4.1.2. Results
4.1.2.1. Experiment 5
Prior to analysis, the control (first) trial of each staircase was removed and then 
cumulative Gaussian curves were fitted, following the generalized linear model (GLM) 
procedure in R (Knoblauch & Maloney, 2012). I then estimated the PSEs and JNDs for each 
participant. 
PSE analysis. Figure 4.2 (A) shows that, in general, all combination of Trial Type x 
Reference Duration PSEs are underestimated, relative to objective durations. More 
importantly, causal PSEs were shorter than noncausal for most levels of Reference Duration. 
Figure 4.2 (A) also shows a linear relationship between PSEs and actual durations, indicating 
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that participants distinguished between reference durations. Statistical analyses support 
these observations, with ANOVA showing a significant effect of Trial Type, F(1,11) = 6.34, p < 
.05, partial 2 = .36, Reference Duration, F(9,99) = 20.56, p < .001, partial 2 = .65, but no 
Trial Type x Reference Duration interaction, F(9,99) = 1.25, p = .28, partial 2 = .10. 
Regression analyses. To investigate pacemaker and switch latency differences 
between causal and noncausal conditions, I regressed PSEs onto reference durations for 
each participant. I then conducted separate t-tests on the mean intercept and slope 
coefficients. While Figure 4.2 (A) shows that, numerically, the intercepts differ between 
causal versus noncausal conditions, the results are not significant, t(11) = -1.93, p = .08. 
Neither did I find a significant difference between slopes, t(11) = -1.07, p = .31. I conducted 
Bayesian t-tests to explore the likelihood both of the difference between intercept and 
between slope coefficients. A Bayes factor of 1 for the intercept difference indicates that 
the alternative and null hypotheses provide and equally likely fit of the data. Meanwhile, I 
found a Bayes factor of 0.5 in favour of difference between slopes (or, put differently, a 
Bayes factor of 2 in favour of no difference between slope coefficients). Thus, a difference in 
intercepts is twice as likely to explain the data than a difference between slopes. 
Scalar variability. Finally, I was interested in the variability of timing across the range 
of durations employed. One quality of internal clock models is that variability remains 
constant across a range of to-be-timed durations. This refers to the scalar property of 
timing3 (known as the coefficient of variation: CV, essentially an index of timing sensitivity), 
3 Wearden and Lejeune (2008) make a distinction between empirical and theoretical 
scalar timing. The latter refers to instances where the underlying representations are 
considered to have scalar properties, but additional factors (e.g., task difficulty) obscure this 
property. Wearden and Lejeune use the example of Ferrara, Lejeune and Wearden (1997), 
who found that the CV varied with task difficulty. However, because perceived durations 
increased with actual durations, the results were said to conform to theoretical timing. 
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and is a form of Weber’s law (Grondin, 2010; Wearden & Lejeune, 2008). Because 
pacemaker reliability is usually explained as the cause of timing variability, any variability 
within the CV suggests that the pacemaker rate varies depending on the duration of the 
stimulus. One way to assess this component is to plot standard deviations against mean 
estimates; standard deviations should increase linearly with mean estimates, such that the 
ratio of the former to the latter is constant across durations. In the present case, this would 
involve plotting JNDs against PSEs for all reference durations, which can be seen in Figure 
4.2 (B). If pacemaker rate is stable within a particular condition, then JNDs should increase 
linearly with PSEs. Inspection of this figure shows that JNDs do indeed increase linearly, both 
in causal and noncausal conditions. This is what would be expected if timing sensitivity were 
constant across a range of durations. To determine whether this observed linear trend is 
significant, I conducted separate regression analyses for causal and noncausal conditions. A 
regression of JNDs onto PSEs found significant models for causal, p < .05, adjusted R2 = .51, 
and noncausal conditions, p < .001, adjusted R2 = .75. Additionally, I conducted an ANOVA to 
determine whether JNDs differed between causal and noncausal conditions. In line with the 
regression results, ANOVA found a significant main effect of Reference Duration, F(9,99) = 
5.88, p < .01, partial 2 = .35, but no effect of Trial Type, F(1,11) = .22, p = .65, partial 2 = 
.02, nor a Reference Duration x Trial Type interaction, F(9,99) = .90, p = .41, partial 2 = .08. 
Thus, I conclude that timing sensitivity remained constant across the range of durations I 
employed, and was not affected by causality.
4.1.2.2. Experiment 6
PSE analysis. As in Experiment 5, I removed the first trial of each staircase before 
fitting cumulative Gaussian functions and estimating PSEs and JNDs. Figure 4.2 (C) shows 
that all PSEs are lower than objective durations. Also, PSEs increase linearly with reference 
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durations, implying that participants distinguished between reference durations. 
Importantly, causal PSEs are perceived as shorter than noncausal, in line with the results of 
the previous experiment. This causal versus noncausal difference is greater than in 
Experiment 5, particularly at reference durations of 400 ms and higher. A 2 x 10 ANOVA with 
Trial Type (causal, noncausal) and Standard Duration (100 - 1000 ms) as factors support 
these observations, with a main effect of Trial Type, F(1,11) = 24.10, p < .001, partial 2 = 
.69, Reference Duration, F(9,99) = 31.30, p < .001, partial 2 = .74, and a Trial Type x 
Reference Duration interaction, F(9,99) = 3.29, p < .01, partial 2 = .23. Simple effects 
analysis found significant effects of Trial Type for all levels of Standard Duration except for 
700 and 800 ms (ps < .05).
Regression analyses. I conducted individual regression analyses to investigate 
differences in slope and intercept coefficients between Trial Type levels. T-tests on these 
results did not find a significant difference between intercepts, t(11) = -.23, p = .82, but did 
yield a significant difference between slopes, t(11) = -3.49, p < .01. Bayesian t-tests found 
factors of 10, in favour of a slope difference, and 0.3 in favour of the intercept difference 
(or, put differently, a Bayes factor of 3 in favour of the null hypothesis for a difference 
between causal and noncausal intercept coefficients). 
Scalar variability. I also investigated whether the data exhibited the scalar property 
found in Experiment 5. This is shown in Figure 4.2 (D), which shows JNDs plotted by PSEs. 
Generally, the JNDs increase linearly with PSEs, corroborating the findings of Experiment 5. 
However, JNDs are dispersed more widely around the line-of-best-fit in the current 
experiment, relative to Experiment 5. One interpretation suggests that changing the trial 
structure for the current experiment affected the memory of each interval. The duration of 
the reference interval was fixed throughout each block, which may have strengthened its 
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representation in memory. In contrast, the comparison interval varied from trial to trial, 
which may have resulted in a relatively weaker representation. Because the comparison 
interval was presented first in the trial sequence (and thus more distant in memory) in the 
current experiment, it may be that its memory trace faded somewhat; in Experiment 5, the 
comparison interval was presented second in the trial (and thus more recent in memory), 
and did not have sufficient time to decay. Nevertheless, reversing the trial structure might 
have increased task difficulty but was not sufficient to entirely abolish the linear relation 
between JNDs and PSEs. Therefore, to determine whether this linear trend is significant, I 
regressed JNDs onto PSEs separately for causal and noncausal conditions. I found a 
significant model for causal JNDs, p < .01, adjusted R2 = .54, but the noncausal model was 
outside significance, p = .06, adjusted R2 = .29. Additionally, ANOVA found that the effect of 
Reference Duration was also just outside significance, F(9,99) = 3.29, p = .06, partial 2 = .23, 
while no significant effects were found for Trial Type, F(1,11) = .13, p = .73, partial 2 = .01, 
nor the Reference Duration x Trial Type interaction, F(9,99) = .96, p = .40, partial 2 = .08. 
These results are in line with those of Experiment 5, in that JNDs did not differ between 
causal and noncausal conditions.
4.1.3. Discussion
In two experiments I replicated the temporal binding effect using a temporal 
discrimination procedure. I found that PSEs increased linearly with Reference Duration in 
both conditions, indicating that participants successfully distinguished between durations. 
Also, PSEs were lower than objective reference durations in both conditions. I also found a 
positive linear association between discrimination thresholds (JNDs) and PSEs. Although, 
this differed between experiments, with more deviation from the trend line in Experiment 6. 
Clearly then, reversing the order of reference and comparison intervals affected the 
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difficulty of the task; the linear trend provides a better fit of the data when the comparison 
interval is presented second in the trial sequence (Experiment 5), compared to the reverse 
(Experiment 6). In other words, my data exhibit a recency effect, which has been 
documented in the time perception literature previously (Matthews, 2013). Importantly, 
while this recency effect may have affected timing sensitivity, it was not sufficient to abolish 
or mar, the temporal binding effect.
The main purpose of Experiments was to analyse the regression coefficients. The 
results of Experiment 6 revealed a significant difference between the slopes of causal and 
noncausal PSEs, while Experiment 5 found no significant differences either between slopes 
or intercepts (although I am among the first to examine slopes in temporal binding, the lack 
of an intercept difference is a common finding in time perception experiments, see e.g., 
Matthews, 2013; but see Matthews, 2011, for an exception). Given that the results of 
Experiments 5 and 6 do not lead to unequivocal conclusions, further experiments are 
necessary. To further strengthen my claim of a slower clock in temporal binding, and to 
attempt to overcome the conflict between the present set of results, I conducted further 
experiments that replicate 5 and 6. However, for practical reasons it was necessary to 
reduce the length of the experiment and therefore, fewer reference durations (5) were 
used. Given that slope differences are often found with fewer than 10 data points (e.g., 
Humphreys & Buehner, 2009; Matthews, 2011), I did not anticipate any reason why this 
reduction would adversely impact the validity of the results.
4.2. Experiments 7 and 8
The current experiments replicate those of 5 and 6 in order to gain a clearer 
understanding of the internal clock processes in operation in temporal binding. I replicated 
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Experiments 5 and 6 using fewer reference durations. Otherwise the procedure was 
identical. 
4.2.1. Method
4.2.1.1. Participants
Sixteen students (16 female, Mage = 18.9 years, age range: 18-20) of Cardiff 
University participated in Experiment 7 and 19 (17 female, 2 male, Mage = 20.6 years, age 
range: 18-29) in Experiment 8. I applied the same exclusionary criteria as in Experiment 5, 
leading to the removal of 3 participants in Experiment 7, and 6 in Experiment 8. As before, 
to enable a comparison between experiments, I replaced participants in Experiment 8. This 
resulted in 13 participants entered in to analyses in both experiments. Participants received 
course credit or £5 payment. 
4.2.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli
This remained the same as Experiment 5. 
4.2.1.3. Design and procedure
The procedure was analogous to Experiments 5 and 6 with the exception that I used 
fewer reference durations (200, 400, 600, 800 and 1000 ms). In Experiment 7 the reference 
interval was presented first the comparison interval second, reversed in Experiment 8.
4.2.2. Results 
4.2.2.1. Experiment 7
PSE analysis. I removed the first trial of each staircase and fitted cumulative Gaussian 
functions, before estimating PSEs and JNDs. Inspection of Figure 4.3 (A) shows that causal 
PSEs are perceived as shorter than noncausal, in line with the results from Experiments 5 
and 6. Also, causal PSEs increase linearly with Reference Duration, indicating that 
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participants discriminated reference durations. However, this increase is of a lesser 
magnitude in causal than noncausal conditions (i.e., shallower slope), corroborating the 
results of Experiment 6. Visually then, the results support a slower clock rate in causal 
conditions. A 2 x 5 (Trial Type [causal, noncausal] x Reference Duration [200, 400, 600, 800, 
1000]) ANOVA found a significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 12) = 8.01, p < .05, partial 2 = 
.40, Reference Duration, F(4, 48) = 22.80, p < .001, partial 2 = .66, and a Trial Type x 
Reference Duration interaction, F(4, 48) = 4.56, p < .01, partial 2 = .28. Simple effects 
analysis found significant effects of Trial Type at 600, 800, and 1000 ms (ps < .05). 
Figure 4.3. Results of Experiments 7 (upper row: A & B) and 8 (lower row: C & D). (Left 
panels A & C): Causal PSEs are smaller in both experiments, replicating the temporal binding 
effect. The long and bold dashed line represents the best linear fit; this shows that durations 
are generally underestimated in both conditions. Error bars represent standard error. (Right 
panels B & D) Scatterplots show JNDs increase linearly with PSEs.
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Regression analyses. As with Experiments 5 and 6, I regressed PSEs onto reference 
durations for each individual participant, and conducted t-tests on the mean intercept and 
slope coefficients for causal and noncausal conditions. In line with the results of Experiment 
6, these reveal no difference between intercepts, t(12) = .03, p = .97, but a significant 
difference between slopes, t(12) = -3.87, p < .01. Bayes t-tests found factors of 20 and 1 in 
favour of the alternative hypothesis, for slope and intercept differences, respectively.
Scalar variability. Finally, JNDs were regressed onto PSEs to determine whether the 
scalar assumption holds. This can be seen in Figure 4.4 (B). I found significant models both 
for causal, p < .05, adjusted R2 = .86, and noncausal conditions, p = .05, adjusted R2 = .68, 
supporting my observation that JNDs increase linearly with perceived duration (PSEs). 
ANOVA supports these results, with a significant effect of Reference Duration, F(4,48) = 
4.77, p < .05, partial 2 = .28, but neither Trial Type nor the Reference Duration x Trial Type 
interaction were significant, F(1,12) = .06, p = .82, partial 2 < .01, and F(4,48) = .23, p = .82, 
partial 2 = .02, respectively.  
4.2.2.2. Experiment 8
PSE analysis. I again fitted cumulative Gaussian functions and estimated PSEs and 
JNDs. Figure 4.3 (C) displays the PSEs for causal and noncausal conditions. The results show 
that causal PSEs are perceived as shorter than noncausal, replicating findings from 
Experiments 5 - 7. Also noticeable in Figure 4.3 (C) is a shallower slope in the causal 
condition, indicating a slower clock rate. ANOVA supports these observations, with a 
significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 12) = 15.32, p < .01, partial 2 = .56, and Reference 
Duration, F(4, 48) = 31.25, p < .001, partial 2 = .72, but no significant Trial Type x Reference 
Duration interaction, F(4, 48) = 1.74, p = .16, partial 2 = .13. 
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Regression analyses. The mean intercept and slope coefficients for each level of Trial 
Type were also analysed, revealing no significant difference between intercepts, t(12) = -
1.58, p = .14, but a significant difference between slopes, t(12) = -2.78, p < .05. Bayes t-tests 
found factors of 4 and 1 in favour of the alternative hypothesis, for slope and intercept 
differences, respectively. 
Scalar variability. Lastly, to investigate the scalar assumption of timing I regressed 
JNDs onto PSEs (see Figure 4.4 [D]). Interestingly, I found no significant models for causal, p
= .17, adjusted R2 = .36, or noncausal conditions, p = .42, adjusted R2 = -0.04. ANOVA 
confirms the results of these regressions, with no main effect of Reference Duration, F(4,48) 
= .99, p = .36, partial 2 = .08. However, this can be explained by the wide dispersion of the 
JNDs, evidencing the increased difficulty of the task; when the reference duration is the 
second interval in a trial, participants require a higher JND to discriminate durations. An 
important finding is that JNDs were not affected by causality, with no effect of Trial Type, 
F(1,12) = .61, p = .45, partial 2 = .05, nor the Reference Duration x Trial Type interaction, 
F(4,48) = 1.38, p = .27, partial 2 = .10.
4.2.3. Discussion
The results of Experiments 7 and 8 largely replicate those of 5 and 6. I found a 
significant temporal binding effect in both experiments, with lower PSEs in causal, versus 
noncausal trials. The PSEs increased linearly with Reference Duration, suggesting that 
participants correctly distinguished the intervals. Additionally, PSEs in causal and noncausal 
conditions were lower than objective reference durations, again corroborating the results of 
Experiments 5 and 6. I also found that my data generally conformed to the scalar 
component of timing, as JNDs regressed onto PSEs exhibit significant models in both 
conditions in Experiment 7; in Experiment 8 though, the models were not significant. 
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However, this is likely due to the increased task difficulty brought about via changes in the 
trial structure from Experiment 7 to 8, corroborating the results of Experiment 6. 
Additionally, the regressions in Experiments 5 and 6 were performed using 10 data points, 
while those in Experiments 7 and 8 use half that number. This suggests that the results are 
robust as to be unaffected by the number of reference durations employed. 
A further important finding is that, contrary to Experiments 5 and 6, I found a 
significant difference between causal and noncausal slopes in each experiment, but no 
difference between intercept coefficients. This occurred regardless of the differences in trial
structure between Experiments 7 and 8, which, together with Experiment 6, supports a 
slower pacemaker in temporal binding.  
4.3. Experiments 5 – 8: Discussion
The aim of these experiments was to determine whether temporal binding is 
effected by the slowing of a specific clock. Previous experiments found that clock slowing in 
binding is not a general effect but rather, is likely a process unique to cause-effect intervals 
(see Chapter 3). I therefore adopted a different paradigm to the experiments in the previous 
chapter, one more suited to investigating a specific cause-effect clock slowing. 
I first estimated the PSEs for a range of durations, before conducting regression 
analyses to determine to slope and intercept coefficients. In three Experiments (6 – 8) I 
found significantly shallower slopes in causal, than noncausal intervals, which signifies a 
slower clock in cause-effect intervals. This replicates the results of Humphreys and Buehner 
(2009), who also found shallower slopes for cause-effect intervals using interval estimation. 
Importantly, I found that, generally speaking, the ability to discriminate intervals increased 
linearly with Reference Duration in both conditions. This indicates that the pacemaker is 
stable within conditions but different between. My results are comparable with Nolden et 
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al. (2012), who found lower PSEs in causal, relative to noncausal conditions, using the 
method of constant stimuli. Interestingly, their Weber fractions did not differ either 
between reference durations or key press condition (causal and noncausal). This indicates 
that timing sensitivity remained constant across a range of durations, in line with my 
findings. 
4.3.1. Switch latencies and timing sensitivity in temporal binding
In line with the majority of studies in time perception (Matthews et al., 2011; 
Penton-Voak et al., 1996; Wearden et al., 2007), the evidence from the current experiments 
do not support switch latency differences. Experiments 5 - 8 used a regression procedure 
commonly used to disentangle pacemaker from switch latency differences (Wearden et al., 
1998). Inspection of the regression coefficients found no difference between causal and 
noncausal intercepts, which is a key indicator of switch latency differences. Thus, the results 
of my experiments are compatible with many others in time perception (see Matthews, 
2011), which implicate changes in pacemaker rate as the root of temporal variability.  
One might ask how and why an internal clock would slow down, and how this relates 
to Eagleman and Holcombe’s (2002) sensory recalibration account of binding. However, 
there are a number of points to discuss before I address these questions. One relates to the 
variability in discrimination thresholds (JNDs) in the experiments. Although I replicated the 
binding effect with lower PSEs in causal trials in all experiments, I found a difference in 
discrimination thresholds; JNDs in Experiments 6 and 8 were more variable than in 
Experiments 5 and 7. Because participants always judged whether the comparison interval 
was shorter or longer than the reference interval (regardless of whether the comparison 
interval was first or second in the trial sequence), changing the sequence of this comparison 
interval affected discrimination judgments; JNDs were dispersed more widely when the 
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comparison interval was first in the trial sequence. This suggests that timing sensitivity per 
se was unaffected, but rather, implicates a decay in the representation of the comparison 
interval (Matthews, 2013). Importantly, this memory decay was not sufficient to adversely 
affect or even abolish the temporal binding effect. In principle then, I conclude that timing 
sensitivity (i.e., JNDs), increases linearly with Reference Duration. 
Why did I not find a difference between slopes in Experiment 5? At best I attribute 
this to the random fluctuation inherent in psychological experiments. It cannot be simply 
due to the procedural difference between Experiment 5 and 6, because the same 
differences exist between Experiments 7 and 8, in which the results revealed a difference in 
slope coefficients between causal and noncausal conditions for both experiments. 
Furthermore, this difference was significant with only five (compared to ten) reference 
durations entered into the regression analyses. Importantly, I found a significant difference 
between causal and noncausal slope coefficients when the data from Experiments 5 and 6 
were combined (p < .01). This suggests that the difference between slopes is a particularly 
robust effect. In sum, my results support the hypothesis of a slower pacemaker in temporal 
binding.        
4.3.2. Pacemaker slowing or drifts in attention?
It is important to be clear about what the slope coefficient represents. A difference 
in slopes between causal and noncausal conditions represents a different number of pulses 
accumulated between conditions. Given an absence of an intercept difference, there are 
two possibilities: one is that there is indeed, a slower pacemaker, while the other is that 
pacemaker rate is constant, yet there are drifts in attention. The latter suggests that pulses 
are missed to due to non-focal attention, such that certain pulses are not accumulated. Both 
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accounts would explain the shallower slopes found in three out of four experiments (the 
exception is Experiment 5). I shall explore each option in turn.
Why would the pacemaker rate decrease in cause-effect intervals? Because 
outcomes followed causes in 100% of trials, then one answer is that clock speed is 
modulated by cause-effect contingency: if an action always produces a certain outcome 
with 100% contingency, then it becomes possible to reliably predict that pressing a key, for 
example, will always trigger a visual flash. Therefore, it might be that clock rate decreases as 
the causal strength between two events increases. One way to test this is to examine PSE 
and slope coefficients for different levels of cause-effect contingency. One caveat is 
necessary here though: contingency and predictability are insufficient in themselves to 
affect clock speed, because noncausal trial events are equally predictable. It is predictability 
engendered by causality, rather than mere association, that I posit as an explanation for 
clock slowing (Buehner, 2012).  
An alternative possibility to clock slowing is that pacemaker rates remain the same in 
causal and noncausal conditions, but instead, an attentional drift in the former results in 
fewer pulses accumulated. Temporal binding might arise, for example, because less 
attention is devoted to the cause-effect interval but more to the outcome stimulus. For 
unrelated events (noncausal conditions), attention might be equally devoted to the interval 
and the stimuli marking the interval. The implication of this is that outcomes in causal trials
would be perceived as longer. Temporal binding then, might be due to a bias in attention, 
such that causally related outcomes result in a bottom-up capture of attention. Note, 
however, that this is merely one suggestion of how attentional drifts might occur. The key 
point is that any lapse in attention during the interval would also result in fewer pulses 
accumulated, thus manifesting as a shallower slope. To be clear, though, this is not the same 
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as an attentional switch account, which posits different switch latencies between causal and 
noncausal conditions; none of the experiments support this notion, despite a numerical 
(and non-significant) intercept difference in Experiment 5. My results then, support a slower 
pacemaker in causal intervals, but drifts in attention during the interval should not be 
discounted.
To conclude this chapter, I have demonstrated that temporal binding is effected by a 
slower pacemaker rate: causal slopes are shallower than noncausal in three of the four 
experiments reported in this chapter. This supports the suggestions in Chapter 3, which 
posited a specific clock process. However, to further verify the clock slowing hypothesis, I 
conducted additional experiments.
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5. Chapter 5: Verifying clock slowing in temporal binding with 
temporal discrimination tasks
The experiments in this chapter exploit the corollary that temporal resolution is 
necessarily impaired if the pacemaker operates at a slower rate. Specifically, if the 
contraction of time in temporal binding reflects a decrease in the rate of a specific clock 
system, then the impaired temporal resolution that follows generates an interesting 
prediction: The threshold required to temporally discriminate causal intervals should be 
higher than for noncausal intervals. This is because a slower pacemaker in causal intervals 
would produce fewer overall pulses, which in turn results in poorer temporal resolution 
(relative to noncausal intervals). This would not be the case if binding were effected by 
shifts in the events that delineate the interval (or by a difference in switch latencies). Only a 
subjective distortion of time during the interval could explain temporal discrimination 
differences between causal and noncausal intervals.
Participants completed a temporal discrimination task, using a similar method to the 
experiments in the previous chapter. However, rather than compare an extended temporal 
event to either a causal or noncausal interval, participants in the following experiments 
discriminated two identical (causal or noncausal) intervals. This is because I wished to 
explore whether a slower pacemaker also reduces temporal resolution. This cannot be fully 
ascertained from Experiments 5 – 8 because the same temporally extended stimulus was 
compared to either causal or noncausal intervals; in order to specifically measure 
discrimination thresholds in causal and noncausal sequences, it is essential that both 
intervals (in each condition) be the same. Also, the staircase procedure in the previous 
chapter’s experiments targeted the PSE, whereas the following experiments were designed 
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specifically to probe to the JND with a higher temporal resolution. Additionally, duration 
perception is sensitive to stimuli structure, such that intervals with different markers are 
judged with less precision than intervals with identical markers (Grondin, 2010; Grondin et 
al., 2005). This might, at least in part, explain the wide dispersion of JNDs in Experiments 5 –
8 (i.e., reference and comparison intervals were marked by different stimuli). Therefore, to 
reliably derive a causal and noncausal JND, it was necessary to conduct further experiments, 
ones that (1) specifically target JNDs rather than PSEs, and (2) contain intervals delineated 
by the same events. 
In causal trials participants discriminated two intervals, each delineated by a key 
press and visual flash. In noncausal trials, participants discriminated two intervals each 
delineated by two visual flashes. The duration of the first interval in both conditions was 
fixed for a block, while the second varied from trial to trial. Participants were asked to judge 
whether the second (variable) interval was shorter or longer in duration than the first (fixed) 
interval. I then computed the discrimination threshold (JND) for a range of fixed intervals. 
Larger JNDs in causal trials would indicate a slower pacemaker rate during causal intervals, 
relative to noncausal. 
5.1. Experiment 9
5.1.1. Method
5.1.1.1. Participants
Fourteen students of Cardiff University (13 female, 1 male, Mage = 22.8 years, age 
range: 12-42) participated in exchange for course credit or £4 payment.
5.1.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli
The experiment was implemented in Psychopy (Pierce, 2007) on CRT monitors 
connected to Apple Mac computers, with resolution of 1280 x 1024 and refresh rate of 120 
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Hz. In both conditions (causal and noncausal) participants were presented with two 
intervals. In causal trials both intervals were between a key press and a visual flash (white 
square, 200 pixels2), while two visual flashes marked the intervals in noncausal trials. All 
visual flash stimuli were 50 ms in duration. In causal and noncausal trials the first interval 
was a fixed duration, while the second always varied in duration from trial to trial. A fixation 
cross (60 pixels2) appeared on screen before each interval and was displayed until the 
interval finished. All stimuli were presented centrally on screen.  
Figure 5.1. Trial structure of Experiment 9. Participants were presented with two intervals in 
each condition. The duration of the first interval was fixed for a block, while the second was 
variable. In causal trials, a key press triggered a visual flash after an interval; in noncausal 
trials, two visual flashes delineated an interval. Participants were asked whether the second
interval was shorter or longer than the first.
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5.1.1.3. Design and procedure
Two factors were employed in the study: Trial Type (causal, noncausal) and 
Reference Duration (250, 450, 650 and 850 ms). The dependent variable was the 
participants’ discrimination judgments. I operationalized discrimination as the just 
noticeable difference (JND), which is half of the difference between 0.75 and 0.25 
responding probability from a fitted psychometric function. Participants completed practice 
blocks of causal and noncausal trials, following the procedure from Experiments 5 – 8 (i.e., 
minimum 12 trials and 2 reversals per block). Thereafter, participants alternated between 
causal and noncausal experimental blocks, with one block of each reference duration, 
comprising roughly 50 trials per block (two interleaved staircases, each ending after a 
minimum of 25 trials and 4 reversals. See specifics below). 
Figure 5.1 shows the trial structure of the experiment. Causal trials began with the 
display of a fixation cross. Participants then made a voluntary key press, which triggered a 
visual flash after a fixed interval (250, 450, 650 or 850 ms). During this interval the fixation 
cross remained on screen, but disappeared immediately following the flash. Participants 
then experienced an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 1000 ms before the fixation cross was 
again displayed. As in the first interval, participants made a voluntary key press that 
triggered a visual flash after a random interval (which began with durations of 50% and 
150% of the reference duration for each respective staircase. See below for specifics). The 
fixation cross again disappeared immediately following the flash. Participants were then 
asked whether the second (variable) interval was shorter or longer than the first (fixed) 
interval by pressing the S or L keys, respectively. The screen then blanked for a random 
duration between 1500 - 2300 ms before the next trial began.
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Noncausal trials followed a similar procedure. Trials began with the display of a 
fixation cross, for a random time (750 - 1250 ms). A visual flash then marked the beginning 
of the interval, followed by another visual flash after a fixed duration (250, 450, 650 or 850 
ms). After an ISI of 1000 ms the fixation again appeared (random duration: 750 - 1250 ms,) 
before the second interval began, which was delineated by two visual flashes. The fixation 
cross remained on screen throughout each interval, disappearing for the ISI period. As in 
causal trials, participants were asked to press the S or L keys if they perceived the second 
interval to be shorter or longer than the first. Following the participants’ response, the 
screen blanked for a random duration between 1500 and 2300 ms. 
The experiment began with either a causal or noncausal block of trials 
(counterbalanced between participants), thereafter alternating between causal and 
noncausal trial blocks. The duration of the fixed interval was selected at random from one of 
the four Reference Duration intervals, and remained fixed for each block. The variable
interval was controlled by a staircase procedure, using the same Kesten stochastic algorithm 
as in Experiments 1 - 4 (Kesten, 1958; Treutwein, 1995). However, the convergence 
thresholds of each staircase were 0.25 and 0.75, respectively, and each block ended after a 
minimum of 4 reversals and 25 trials per staircase. In other respects, the procedure 
remained the same as the previous experiments.
Participants first completed practice blocks, with a fixed reference duration of 600 
ms. These were shorter than the main experimental blocks and were programmed to end 
after a minimum of 2 reversals and 6 trials per staircase. After completing practice blocks 
participants moved on to the main experimental blocks. Throughout the experiment, 
participants were given a short 2-minute break between blocks.   
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Figure 5.2. Results of Experiments 9 (upper row: A-C) and 10(lower row: D-F). (Left panels: A 
& D): JNDs are higher in causal conditions, than noncausal, showing that participants found 
causal intervals harder to discriminate in both experiments. Error bars represent standard 
error. (Centre panels B & E): JNDs as a function of PSEs. In both experiments, noncausal 
JNDs increase linearly with PSEs, conforming to the scalar component of timing. Dashed and 
solid lines show lines of best fit. (Right panels: C & F): In Experiment 9, causal PSEs are 
overestimated, with respect to the veridical (shown by a lighter/shorter dashed line). This is 
not the case for Experiment 10.
5.1.2. Results
JND analysis. Control trials (trial 1 of each staircase) were removed before fitting 
psychometric functions (cumulative Gaussian). Figure 5.2(A) shows mean JNDs for Trial 
Type, plotted against Reference Duration. JNDs are clearly higher for the causal condition 
across all reference durations, indicating that participants found discriminating causal 
intervals more difficult than noncausal. A 2 x 4 (Trial Type [causal, noncausal] x Reference 
Duration [250, 450, 650,850]) ANOVA corroborated these impressions. I observed a main 
effect of Trial Type, F(1,13) = 25.06, p < .001, partial 2 = .67, and Reference Duration, 
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F(3,39) = 3.79, p < .05, partial 2 = .23. However, the Trial Type X Reference Duration 
interaction was not significant, F(3,39) = .42, p = .74, partial 2 = .03. 
Scalar variability. Inspection of Figure 5.2 (A) also shows a slight linear increase in 
noncausal JNDs as a function of Reference Duration. In contrast, causal JNDs show a linear 
relationship only between 250 and 450 ms reference durations. Confirmation of the scalar 
component of SET requires the discrimination threshold to increase in line with to-be-timed 
durations. To further explore the scalar component, I regressed JNDs onto PSEs for causal 
and noncausal conditions separately. According to Wearden and Lejeune (2008), the scalar 
component holds when a high R2 is obtained (see Chapter 4, and footnote 1 in the same 
chapter). The results support the impression conveyed by Figure 5.2 (B), with a significant 
model for noncausal JNDs, p < .05, adjusted R2 = .96, but no significant model for causal 
JNDs, p = .22, adjusted R2 = .41. Thus, my results conform to the scalar property of timing 
only for noncausal intervals. 
PSE analysis. A common finding in time psychology is the temporal order effect 
(TOE), where the second interval is judged as longer than the first, when the intervals are 
presented in series (Schab & Crowder, 1988). Additionally, in the current experiment 
reference intervals were always presented before variable duration intervals. I have no a 
priori reason why this order effect might have differentially affected causal and noncausal 
intervals, and therefore, conducted an analysis to determine if this occurred. I derived a PSE 
for each level of Reference Duration. Figure 5.2 (C) displays these results, showing a near 
perfect linear relation between noncausal PSEs and actual stimulus duration. In contrast, 
causal PSEs are consistently longer than veridical for all reference durations, suggesting a 
TOE, i.e., because the second interval required a longer real-time duration in order to be 
judged as equal in duration to the first. In other words, the second interval was actually 
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perceived as shorter than the first. It is not certain, therefore, to what extent this order 
effect explains the JND results (I return to this point in the following Discussion section).   
5.1.3. Discussion
In line with the hypothesis of a slower clock in temporal binding, I found that causal 
JNDs were significantly larger than noncausal, for all reference durations tested. 
Interestingly, I found that discrimination sensitivity increased linearly with reference 
duration only for the noncausal condition. Discrimination in the causal condition, by 
contrast, was not linearly related to reference duration; JNDs increased only between the 
shorter durations tested (250 and 450 ms), but did not change for durations between 450 
and 850 ms. Whilst this violates empirical scalar timing (Wearden & Lejeune, 2008; see also 
footnote in Chapter 4), it is not an uncommon finding, as Rammsayer & Ulrich (2001) found 
that the pulse rate decreased as the standard duration increased. However, given that mean 
PSEs increased linearly with Reference Duration, my data then conforms to theoretical 
scalar timing. 
A possible reason for JNDs violating scalar timing is due to differences in task 
difficulty between the current experiment, and those in Chapter 4. JNDs in the experiments 
of Chapter 4 all exhibited the scalar component, whilst the current experiment did not. A 
source of difference between these experiments is the staircase procedure. In the previous 
chapter’s experiments, the target thresholds for the Kesten algorithm (Kesten, 1958) were 
set at 0.5; in the current Experiment 9, both staircases were set at 0.75 and 0.25, 
respectively. A target threshold of 0.5 would mean that upward and downward step sizes 
are equal. However, target thresholds other than 0.5 would result in step sizes that are 
different in downward than upward motion. Thus, unequal down-up step sizes in the 
current experiment might have increased task difficulty, relative to experiments 5 – 8.        
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An unexpected finding concerns the PSEs. While PSEs in noncausal conditions were 
generally veridical, causal PSEs were larger. This indicates that the second (comparison) 
causal interval was perceived as shorter than the first (reference) duration. Given that the 
data conform theoretically to scalar timing (i.e., PSEs increased linearly with reference 
duration), it is unknown if, and to what extent, this order effect contributes to the JND 
results. In order, therefore, to rule out this order effect and provide more compelling 
evidence of differences in the discrimination thresholds of causal and noncausal intervals, I 
conducted a further experiment. Experiment 10 is a variation of Experiment 9, with the 
exception that the order of reference and variable duration intervals are randomised from 
trial to trial.   
5.2. Experiment 10
This experiment differed to the first only in terms of the sequence of reference and 
comparison intervals in each trial. I randomised the location of the reference and 
comparison intervals and asked participants to judge which interval was the longest. 
However, because researchers often conduct temporal discrimination studies with few 
standards (e.g., Rammsayer & Ulrich, 2001), I employed only two reference interval 
durations. In other respects, the procedure remained the same as in Experiment 9. 
5.2.1. Method
5.2.1.1. Participants
Six students of Cardiff University (5 female, 1 male, Mage = 26.8 years, age range: 22-
33) participated in exchange for £2 payment or course credit. 
5.2.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli
This remained the same as the previous experiment. 
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5.2.1.3. Design and procedure
This remained the same as the previous experiment with a few exceptions. I 
randomised the sequential position of the reference and variable intervals, so that the 
reference interval could be presented either first or second in a particular trial. Also, I used 
two standard durations (450, 650 ms) instead of four. Participants were asked which 
interval was longest, and responded by pressing either the left or right arrow key to 
correspond to the first or second interval, respectively. In all other respects the procedure 
remained the same as above. 
5.2.2. Results 
JND analysis. As in Experiment 9, I removed the first trial of each staircase before 
fitting cumulative Gaussian functions. Mean JNDs are shown in Figure 5.2 (D). Consistent 
with the previous results, JNDs were higher in causal than noncausal conditions. ANOVA 
supports these results, with a main effect of Trial Type, F(1,5) = 11.19, p < .05, partial 2 = 
.69. In contrast to the previous experiment I found no effect of Reference Duration, F(1,5) = 
.02, p = .90, partial 2 < .01, and no Trial Type x Reference Duration interaction, F(1,5) = .12, 
p = .74, partial 2 = .02. 
Scalar variability. Regarding the scalar property, Figure 5.2 (E) also shows a 
concordant increase in JNDs in line with PSEs for the noncausal condition. By contrast, 
causal JNDs are inversely related to PSEs, with a lower JND in the 650 condition compared to 
the 450. In line with the previous experiment then, only noncausal trials conform to the 
scalar property of time. Because regression is not meaningful with only two reference 
durations, I restrict my observation to visual inspection only. 
PSE analysis. A final and important observation concerns order effects. Given that 
the intervals in the trial sequence were random (i.e., fixed duration intervals could either be 
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first or second in a particular trial), I expected PSEs of both conditions to be veridical. 
Indeed, this is what I find, as Figure 5.2 (F) shows. Thus, the finding that JNDs in causal trials 
are higher than noncausal, cannot be attributed merely to order effects, and instead, is 
likely due to poorer temporal resolution, achieved by a different pacemaker rate. 
5.2.3. Discussion
The results of the present experiment complement those of Experiment 9. I found 
that causal JNDs were significantly larger than noncausal. Importantly, this is independent of 
the order of reference and comparison intervals, with PSEs for both conditions following a 
linear and veridical trend. Also complementing Experiment 9 is the finding, based on visual 
inspection, that discrimination sensitivity increased linearly with reference duration in 
noncausal trials. In contrast, Figure 5.2 (E) shows a decrease in discrimination sensitivity 
from 450 ms to 650 ms in causal trials. As noted in the Discussion of Experiment 9, this 
might have occurred because of the difference in staircase parameters between the current 
chapter’s experiments and those in Chapter 4; the different step sizes might have 
differentially affected Trial Type levels, such that discrimination in causal trials violates 
scalar timing. This finding may then simply reflect task difficulty, such that greater attention 
is required to discriminate intervals with smaller step sizes (Rammsayer & Ulrich, 2001). This 
is particularly bolstered by the finding that arousal (e.g., which here can be attributed to 
task difficulty) increases subjective time by increasing pacemaker rate (Gil & Droit-Volet, 
2012; Mella, Conty, & Pouthas, 2011). However, given that mean accuracy is preserved, one 
can argue that the data conform theoretically to scalar timing. Importantly though, the 
higher JNDs in causal trials support a slower clock (and poorer temporal resolution) in 
temporal binding. 
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5.3. Experiments 9 – 10: Discussion
In two experiments I have found higher JNDs when discriminating causal, than 
noncausal intervals. Also, I find that JNDs in the noncausal condition increase linearly with 
reference duration, therefore conforming to the scalar component of timing (Wearden & 
Lejeune, 2008). Interestingly, JNDs in the causal condition do not show this scalar 
component. Instead, the JNDs only differ between 250 and 450 ms, thereafter remaining 
the same. What do these results say about internal clock process in temporal binding? First, 
they suggest that cause-effect intervals are served by a slower clock than noncausal 
intervals. Second, the rate of the clock is not systematically slower in causal than noncausal 
intervals, but varies with the duration to-be-timed; timing is more sensitive at longer (e.g., 
850) than shorter durations (e.g., 450 ms). Third, the higher JNDs in causal conditions 
support the hypothesis that a slower pacemaker necessarily leads to poorer temporal 
resolution during causal (binding) sequences.
The obvious question is: why would pacemaker rate vary only in cause-effect 
intervals? One possibility is that pacemaker rate varies in order to compensate for timing 
difficulty at different durations. For example, if short durations are harder to discriminate 
than long durations, then pacemaker rate should vary in order to compensate for this: a 
faster pacemaker rate would improve discrimination at short intervals (Killeen, 1992; Killeen 
& Fetterman, 1988). Of course, this would have affected causal and noncausal conditions 
equally. So the question is why this affects only causal intervals. A tentative possibility is 
that discriminating causal intervals is sufficiently harder than noncausal intervals. This 
suggests that pacemaker rate fluctuates in order to compensate for poorer discrimination at 
certain durations. However, there is reason to believe that this is simply an artefact of the 
experiment, rather than a finding unique to causal interval discrimination, for the following 
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reasons: (1) temporal discrimination tasks, in general, usually find that the CV (standard 
deviation/mean) is greater at durations below 100 ms (Killeen & Fetterman, 1992), 
thereafter remaining constant; and (2) the experiments in the previous chapter 
(Experiments 5 - 8) found that JNDs increased linearly with PSEs. The reason that causal trial 
JNDs in the current experiments do not exhibit this scalar component is likely due to the 
parameters of staircase procedure; response thresholds of 25% and 75% result in smaller 
step sizes than the parameters used in Experiments 5 - 8 (where target thresholds of 50% 
were employed). Hence, the smaller step sizes might simply have increased the task 
difficulty (Wearden & Lejeune, 2008), which can affect the scalar property. 
Can other clock processes, for example switch latencies, explain the results? 
Consider that the latencies between the opening Lo, and closing Lc, are greater in causal than 
noncausal intervals. This cannot account for my results because the latencies would 
presumably be equal in both (reference and comparison) intervals. In other words, 
comparing intervals where the subjective start and end points are the same, would not 
result in different JNDs between causal and noncausal conditions. The same argument 
applies to a sensory recalibration perspective (Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002); the shifts 
would result in equally perceived intervals. It is difficult to see how causality would affect 
JNDs, if the intervals were effected by subjective differences in the start and end point. To 
account for my results therefore, there has to be a change in time perception during the 
causal interval. 
The only reasonable explanation then, is that pacemaker rate slows down in causal 
intervals. A slower pacemaker would mean that fewer pulses are emitted, which decreases 
temporal acuity. The key question is what the pulses actually represent. One suggestion is 
that the pulses themselves represent a neural pacing signal (Grondin, 2010; Wenke & 
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Haggard, 2009), such that a slower pacemaker rate reflects a decrease in neural activity. The 
exact locus of this activity is unknown, with researchers often claiming that time perception 
is distributed throughout the brain (Grondin, 2010). However, establishing the locus of time 
perception in the human brain is beyond the scope of this thesis. The main questions, 
regardless of the locus of time perception, are whether clock pulses represent neural 
activity, and how this activity results in changes to pacemaker rate in causal sequences. 
In an attempt to answer the questions posed above, one might consider Gestalt 
grouping principles (von Ehrenfels, 1890/1988). There are two reasons for this: One, is that 
durations are perceived as shorter when grouped by similarity (Zhou, Yang, Zhang, Zhang, & 
Mao, 2015), and two, neural activity appears reduced when items are perceptually grouped
(Peterson, Gozenman, Arciniega, & Berryhill, 2015). If causality is a perceptual grouping 
factor, then it might explain why causal intervals are perceived as shorter, and why the 
decreased pacemaker rate implies less neural activity. I will elaborate more on this 
argument in the following chapter. For now however, it is sufficient to say that (1) causal 
intervals may be perceived as shorter, and (2) the rate of an internal clock during such 
intervals is slowed, because causality may be a Gestalt grouping factor, i.e., causally related 
events appear closer together because causality itself might be a grouping principle.
In conclusion, the experiments in the current chapter rule out explanations based on 
subjective shifts in the stimuli marking the interval. Instead, the results are in line with those 
of the previous chapter, which support a slower pacemaker in temporal binding episodes. 
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6. Chapter 6: General Discussion
Temporal binding may be characterised as a contraction of perceived time during 
cause-effect intervals. Since the first publication by Haggard et al. (2002), there has been a 
good deal of discussion of the factors that give rise to, and modulate the effect. A notable 
topic of contention has been debated about the factors that give rise to temporal binding –
whether intentional action or causality are necessary for binding to occur (Buehner, 2012; 
Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Engbert et al., 2008). Discussion has also centred on whether 
binding can be considered an implicit measure of agency (Christensen, Yoshie, Di Costa & 
Haggard, 2016; Engbert et al., 2008; Moore et al., 2009). The outcome of these academic 
debates has shown unequivocally that causality, and not intentional action, is necessary for 
binding (Buehner, 2012). Furthermore, referring to binding as an implicit measure of agency 
is moot, because no correlations have been reported between measures of temporal 
binding and explicit agency judgments (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Ebert & Wegner, 2010)4.   
However, despite inconsistencies, research into temporal binding has been fruitful since 
Haggard et al. (2002). 
One area that has received little attention, though, concerns the mechanisms that 
effect binding, i.e., how does binding occur? There are two dominant theoretical 
underpinnings to consider: on one hand, event perception approaches posit that temporal 
binding is a product of sensory realignment (Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002). On the other 
hand, temporal binding might be explained by changes to our perception of time (Wenke & 
Haggard, 2009). The aim of this thesis was simply to explore whether changes in time 
4 Haggard (e.g., Christensen et al., 2016) often refers to binding as a sense of agency 
because of the orthogonal relationship between binding and explicit agency measures: 
shorter perceived intervals are usually associated with stronger ratings of self-agency, even 
though these measure do not correlate. Whether or not binding should be referred to as a 
sense of agency is likely to become a debatable topic in the future publications.
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perception actually occur. To this end, I applied the most popular model of time perception, 
the SET model (Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984), to temporal binding. Internal clock models 
explain changes in time perception either via fluctuations in the rate of a pacemaker, or via 
different switch latencies. There is also evidence that time perception is not ‘general’, but is 
stimulus specific (Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2007); that is, changes in temporal resolution for 
one stimulus might not necessarily affect another simultaneously presented stimulus. 
Therefore, an investigation into to the contraction of time in binding should consider not 
only the different clock processes but also whether such processes are general or specific. 
In applying an internal clock to temporal binding, I first explored whether temporal 
binding is effected by general or specific clock processes (Experiments 1 - 4, Chapter 3). In 
four experiments, participants judged the duration of intervals marked by different events: 
in the causal condition, the intervals were marked by a key press and either a visual or 
auditory outcome, while noncausal trial intervals were marked by a visual stimulus and 
either a visual or auditory outcome. Participants also judged the duration of an additional 
event embedded into certain trials: in one-third of trials a stimulus (auditory or visual) was 
scheduled to occur before the interval, in another one-third the stimulus was scheduled to 
occur during the interval, and in a further one-third the stimulus was not scheduled to 
occur. If the contraction of time in temporal binding is served by changes to a general clock 
process, specifically a general decrease in pacemaker rate, then it would effect events 
embedded during cause-effect intervals in addition to the overall cause-effect interval; 
intervals and events embedded during causal intervals would both be judged as shorter
than those in noncausal conditions. However, if temporal binding is effected by changes to 
switch latencies or by perceived shifts in the time of the events marking causal intervals, 
then embedded event judgments ought not to differ between causal and noncausal 
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conditions. The results were uniform across all four experiments: (1) intervals were judged 
as shorter in causal than noncausal trials; (2) embedded events were judged the same in 
causal and noncausal trials. Importantly, interval judgments were not affected by the 
presence of embedded events. That is, the binding effect occurred regardless of the 
presence or location of embedded events. Also, embedded events were judged the same, 
whether presented before or during the interval. Together, this suggested that temporal 
binding was not effected by a general pacemaker slowing. Instead, I concluded that binding 
is affected either by differences in switch latencies or by clock processes specific to cause-
effect intervals.   
Second, I explored whether temporal binding is indeed effected by changes in 
pacemaker rate or by switch latencies (Experiment 5 - 8, Chapter 4). Following a procedure 
common in time perception research, that of conducting regression analyses to disentangle 
switch latencies and pacemaker rate changes, I investigated the slopes of various interval 
durations in causal and noncausal intervals. Participants judged whether a comparison 
duration interval was shorter or longer than a reference duration interval. In causal 
conditions, reference intervals were marked by a key press and flash, while noncausal trial 
reference intervals were marked by two flashes. In both conditions the duration of the 
intervals was fixed for a block. The comparison interval, meanwhile, varied from trial to trial 
and consisted of a single visual stimulus. I computed the PSE for a series of durations and 
conducted regression analyses to disentangle possible switch latency differences from 
pacemaker rate changes. In three out of four experiments (Experiments 6 - 8) I found a 
significant difference between causal and noncausal slopes, but no intercept difference. 
These results supported a slower pacemaker account of temporal binding, thus concluding 
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that temporal binding is effected by specific clock process dedicated to tracking cause-effect 
sequences.
Third, I verified the findings of Experiments 6 - 8 by examining the temporal 
discrimination thresholds within causal and noncausal conditions (Experiments 9 - 10, 
Chapter 5). If the pacemaker operates at a slower rate in cause-effect intervals then 
temporal resolution should be poorer, resulting in higher discrimination thresholds. 
Participants temporally discriminated two key press-flash intervals in causal trials, and two 
flash-flash intervals in noncausal trials (using a reference and comparison method similar to 
Experiments 5  - 8). The results showed that JNDs for a range of durations were higher in 
causal than noncausal trials, supporting a slower pacemaker in cause-effect intervals. Thus, 
the present body of work finds that temporal binding is effected by changes to the rate of 
an internal clock.  
6.1.1. Is the compression of time around motor commands different to temporal binding?
Research shows that time perception is affected by the mere presence of motor 
action. Tomassini et al. (2014) have shown a perceived compression of time around a 
moment of action. Participants received tactile stimulation (consisting of two pairs of taps) 
to either a moving hand or a static hand. The interval between the reference pair was fixed, 
while the interval between the comparison pair of taps varied from trial to trial. By 
scheduling the reference pair of taps to occur before and after hand movements, Tomassini 
et al. were able to identify whether perceived time changed as a result, or in anticipation of, 
hand movements. Their results showed a subjective compression of time just prior to and 
immediately following hand movements. Importantly, this compression was effector-
specific, as compression was found only for the hand that moved. This complements the 
results of Wenke and Haggard (2009), who also found evidence for effector-specific clock 
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slowing in temporal binding. However, a key difference between Tomassini et al., and 
Wenke and Haggard is that no causal relation existed in the former. Instead, participants 
simply moved their hand, with no causal outcome (i.e., the hand movements did not cause 
the taps). Motor actions in Wenke and Haggard, in contrast, always triggered an auditory 
outcome after an interval (in addition to triggering tactile stimuli). If the contraction of time 
in Tomassini et al. occurs between two tactile stimuli, then what accounts for the 
contraction between a tactile and non-tactile stimulus (e.g., a key press and tone)? 
Presumably, a tactile-specific contraction would not occur between tactile and non-tactile 
stimuli. Therefore, the results of Tomassini et al. cannot explain temporal binding, in which 
intervals are often delineated by a key press and auditory or visual outcome. I propose that 
Tomassini et al.’s finding, and those of Wenke and Haggard simply reflect a process 
independent of temporal binding, one that is specific to motor commands and not affected 
by causality. 
6.1.2. Is clock slowing driven by causality or intentional action?
One issue with the present experiments is that causality and intentional actions were 
compounded. While noncausal intervals were always delineated by either auditory or visual 
stimuli (or a combination of both), causal intervals were always delineated by intentional 
action and auditory/visual stimuli. How can we be sure that the results are driven by 
causality and not merely by intentional action? Humphreys and Buehner (2009) were able to 
isolate intentional action and causality. In their study, participants had to synchronise a key 
press with a tone (t1) that marked the start of the interval. The authors employed stimulus 
anticipation to measure binding, which involved pressing a key to anticipate the outcome 
stimulus. In causal trials, the key press at time t1 was causally related to the outcome 
stimulus. However, in noncausal trials, neither the key press nor the tone (t1) caused the 
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outcome stimulus. The authors showed a temporal binding effect only when the action at 
time t1 caused the outcome stimulus. In trials where the key press (t1) did not cause the 
outcome stimulus, no binding effect was found. Thus, the study demonstrated that 
intentional action itself is not sufficient. Instead, it is the causal link between action and 
outcome that is necessary for temporal binding, over and above association. In the current 
experiments, stimuli marking causal intervals were related by causality, whereas stimuli 
marking noncausal intervals were related by mere association. Thus, one likely 
interpretation is that causality, and not intentional action is driving clock slowing. 
To be certain that pacemaker rate is driven by causality, in the present experiments, 
however, further research is advisable. Given that Tomassini et al. (2014) found a 
contraction of time surrounding hand movements only, it would be beneficial to replicate 
Experiments 5 – 8 with a different causal manipulation. One solution is to replace the key 
press with the mechanical apparatus from Buehner (2012). Finding shallower slopes in 
mechanical-causal, compared to noncausal conditions, would support the notion of 
causality induced changes to pacemaker rate. 
6.1.3. Clock slowing in temporal binding is specific
The evidence from the current experiments supports the notion of a slower specific 
clock in temporal binding episodes. This is in line with work by Eagleman and colleagues 
(Paryiadath & Eagleman, 2007, 2008) who found that time is not one entity (Eagleman, 
2008). In a series of studies, the authors used the oddball paradigm to assess whether 
subjective temporal expansion affects all simultaneously presented stimuli, or whether it is 
specific to the oddball stimulus only. In the oddball illusion, a sequence of stimuli is 
presented, in which one stimulus is markedly different from the other stimuli (e.g., 
presenting an image of a car in a series of strawberry images). Eagleman found that the 
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subjective expansion of time for the oddball stimulus did not generalise to additional, 
simultaneously presented stimuli, such that a tone stimulus showed no expansion effect. 
This was also the case when the images where flickered; a perceived expansion of time 
should result in a decreased flicker frequency threshold (and better temporal acuity). Their 
results, however, showed no such increase in flicker frequency acuity (see also Stetson et 
al., 2007). Eagleman suggests that time perceptions function much like visual perception, “in 
which it is understood that vision emerges as the collaboration of many subpopulations that 
code for different aspect of scenes (motion, position, colour, and so on)” (Eagleman, 2008, 
p. 134). Eagleman further suggests that duration judgments, flicker rates, and simultaneity 
judgments (among others) are underpinned by mechanisms that usually work in concert but 
can be dissociated in laboratory settings. Wenke and Haggard (2009) is an example of a 
study that employed different measures: intervals were measured with verbal estimation, 
while discrimination thresholds were measured with simultaneity judgments. According to 
the logic of Eagleman (2008) then, the results of the discrimination judgments might be 
independent of the processes governing the contraction of the interval. Similarly, the 
embedded events in my Experiments 1 – 4 are judged by processes independent of the 
contraction in the causal intervals. Given the results of the present experiments, in addition 
to those of Eagleman, the implication is that the notion of specific clocks is not unique to 
temporal binding, but is a product of time perception in general. 
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Figure 6.1. Sequences are composed of three-tone segments, which are repeated for a few 
seconds (e.g., the pattern ‘up-down-up, up-down-up’, and so on, is heard). The sequences 
are perceived differently depending on pitch difference. When the pitch is similar a single 
stream is heard, whereas increasing the pitch difference results in two simultaneous but 
distinct streams. The dashed line represents the object streams (based on Dannenbring and 
Bregman, 1976).
The logical question now is to ask what determines the specificity of time 
perception. It is not sufficient to simply conclude that duration judgments are governed by a 
specific group of neurons, distinct from those involved in other temporal judgments (e.g., 
simultaneity5), because duration judgments were required both for intervals and embedded 
events in Experiments 1 - 4. Also, it is not sufficient to conclude that causality engages a 
specific clock. One must ask how and why causality would engage a specific clock. One novel 
suggestion is that time perception is governed by the perceptual organization of the stimuli, 
5 It is not obvious whether internal clock models can be applied equally simultaneity and 
interval estimation judgments. The latter require explicit judgments of duration, whereas 
the former involve and implicit awareness of duration: judging whether two stimuli are 
consecutive or simultaneous (in time) undoubtedly necessitates implicit awareness of the 
duration separating the stimuli.
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such that items grouped by similarity are more likely to be judged by a single independent 
clock. My chief motivation for this suggestion is that temporal judgments differ, depending 
on the relatedness of one stimulus to another set of stimuli. For example, van Noorden 
(1975) used the stimuli from Dannenbring and Bregman (1976; Bregman, 1990) in which a 
sequence is constructed from three tones, the second of which is lower in pitch than the 
outer tones (see Figure 6.1). The classic finding, from Dannenbring and Bregman (1976), is 
that the tones are perceived as a single auditory stream when the second, lower-pitched 
tone, is similar in pitch to the outer tones (Figure 6.1, left panel). When the second tone is 
significantly different to the outer tones then two simultaneous streams are heard (Figure 
6.1, right panel). In other words, the perceptual grouping of the stimuli is differentially 
affected by the similarity of the tone pitches: when the pitches are similar the sequence ‘up-
down-up’ is heard, whereas a substantial difference in pitch results in two simultaneous 
streams (‘up-up’ and ‘down--down’). Van Noorden built upon this finding to determine 
whether this perceptual grouping affects time perception. To achieve this, van Noorden 
used a variant of Dannenbring and Bregman’s stimuli, whereby the second stimulus was 
offset, so that its occurrence was delayed with respect to the midpoint between the outer 
tones (Figure 6.2). He found that the offset was only detected if the second stimulus 
differed significantly in pitch from the outer tones; when the pitch difference was small, the 
offset stimulus was actually perceived as equidistant between the outer tones. How does 
this relate to time perception? If a single timer was used to make judgments about the 
temporal offset of the second stimulus, then adjusting the pitch should not have affected 
the results (i.e., the offset should have been detected regardless of pitch). However, the fact 
that the temporal offset was only detected when the streams were segregated, suggests the 
involvement of multiple clocks. Indeed, it is difficult to explain van Noorden’s results 
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without invoking multiple clock systems. One caveat however: I acknowledge that van 
Noorden (1975) asked participants to judge the time of the event occurrence, rather than its 
duration. While internal clock models are traditionally associated with duration judgments, I 
nevertheless feel that van Noorden’s evidence is sufficiently supportive of multiple timers, 
rather than a single clock system. Analogously to temporal binding then, which is measured 
with event and duration judgments, I posit that van Noorden would have found similar 
results with duration judgments: for example, the second stimulus might be perceived as 
different (shorter or longer) when perceived in the same stream, and thus effected by a 
single clock, relative to the when perceived as separate groups. To be clear though, I posit 
perceptual grouping as a basis for judging the duration of stimuli according to single or 
multiple clocks; I am not suggesting that perceptual grouping is itself a theory of time 
perception. My argument, then, is that time perception is specific to the perceptual groups, 
such that similar items are grouped together and their temporal judgments effected by a 
single clock.
My claim of a Gestalt basis of time perception is further strengthened by evidence 
from Zhou et al. (2015). Zhou et al. found that temporal judgments of visually presented 
stimuli are also affected by similarity, such that similar items are judged as shorter than 
dissimilar. This merely demonstrates that a Gestalt basis (of time perception) is not limited 
to the auditory domain. Additionally, Rajendran, Harper, Willmore, Hartmann, & Schnupp 
(2013) used the stimuli from Dannenbring and Bregman (1976) to study the effects of 
temporal uncertainty on perceptual grouping. In their study the second stimulus was 
temporally jittered from trial to trial, so that its exact temporal onset was unpredictable. 
They found that this temporal jitter led to multiple simultaneous groups, such that the 
jittered stimulus and the outer stimuli were perceived as separate streams (relative to trials 
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in which no jitter was applied). Thus, temporal expectancy and similarity affect the 
perceptual grouping of stimulus sets; a temporally unexpected stimulus will be grouped 
separately to a temporally expected stimulus. Also, stimuli that are dissimilar (along a 
particular dimension) will be grouped separately. 
Figure 6.2. Schematic of the stimuli in van Noorden (1975). The temporal offset is perceived 
when the streams are segregated (i.e., ungrouped: right panel). The white-coloured tone 
denotes the perceived time of the offset stimulus.
As an interim summary I propose the following: auditory stimuli of similar pitch are 
grouped into the same perceptual stream (Bregman, 1990). Temporal uncertainty is an 
additional factor that affects perceptual grouping, such that stimuli occurring at 
unpredictable times are grouped separately to predictably occurring stimuli (Rajendran et 
al., 2013). Perceptual grouping affects temporal awareness, such that judging whether a 
stimulus is placed equidistantly between outer stimuli is dictated by pitch similarity; a 
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temporal offset is not detected when the stimulus is integrated into the same stream as the 
outer stimuli (van Noorden, 1975).     
How does this relate to temporal binding? I propose that causality itself is a grouping 
factor. This is because (1) temporal unpredictability and similarity affect the perceptual 
grouping of events (Bregman, 1990; Rajendran et al., 2013); (2) grouped items are timed by
independent clocks (Dannenbring & Bregman, 1976); and (3) similar items are judged as 
shorter than dissimilar items (Zhou et al., 2015). Strictly speaking, this is not a novel idea. 
There is a rich literature documenting the categorization of objects based on causal 
information (Sloman & Lagnado, 2005; Sloman, Love, & Ahn, 1998). The main premise of 
this literature is that objects are assigned to a category if they share the same causal 
features (Hayes & Rehder, 2012). One study, for example, presented a fictitious animal (a 
“Taliboo”) to 7 – 9 year olds (Ahn, Gelman, Amsterlaw, Hohenstein, & Kalish, 2000). The 
children were told that the Taliboo had promicin in their nerves, which caused thick bones 
and large eyes. Ahn et al. then presented the children with two test Taliboos, each missing a 
feature: one missed the cause (i.e., promicin), and the other one of the outcome features 
(thick bones or large eyes). When asked which animal made the most likely Taliboo, the 
children preferred the test animal with a missing outcome feature over the animal with the 
missing cause. In other words, children judged the animal with preserved causal information 
(in which promicin caused one of the outcome features), as a more likely Taliboo candidate 
than the animal without any causal information. Thus, this demonstrates that causality 
influences category membership, such that objects with a similar cause are grouped 
together. 
In line with the above, I propose that causality is not only a grouping factor that 
affects category membership, but might also affect temporal judgments. Specifically, the 
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interval between items that are causally related is not only likely to be judged as shorter 
than unrelated (along the lines of Zhou et al., 2015), but will be judged by the same clock 
process. One way to test my hypothesis is to conduct a variant of the embedded event 
estimation procedure, but manipulate the causal relation between the embedded events 
and the interval. This might be achieved by varying the key press-embedded event 
contingency: rather than targeting a 50-50 balance for events presented before and during
the interval, an experiment might use an additional 25-75 balance, such that more events 
occur during the interval. Because outcomes always follow causes (Hume, 1739/1888), 
there would be a greater likelihood of embedded events being grouped with the intervals, 
either by causality or associationism (in causal and noncausal conditions, respectively). If 
causality (or simply association) is a grouping factor that affects the operation of single or 
multiple clocks, then a contingency x trial type interaction would be expected: embedded 
events should be judged as shorter in causal versus noncausal trials, with events in the 25-
75 condition being judged as shorter than those in the 50-50 contingency condition. 
Additionally, embedded events should also be judged as shorter in 25-75 than 50-50 
conditions, in causal and noncausal trials. This is because the embedded event would be 
associated with the cause (i.e., key press or first interval-marker), assuming that association 
truly is a grouping factor. The key point I propose is that temporal binding is selectively 
effected by a specific clock process because causality itself is a grouping factor. 
6.1.4. Outcome predictability and attentional drifts
One might ask how the pacemaker might slow down, when no information about 
causality is given until the outcome has occurred, at which point the pacemaker has stopped 
emitting pulses. A possibility I discussed in chapter 4 is that pacemaker rate might be 
modulated by causality. Because contingency is a key determinant of perceived causality 
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(Allen & Jenkins, 1979; Cheng, 1997), then differing levels of contingency would affect 
outcome predictability. Studies using the Libet clock method (Libet et al., 1983) have shown 
that binding is driven by predictive, in addition to retrospective, components (Moore & 
Haggard, 2008; Moore et al., 2009). Moore and colleagues contrasted a predictable 
condition (75% key press-outcome contingency) with an unpredictable condition (50% key 
press-outcome contingency). Their results showed that the reported time of action shifted 
towards expected (but absent) outcome tones in the 75% compared to the 50% condition. 
In other words, participants experienced a binding effect when when no outcome actually 
occurred. This demonstrates that binding is driven by predictability, in addition to 
retrospective awareness. Would predictability directly modulate clock speed? Manipulating 
cause-effect contingency is a way to measure this. For instance, if contingency is linearly 
related to pacemaker rate, such that increased contingency results in higher pacemaker 
rates, then two predictions follow: (1) a regression of perceived onto actual intervals would 
reveal shallower slopes as pacemaker rate decreases; (2) discrimination thresholds of two 
causal intervals (e.g., the paradigm in Experiments 9 - 10) would increase as pacemaker 
decreases, as a result of poorer temporal resolution. However, this paradigm would 
necessitate a different approach regarding staircases, because this procedure would require 
intervals that are marked by two events. An alternative, instead of including trials where no 
outcome occurs, is to manipulate the contingency with which an event causes an outcome; 
on certain trials, for example, an outcome might follow a key press without having been 
caused by it. Additionally, it may be that predictability, and not causality, would affect 
pacemaker rate. In this case, slope differences might be observed between various 
contingency levels in noncausal trials. In contrast, if causality drives the pacemaker rate, 
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then slope differences would only manifest in causal trials. In sum then, I propose that 
pacemaker rate might be modulated by cause-effect contingency. 
Instead of clock slowing per se, one option is that pulses are missed due to an 
imbalance of attention in causal versus noncausal trials. For example, fewer pulses might 
accumulate in causal intervals because more attention is focused on the outcome stimulus. 
This would result in shorter perceived cause-effect intervals but a longer perceived outcome 
stimulus, relative to noncausal intervals. As noted in chapter 4, a way to test this hypothesis 
is to measure the subjective duration of an outcome stimulus, in addition to the action-
outcome interval. More attention to the outcomes in causal trials would results in longer 
perceived outcome durations than in noncausal trials. Thus, temporal binding might arise 
due to attention being focused away from the interval and toward the outcome. To date, no 
research has investigated this. Empirical work then, is necessary to establish whether our 
results occur due to an imbalance of attention in causal versus noncausal trials. 
6.1.5. Reconciling event with time perception theories
It is important to note that event and time perception accounts of temporal binding 
are not mutually exclusive. Sensory recalibration (Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002; Parsons et 
al., 2013) proposes a realignment of sensory streams, such that the delay between an action 
and outcome can be adapted to, bringing the events closer together in time. Time 
perception theories would account for binding by a change in temporal resolution during 
the cause-effect interval, such that the rate of an internal clock is slowed down. The present 
experiments support this latter notion, particularly Experiments 9 - 10, which found that the 
slower clock in cause-effect intervals affect temporal resolution; the higher discrimination 
thresholds in causal intervals supported the notion of a slower clock, relative to the 
thresholds in noncausal intervals. It is difficult to see how Eagleman’s sensory recalibration 
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approach can explain these findings; a shift in the perceived time of events marking the 
intervals would not affect discrimination judgments. Instead, the results of the JNDs 
(Experiments 9 - 10) can only be explained by a change in our temporal acuity during cause-
effect intervals. Does this mean that sensory recalibration is redundant? Not necessarily, as 
the two approaches can be reconciled. For example, a slower pacemaker would result in a 
contraction of time, and thus, the outcome being perceived as earlier. However, one 
problem with this hypothesis is that it assumes time perception to be responsible for the 
perceived change in events, i.e., that changes in time perception somehow cause the 
perceived shift in events. Alternatively, it may be that perceived event shifts and time 
perception changes are represented by the same underlying process; event and time 
perception approaches manifest from a common cause. More empirical work is needed to 
investigate the relation between subjective event and time perception changes. For now, 
the point is wish to stress is that dismissing either internal clocks or sensory recalibration 
approaches is naïve: research should determine the commonality between event and time 
perception methods.
6.1.6. Conclusion
Temporal binding is affected by the same principles that govern causal inference. 
Contiguity (Shanks, Pearson & Dickinson, 1989) and contingency (Allen, 1993) both
modulate the strength of the binding effect. The purpose of this thesis, however, was to 
determine how binding is effected. That is, what are the processes that give rise to temporal 
binding. Specifically, I investigated whether changes in time perception underlie binding, by 
focussing on the pacemaker rate of internal clocks. My findings have demonstrated that 
temporal binding is effected by a slower pacemaker. This is in line with previous studies 
(Humphreys & Buehner, 2009) that demonstrated a slower pacemaker in causal intervals. 
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The results are also in line with a larger body of evidence implicating pacemaker rate in 
temporal illusions in general (e.g., Penon-Voak et al., 1996; Wearden et al., 1998). Future 
research is necessary to investigate (1) whether the results generalise to other causal 
scenarios, such those involving mechanical causal action (Buehner, 2012), and (2) the extent 
to which changes in the magnitude of the temporal binding effect is rooted in causality, such 
as whether pacemaker rate is affected by cause-effect contingency. To assume a broader 
perspective, research into time perception and perceptual grouping would provide a great 
and necessary insight into the recent notion of multiple clocks (Klapproth, 2011). A potential 
start would be to determine whether perceptual grouping underpins the amount of clocks 
used. 
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7. Appendix A: Supplementary analysis 1: Experiments 1 – 4
7.1.1. Results
7.1.1.1. Data analysis
In the main results section I classified intervals as before or during depending upon 
whether they began before or during the interval, respectively. In some cases this means 
that embedded events that began before the interval could have overlapped into the 
interval. Similarly, embedded events that began during the interval could have overlapped 
into the outcome stimulus. Thus, an embedded event that began before the interval might 
finish during the interval, yet be still be classified as a before trial. The concern with this 
approach to classification is that embedded events might be perceived in two segments 
instead of a single stimulus (Bryce, Seifried-Dubon & Bratzke, 2015; Matthews, 2013). In 
other words, the portion of an embedded event presented before the interval would be 
segment 1, and the portion occurring during the interval segment 2. If causal event-
triggering actions affect pacemaker rate, then segment 2 would be temporally perceived 
differently to segment 1. Therefore, there is a chance that our classification process has 
somewhat confounded the embedded event judgment results. In order to avoid this 
confound and provide a more robust picture, I analyzed the data based on more rigorous 
criteria. Specifically, I eliminated trials where the embedded event overlapped into the 
interval (for before trials) and into the outcome stimulus (for during trials). The distribution 
of before and during embedded events for causal and noncausal trials are shown in Tables 
A1 (Experiments 1 and 2) and A2 (Experiments 3 and 4). In other respects, I applied the 
same exclusionary criteria as in the main results section. 
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The pattern presented by this analysis does not differ to the main results section. As 
the results show, the pattern is near identical to the main body of results that did not control 
for overlapping embedded events.
7.1.1.2. Interval Judgments: Experiment 1 
Inspection of Figure 8.1 (panel A) finds causal intervals are judged as shorter than 
noncausal intervals for all levels of Embedded Event Location. Also, noncausal intervals are 
judged longest when an embedded event was presented before the interval. Statistical 
analysis confirm these impressions, with a significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 30) = 21.73, p
< .001, partial η2 = .42, Embedded Event Location, F(2, 60) = 23.12, p < .001, partial η2 = .44, 
and Trial Type x Embedded Event Location interaction, F(2, 60) = 4.28, p < .05, partial η2 
= .13. Simple effects analysis revealed that the main effect of Trial Type was significant at all 
three levels of Embedded Event Location (all ps < .05).
7.1.1.3. Interval Judgments: Experiment 2
Figure 8.1 Panel (B) shows the same pattern as intervals in Experiment 1. Causal 
intervals are again perceived as longer than noncausal, and noncausal intervals with a before
embedded event are perceived as longer than other interval conditions. ANOVA confirms 
this with a significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 31) = 15.71, p < .001, partial η2 = .34, 
Embedded Event Location, F(2, 62) = 6.40, p < .01, partial η2 = .17, and Trial Type x 
Embedded Event Location interaction, F(2, 62) = 6.92, p < .01, partial η2 = .18. Simple effects 
analysis revealed that the main effect of Trial Type was significant at Embedded Event 
Locations before (p < .001), and during the interval (p < .05), but not at the no event level (p
= .10).
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7.1.1.4. Embedded Event Judgments: Experiment 1
Numerically, Figure 8.2 (panel A) shows that causal trial embedded events are judged 
as longer then noncausal, both when presented before and during the interval. However, 
these observations are not statistically significant, with no significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 
30) = 1.57, p = .22, partial η2 = .05, Embedded Event Location, F(1, 30) = 3.08, p = .09, partial 
η2 = .09, or Trial Type x Embedded Event Location interaction, F(1, 30) = .22, p = .64, partial 
η2 = .01. I also conducted a Bayesian analysis using the same procedure I applied to 
embedded event judgments in Experiment 1 (see main results section of the manuscript). 
This yielded a Bayes factor of 8 in favour of the null versus the alternative restricted model. 
7.1.1.5. Embedded Event Judgments: Experiment 2
In contrast to Experiment 1, embedded events in causal trials are judged as slightly 
shorter than noncausal (see Figure 8.1, panel B). However, this difference is only numerical, 
with ANOVA finding no significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 31) = .29, p = .59, partial η2 = .01, 
Embedded Event Location, F(1, 31) = .96, p = .34, partial η2 = .03, or Trial Type x Embedded 
Event Location interaction, F(1, 31) = .09, p = .76, partial η2 < .01. A Bayesian analysis found a 
factor 10 in favour of the null versus the alternative restricted model. 
7.1.1.6. Interval Judgments: Experiment 3 
The results display the same pattern as in experiments 1 - 3. These are also 
significant with ANOVA finding a significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 27) = 47.53, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .64, Embedded Event Location, F(2, 54) = 12.47, p < .001, partial η2 = .32, and 
Trial Type x Embedded Event Location interaction, F(2, 54) = 14.34, p < .001, partial η2 = .35. 
Simple effects analysis revealed that the effect of Trial Type was significant at all levels of 
Embedded Event Location (all ps < .001). 
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7.1.1.7. Interval Judgments: Experiment 4
Figure 8.3 (panel B) shows the same pattern as Experiment 4 interval judgments in 
the main body of the results. Causal intervals are judged as shorter than noncausal, yet 
noncausal intervals are not judged longer with an embedded event before the interval. 
ANOVA supports these observations, with a significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 30) = 74.70, p
< .001, partial η2 = .71, Embedded Event Location, F(2, 60) = 15.96, p < .001, partial η2 = .34, 
but no Trial Type x Embedded Event Location interaction, F(2. 60) = 1.24, p = .30, partial η2
= .04. 
7.1.1.8. Embedded Event Judgments: Experiment 3
Embedded events are judged as shorter in causal trials than noncausal (Figure 8.4, 
panel A). As in Experiments 1 and 2, these are only numerical differences, with no significant 
effect of Trial Type, F(1, 27) = 2.76, p = .11, partial η2 = .09, Embedded Event Location, F(1, 
27) = 2.61, p = .12, partial η2 = .09, or Trial Type x Embedded Event Location interaction, F(1, 
27) = .03, p = .86, partial η2 < .01. I also conducted a Bayesian analysis using the same 
procedure applied to embedded event judgments in Experiment 1. This yielded a Bayes 
factor of 1 in favour of the alterative versus the null model.
7.1.1.9. Embedded Event Judgments: Experiment 4
Figure 8.4 (panel B) shows the same pattern as Experiment 3 (Figure 8.4, panel A). 
Causal trial embedded events are shorter than noncausal, but this difference is not 
significant. ANOVA finds no significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 30) = 1.52, p = .23, partial η2 
= .05, Embedded Event Location, F(1, 30) = .37, p = .55, partial η2 = .01, or Trial Type x 
Embedded Event Location interaction, F(1, 30) = .44, p = .51, partial η2 < .02. A Bayesian 
analysis found a factor of 6 in favour of the null versus the alternative restricted model.
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7.1.1.10. Pooled Analysis
I combined the data from all experiments and included Embedded Event Modality 
and Outcome Modality as between-subjects factors. The results revealed significant effects 
of Embedded Event Modality (p < .001), an Outcome Modality x Trial Type interaction (p
< .05), and an Embedded Event Modality x Embedded Event Location interaction (p < .05). 
Importantly, I found no effect of Trial Type (p = .21) or Trial Type x Embedded Event Location 
interaction (p = .94). Lastly, I also compared the fit of the pooled data under the restricted 
model against the null, to yield a Bayes factor of 82 in favour of the null (see Embedded 
Event Judgments: Experiment 1 in main results section of manuscript).  
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Table 7.1 
Mean percentage of trials on which an embedded event was experienced before and during 
the overall interval, for interval and embedded event judgment trials in Experiments 1 and 2 
(standard deviation in parenthesis). The table shows data with overlapping embedded 
events removed.
Judgment
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Causal Noncausal Causal Noncausal
BI DI BI DI BI DI BI DI
Intervals 32.18 
(16.52)
32.42 
(11.96)
27.18 
(7.90)
36.94 
(9.28)
33.83 
(14.06)
32.66 
(11.55)
28.52 
(9.50)
35.39 
(8.71)
Embedded
Event
33.63 
(13.66)
32.90 
(10.63)
29.35 
(6.92)
36.69 
(7.84)
38.28 
(13.45)
31.33 
(10.96)
27.27 
(7.50)
36.95 
(7.64)
Note: BI, DI = Embedded Event occurred before/during the interval. Percentages do not sum 
to 100 because a mean range of 4.81 - 7.77% of trials contained embedded events that 
began during or after the outcome, and are thus not included. 2 x 2 (Trial Type [causal, 
noncausal] x Embedded Event Location [before, during]) ANOVAs in which the dependent 
variable was the proportion of trials with an embedded event, found no significant effects 
(ps>.05), with one exception: Embedded event judgment trials in Experiment 2 had more 
events in causal than noncausal trials (means of 34.81 and 32.11%, collapsed across BI and 
DI trials), F(1, 31) = 4.39, p < .05. I attribute this to random fluctuation.
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Table 7.2 
Mean percentage of trials on which an embedded event was experienced before and during 
the overall interval, for interval and embedded event judgment trials in Experiments 3 and 4 
(standard deviation in parenthesis). The table shows data with overlapping embedded 
events removed.
Judgment
Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Causal Noncausal Causal Noncausal
BI DI BI DI BI DI BI DI
Intervals 29.91 
(13.01)
35.09 
(11.35)
26.70 
(7.67)
36.16 
(6.58)
36.61 
(21.58)
34.11 
(14.73)
31.61 
(9.84)
34.27 
(8.12)
Embedded
Event
28.93 
(13.13)
35.80 
(10.07)
26.70 
(8.82)
40.36 
(6.86)
35.73 
(23.28)
33.87 
(13.02)
27.18 
(8.08)
36.45 
(5.69)
Note: BI, DI = Embedded Event occurred before/during the interval. Percentages do not sum 
to 100 because a mean range of 4.17 - 6.25% of trials contained embedded events that 
began during or after the outcome, and are thus not included. 2 x 2 (Trial Type [causal, 
noncausal] x Embedded Event Location [before, during]) ANOVAs in which the dependent 
variable was the proportion of trials with an embedded event, found no significant effects 
(ps>.05), except the following: First, Experiment 3 had more events embedded during than 
before the interval both for interval judgment trials (means of 35.63 and 28.30, collapsed 
across causal and noncausal trials, respectively), F(1, 27) = 7.65, p < .05, and embedded 
event judgment trials (means of 38.08 and 27.81, collapsed across causal and noncausal 
trials, respectively), F(1, 27) = 16.02, p < .001. Second, Experiment 4 had more events in 
causal than noncausal trials both for interval judgment trials (means of 35.36 and 32.94%, 
collapsed across BI and DI trials), F(1, 30) = 6.11, p < .05, and embedded event judgment 
trials (means of 34.80 and 31.82%, collapsed across BI and DI trials), F(1, 30) = 7.00, p < .05. I
attribute this to random fluctuation.
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7.2. Figures
Figure 7.1. (A) Experiment 1. (B) Experiment 2. Data with embedded events removed. Mean 
interval judgment errors from causal and noncausal trials broken down by embedded event 
location. Error bars represent within-subjects confidence intervals (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 
2008).
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Figure 7.2. (A) Experiment 1. (B) Experiment 2. Data with embedded events removed. Mean 
embedded event judgment errors for events occurring before and during the interval, 
broken down by trial type. Error bars represent within-subjects confidence intervals.
156
Figure 7.3. (A) Experiment 3. (B) Experiment 4. Data with embedded events removed. Mean 
interval judgment errors from causal and noncausal trials broken down by embedded event 
location. Error bars represent within-subjects confidence intervals.
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Figure 7.4. (A) Experiment 3. (B) Experiment 4. Data with embedded events removed. Mean 
embedded event judgment errors for events occurring before and during the interval, 
broken down by trial type. Error bars represent within-subjects confidence intervals.
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8. Appendix B: Scatterplots showing estimated versus actual 
durations for Experiments 1 – 4
Figure 8.1. Interval judgments for Experiment 1. Scatterplot showing interval estimates 
plotted against interval durations. Because random durations were used, I binned the 
estimates into 12 bins within the interval range (700 - 1300 ms). The data points represent 
the mean of the binned estimates per participant. Regression lines are also shown
(emboldened black dashed line).
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Figure 8.2. Interval judgments for Experiment 2. Scatterplot showing interval estimates 
plotted against interval durations. The data were binned following the same procedure used 
for Figure 8.1.
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Figure 8.3. Interval judgments for Experiment 3. Scatterplot showing interval estimates 
plotted against interval durations. The data were binned following the same procedure used 
for Figure 8.1.
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Figure 8.4. Interval judgments for Experiment 4. Scatterplot showing interval estimates 
plotted against interval durations. The data were binned following the same procedure used 
for Figure 8.1.
Interval Duration (ms)
In
te
rv
a
l E
st
im
a
te
 
(m
s)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300
Before
700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300
During
700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300
None
Causal Noncausal
162
Figure 8.5. Embedded event judgments for Experiment 1. Estimates are plotted against 
actual durations. Regression lines are shown.
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Figure 8.6. Embedded event judgments for Experiment 2. Estimates are plotted against 
actual durations.
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Figure 8.7. Embedded event judgments for Experiment 3. Estimates are plotted against 
actual durations.
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Figure 8.8. Embedded event judgments for Experiment 4. Estimates are plotted against 
actual durations.
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9. Appendix C: Supplementary analysis 2: Experiments 1 – 4
9.1.1. Results
The following analyses are based on deviations in the intended 50-50 balance of before and 
during embedded events. Participants who experienced fewer than 35% or greater than 
65% of before and during trials, were removed from the analyses. 
9.1.1.1. Interval Judgments
Experiment 1. ANOVA found a main effect of Trial Type, F(1, 23) = 23.47, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .51, Embedded Event Location, F(2, 46) = 22.83, p < .001, partial η2 = .50, and a 
Trial Type x Embedded Event Location interaction, F(2, 46) = 4.86, p < .05, partial η2 = .17.
Experiment 2. ANOVA found a main effect of Trial Type, F(1, 19) = 5.06, p < .05, 
partial η2 = .21, but no Embedded Event Location, F(2, 38) = 1.74, p = .19, partial η2 = .08, or 
a Trial Type x Embedded Event Location interaction, F(2, 38) = 3.09, p = .06, partial η2 = .14.
Experiment 3. ANOVA found a main effect of Trial Type, F(1, 20) = 39.27, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .66, Embedded Event Location, F(2, 40) = 10.88, p < .001, partial η2 = .35, and a 
Trial Type x Embedded Event Location interaction, F(2, 40) = 5.94, p < .01, partial η2 = .23.
Experiment 4. ANOVA found a main effect of Trial Type, F(1, 20) = 49.74, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .71, and Embedded Event Location, F(2, 40) = 8.64, p < .001, partial η2 = .30, but 
no Trial Type x Embedded Event Location interaction, F(2, 40) = 2.56, p = .09, partial η2 = .11.
9.1.1.2. Embedded Event Judgments
Experiment 1. ANOVA found no effect of Trial Type, F(1, 23) = .17, p = .69, partial η2 = 
.01, Embedded Event Location, F(1, 23) = 1.48, p = .24, partial η2 = .06, nor a Trial Type x 
Embedded Event Location interaction, F(1, 23) = .35, p = .56, partial η2 = .02.
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Experiment 2. ANOVA found no effect of Trial Type, F(1, 19) = .19, p = .67, partial η2 = 
.01, Embedded Event Location, F(1, 19) = 2.67, p = .12, partial η2 = .12, nor a Trial Type x 
Embedded Event Location interaction, F(1, 19) = .27, p = .61, partial η2 = .01.
Experiment 3. ANOVA found no effect of Trial Type, F(1, 20) = 2.13, p = .16, partial η2
= .10, Embedded Event Location, F(1, 20) = 2.91, p = .10, partial η2 = .13, nor a Trial Type x 
Embedded Event Location interaction, F(1, 20) = .47, p = .50, partial η2 = .02.
Experiment 4. ANOVA found no effect of Trial Type, F(1, 20) = 1.40, p = .25, partial η2
= .07, and Embedded Event Location, F(1, 20) = .83, p = .37, partial η2 = .04, but no Trial Type 
x Embedded Event Location interaction, F(1, 20) = 2.41, p = .14, partial η2 = .11.
